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I. INTRODUCTION
Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was adopted in 1966 to make
class actions more available, judicially efficient, and binding.2 The device was
seen by its proponents as an additional method of enforcing consumer
protection, antitrust, and particularly, civil rights laws. The device made even
small claims economically viable. Whereas original Rule 23 restricted binding
class actions to cases involving "joint or common rights" or actions affecting
"specific property," amended Rule 23 relaxed these restrictions, which
extended the social and economic uses of the class device.
Amended Rule 23 defined three brodd categories for permissible
class actions: (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). By interpretation, almost any case falls
within one or more of these categories, provided there is federal subject-matter
jurisdiction and the parties are so numerous that joinder is impractical.
Constitutional challenges to statutes or governmental practices, patent
2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966).
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infringement, product liability, school integration, employment discrimination,
securities fraud, prisoners' rights, antitrust claims, consumer claims,
franchise disputes, as well as breach of contract and mass tort claims are now
clearly established as subject to class processes. 3
In this period of rapid growth and widespread use of the class device under
the amended Rule, concerns of procedural fairness and due process rights of
absent members of the class were less clearly focused or ignored. Historically,
absent members of the class were protected by the following two legal
principles:
A. Adequacy of representation, which included four components:
(1) The named representatives presented the same claims as the class's
claims; the self-interest of the representatives provided motivation to
litigate, to prove facts (presumably the event impacting the named
representatives was admissible), and to negotiate a settlement that was fair
to the entire class.
(2) The named representatives were competent to present the issues.
(3) The class counsel was qualified and competent to present the issues.
(4) There was an absence of conflict between the interests and remedies of
the representatives or counsel and the interests and remedies of the class.
If these four components of adequacy of representation were satisfied, class
judgments (including settlement judgments) were binding and entitled to
full faith and credit. Historically, there was no requirement of notice with
opportunity to appear or opt out if the above adequacy of representation
requirements were satisfied.
B. Notice to class members giving opportunity to appear or to opt out
provided alternative or supplemental protection for the members of the
class. If an absent member appeared in the action, adequacy of
representation became insignificant because the class member had
individually participated. If the absent member opted out, adequacy of
representation became insignificant because the judgment was not binding
on him, and his property rights were unaffected. If, after notice, the absent
class member failed to appear or opt out, adequacy of representation was
3 See infra notes 206-327 and accompanying text.
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satisfied because the absent member was deemed to have impliedly
consented to the representation as described in the notice. In this latter
case, the named representative and counsel nevertheless proceeded
competently in the presentation of the case and avoided forbidden conflicts
of interest.
The above safeguards have been substantially weakened by the language,
structure, and application of amended Rule 23.
The role and competency of the named representatives has steadily
diminished under amended Rule 23. Representatives neither monitor nor are
consulted by class counsel or the court on key decisions. Indeed, recent
articles4 argue that representatives are mere figureheads and should be
abolished altogether. These articles propose that adequacy of class counsel
should be the sole element in determining adequacy of representation-.5
The class counsel's required level of competency has also diminished as a
protective device under amended Rule 23. Seldom is there an attack or an
examination of the legal competency of class counsel. Ethical rules that protect
the class concerning maintenance, solicitation, and fee splitting are largely
ignored by the courts, and conflict of interest principles are narrowly
construed. Moreover, the scope and nature of settlement sought by the
self-interested counsel may differ materially from the interests of the class, yet
the settlements, when approved by the courts, are binding on the entire class.
These concerns are not totally resolved by judicial supervision. Court
approval may be employed to sweep the due process and fairness issues under
the carpet of settlement in proceedings that are more characterized as cheer-
leading than judicial inquiry. Moreover, trial court supervision is seldom
reviewed by the appellate courts.
The alternative and supplemental protection of notice giving opportunity to
appear or opt out has also been reduced by the categorization and ambiguities
of the amended Rule. In certain categories of class actions (so called
"mandatory" (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes), the historical protection of notice to
class members giving opportunity to appear or opt out is not required, although
notice may be given by the discretion of the court. Adequacy of representation
is significant in such mandatory classes because the member does not have the
4 See Jean W. Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in
lass Actions, 42 HmsTirs L.. 165 (1990); Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks:
Evaluating the Role of the Cas Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. REV. 385 (1987).
5 The articles assume that absent class members would be fully protected by class
counsel-an assumption not supported by the federal experience. Furthermore, such a
suggestion violates basic due process and "case or controversy" requirements. See
generally Burns, supra note 4; Kane supra note 4.
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right to participate individually or opt out; therefore, implied consent cannot be
argued as flowing from the failure to exercise such rights.
These mandatory class categories are being used more often by the courts.
Initially, any action that sought damages was classified as a (b)(3) class,
requiring notice giving opportunity to appear or opt out. Today, however,
there is authority* that any action that combines damages with injunctive relief
should be a mandatory class action. Moreover, mandatory classes based on a
"limited fund" ((b)(1)(B)) theory or an "incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class" ((b)(1)(A)) theory are being certified by the courts
more often.
In the federal system, several recent mass tort cases illustrate the trend
toward mandatory classes. In the Agent Orange6 litigation, brought on behalf
of tens of thousands of Vietnam veterans, the court certified the class under
both (b)(3) and (b)(1)(B) and gave notice and opportunity to appear or opt out.7
In the original Dalkon Shield8 case, the lower court certified a mandatory
(b)(1)(B) class for some fifteen hundred claimants on the limited issue of
punitive damages. 9 The Ninth Circuit vacated that certification on the ground
that the record was inadequate to establish the "limited fund" requirement of a
(b)(1)(B) category. 10 However, in 1989 the Fourth Circuit upheld a mandatory
class for claimants who asserted that an insurance carrier had engaged in
tortious conduct toward Dalkon Shield users.11 The mandatory class was
declared binding although no notice was given to the plaintiffs. 12
Most importantly, the identity of claims requirement was undercut by the
uncertain language and structure of the Rule. Historically, identity of claims
required a sameness of the essential elements of . liability' 3 between
6 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affid,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
7 In re "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 728.
8 In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" I.U.D. Prods. Liab. Litig., 521
F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
9 In re "Dalkon Shield," 521 F. Supp: at 1195.10 In re "Dalkon Shield, "693 F.2d at 851-52.
11 In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 747-48 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
959 (1989).
12 In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 747-48.
13 Identity is defined by Webster as "[slameness of essential or generic character in
different examples or instances...." WEBSTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcInoNARY
(William A. Nielson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1956). This article uses the "identity of claims"
language because other phrases such as "typicality," "nexus," and "homogeneity" have
become confised by varying usage. See infra notes 120-149 and accompanying text.
"Coextensive," "encompassed," or "same" are also possible phrases for post-1982 use.
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representative and class claims, although the claims did not need to be identical
in every fact or in the amount and nature of the remedy. Such identity on the
liability elements ensured that the self-interest of the representative would enure
to the benefit of the absent class members. The uncertainty with the amended
Rule is that not one but three phrases were chosen-commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation-that contain elements of the historical identity
of claims concept; the relationship between these phrases is not defined. The
inconsistency of the phrases is evident in (b)(3) cases. All three requirements
are necessary in (b)(3) as well as in (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases even though, by
definition, (b)(3) cases may involve uncommon liability issues. 14
As a result of the amended Rule, identity of claims was largely ignored by
federal courts between 1966 and 1982, notwithstanding the principle that the
Federal Rules shall not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."15
However, in 1982, the historical standard of identity of claims was reaffirmed
as a requirement by the United States Supreme Court through its General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon decision. 16 The cases after 1982, applying,
circumventing, and ignoring that decision, are explored at length in this
Article.
The central focus of this Article is the identity of claims as a requirement
for class certification. The Article begins with a historical description of the
development of class actions in England and the United States prior to Rule 23.
Then the Article considers the development of the due process and fairness
standards, followed by an analysis of amended Rule 23 as applied in the federal
court system before and after General Telephone Co. v. Falcon.17 This Article
will propose clarifications and modifications of the present law, only some of
which may be accomplished by judicial declaration. Other deficiencies call for
revision of the Rule itself.
II. HISTORY OF THE CLASS ACTION
A. The English Precedent in the Medieval Period to 1500
A variety of rural and town groups, which dominated medieval social and
political life, routinely appeared in the English courts as litigants represented
14 See FEn. R. C. P. 23.
Is 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (Supp. 1111991).




by members of their group. 18 The villeins of the manor, whose rights and
duties ran to the manor lord, the frankpledge group, whose obligations ran to
the King, and the parish, whose benefits and duties ran from the parson and the
church to the members of the local ecclesiastical unit, regularly appeared as
parties in representative actions. Similarly, town groups, including merchant
guilds and the boroughs, not only dominated social and political life, but
regularly appeared in.representative actions. As a practical matter, such suits
were effectively binding upon all members of the group. 19 The protection for
the absent members of the group included the following:
(1) Each member of the group had an identical, not just similar, right,
duty, and interest in the claim.
(2) The competency of the representative was largely assumed based in part
on the self-interest of the representative in presenting his identical claim. In
any event, the closely knit group tended to monitor their own
representatives who were, by and large, the richer or more solid members
of the group. Implied consent could be inferred from group association, but
this was not extensively relied upon by the courts. 20
18 Recent scholars provide valuable insight into the origin and nature of the
representative suit. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION To TE
MODERN CLASS AcrION (1987) [hereinafter YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION];
Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL
GROUP LITIGATION); Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23
CATH. U. L. REV. 515 (1974); George M. Strickler, Jr., Protecting the Class: The Search
for the Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 73 (1984);
William Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action, from the English Bill of Peace
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Is 77re a Common Thread?, 8 WHrIrIER L. REV.
935 (1987); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part I.- The
Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 514 (1980) [hereinafter Yeazell,
Part 11; Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II Interest, Class,
and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067 (1980) [hereinafter Yeazell, Part 11]; Stephen
C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 866 (1977).
19 YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 18, at 41-93.
20 See FPEDERuc CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS
IN EQUITY *19-20 (London 1837, reprinted Philadelphia 1837); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY at 1304 (1950); Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1331 (1976); cf Yeazell, Part I, supra note 18, at 515; Yeazell,
Part II, supra note 18, at 1083.
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B. The English Early Modem Period to 1850
From 1500 to 1850, medieval rural and town groups diminished in
importance. Rapid economic development, market capitalization, centralization
of political power in the King and Parliament, and a premium placed on
individual liberty led to a fundamental shift in litigation responsibilities. The
norm in litigation became individual litigant control. 21 Group litigation was an
exception available only in courts of equity.22
There were two types of cases that equity entertained. The first category of
accepted class actions involved adjudication of identical rights or duties and
remedies of all members of the class.23 For example, villeins (later
copyholders) or parishioners may have had a disputed duty to pay the manor
lord, borough, or King. The same rights and duties applied to each member by
reason of his occupancy, of the group territory, and the remedy sought by the
class similarly affected both the rights and duties of the group and the separate
rights and duties of each individual. These rights and duties were part of a
"general right" owed from and to the manor lord, borough, or King.24
Although the general right involved separate and distinct rights, it supported
21 See Id. at 117-54; Bone, supra note 18, at 220-23.
2 2 The Court of Star Chamber offered some relief in group litigation until its demise in
the mid-seventeenth century. YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LIIGATION, supra note 18, at
128-31. Common-law courts would not hear claims by unincorporated associations; thus,
such groups had to proceed in equity, which only granted declaratory relief. Bone, supra
note 18, at 221.
23 Bone uses the phrase "general right" to apply to this category. Bone, supra note 18,
at 237. Yeazel believes this phrase is empty formalism and that the essential requirement in
equity was a goal based in common interest. YEAzELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION,
supra note 18, at 181. Bone rejects Yeazell's interpretation as ignoring the rights-duties
analysis of the decisions. Bone, supra note 18, at 269.
24 Bone argues that such rights were impersonal, i.e., independent of the personal wills
of group members. Bone, supra note 18, at 238. But the impersonal/personal distinction is
not established in the cases or commentaries and is not accepted by Yeazell. YEAZELL,
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 18, at 181. Trying to determine whether rights
and duties of parishioners, merchant guild members, joint stock companies, crews of prize
ships, and friendly societies have personal rights poses difficult and confusing questions not
important to our analysis. What is important is that the rights of the class were identical, not
just similar. Moreover, Bone's analysis that binding class actions only existed when rights to
a class were determined and involved impersonal remedies is questionable. See Bone, supra
note 18, at 238. See also infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text discussing Smith v.
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), in which the Court bound the class because




separate actions at law. Such actions involved a "multiplicity of suits," which
gave equity jurisdiction to resolve the claims in one group lawsuit.
The second broad category of accepted class actions involved adjudication
of identical rights or duties and remedies among the members of the class in the
initial stage, but the suit in later stages involved non-similar issues. Examples
included:
(1) Suits by a privateer crew member to determine the crew's full share of
the prize vis-A-vis the ship owner and then to distribute the shares;25
(2) Suits brought against voluntary unincorporated associations, such as
joint stock companies or friendly societies, by association members to
recover funds or property wrongfully appropriated and then to dissolve the
association or provide an accounting and distribution;26 and
(3) Suits by creditors against a debtor or the estate of a deceased debtor to
declare assets as the property of creditors and then to distribute the funds to
the creditors. 27
These class actions normally involved two stages. Stage one established the
rights of the crew members, association members, or creditors against the ship
owner, association manager, or debtor. In stage one, the rights and remedies of
the class members were identical in that the goal was to obtain the maximum
prize, fund, or assets from the defendant in an interlocutory decree. On the
other hand, stage two involved a determination of individual rights and
remedies between class members as the prize, fund, or assets were divided
among the class. The first stage was appropriate for a class action. The second
stage required notice and individual opportunity to litigate.
Equity courts justified jurisdiction in these two categories of class suits
because legal remedies were inadequate and individual litigation was likely to
generate a multiplicity of suits at law. 28 This "multiplicity standard" did not
25 See Good v. Blewitt, 34 Eng. Rep. 542 (Ch. 1815); Good v. Blewitt, 33 Eng. Rep.
343 (Ch. 1807); Leigh v. Thomas, 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1751); JosEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGs § 98 (1838).
26 See Small v. Attwood, 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ex. 1832); iechens v. Congreve, 38
Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1828); Lloyd v. Loaring, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ch. 1802); see also
Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1006-08 (Ch. 1809).
27 See Good, 34 Eng. Rep. at 543 (analogizing to a creditor bill); Leigh, 28 Eng. Rep.
at 201 (describing a creditor bill).
28 Bone, supra note 18, at 236; see also Ewelme Hosp. v. Andover, 23 Eng. Rep. 460
(Ch. 1684); How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch. 1681).
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refer just to an overlapping of common issues or a similarity of interest in the
general goals of the litigation; rather, the class cases that qualified for equity
jurisdiction under the multiplicity standard involved identical legal rights and
duties.29
The representative suit served a key function in solving compulsory joinder
problems. Representative actions frequently sought decrees that determined the
rights of all class members-crews, voluntary association members, or
creditors. A determination of the total amount of the prize, fund, or assets
affected the rights of individual crew members, association members, or
creditors, respectively, and such a determination required joinder of the entire
class. Joinder might be impossible, however, because of the potential numbers
of parties.30 Moreover, if some parties were unavailable, the chancellor had to
dismiss the action and deny all relief. The representative suit solved these
problems, making litigation of multiple claims possible.
The "on behalf of' allegation established a formal connection between the
lawsuit and absent parties, who were known as "quasi-parties." The quasi-
party status of absentees allowed the court to fashion a decree that took account
of absentees' rights and duties in the face of a technical rule that prevented
equity courts from acting on the rights or duties of "strangers" to a Suit.3 1
Quasi-parties also were not subject to the restrictive intervention rules
applicable to strangers and were able to intervene in the suit and participate as
parties if they wished. 32
Representative suits were available only when there was a "common
interest" betweeri the representatives and absent class members. This phrase in
modem procedure is ambiguous, but, in courts of equity from 1500-1850, the
term had a more precise meaning. Common interest denoted "formal
2 9 Bone, supra note 18, at 237-38.
30 Moreover, in chancery, the death of a party required the court to start over with
resulting interminable delays. Thus, it was impractical to join a large number of parties.
The problem was solved by the representative suit because the death of an absent class
member would not affect the continuance of the suit.
31 CALVERT, supra note 20. "The established rule is, that... nothing under the great
seal can issue, except inter partes," subject to limited exceptions. Id. at *60. Moreover,
"the rights of no man shall be decided in a court of justice, unless he himself be present."
Id. at *1.
32 See, e.g., Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809) (holding
that absentees are quasi-parties who can be introduced into the litigation through a
subsequent proceeding); see also CALVERT, supra note 20, at *58 (explaining that while a
stranger to a lawsuit normally cannot participate in a suit without the parties' consent, a
member of a class on whose behalf the action is brought is a quasi-party, not a stranger,
with the consequence that "his cause is in the course of decision, and he may at any time
take an active part").
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relationships among pre-existing rights and duties . . . warranting a single
remedy."33 The class members' rights or duties had to be connected to the
subject of the suit in exactly the same way.
The general right cases met the common interest requirement, but only the
first stage of the second category of class actions satisfied this requirement.
General right cases affecting tenants and parishioners, for example, satisfied the
common interest requirement because each class member had identical rights
and duties affected in the same way due to their occupancy of the same group
territory.34 On the other hand, in nongeneral right cases-privateer crew
member, voluntary association, and creditor suits-there was a combination of
common and individual claims. For exarpple, the association suit to recover
property wrongfully converted by the association involved a common interest
in stage one: all association members had identical rights and sought to
maximize the group's total fund. However, regarding the distribution of the
fund to association members, the rights were individual. There was no common
interest (notwithstanding some common issues of fact or law), and individuals
were given the right to participate. Class adjudication was not permitted for
phase two. 35
The binding effect of representative suits in equity during this period was
less clear.36 There was common agreement that general right cases bound all
class members whether or not they appeared as parties.37 On the other hand, in
33 Bone, supra note 18, at 247 (criticizing Yeazell's assumption that common interest
meant common goals or objectives).
3 4 Id. at 249.
35 It was not uncommon for courts to deny a class suit for lack of the requisite
common interest in phase one. See Long v. Yonge, 57 Eng. Rep. 827, 833-34 (Ch. 1830)
(holding that shareholders in a joint stock (insurance) company could not file a bill on behalf
of themselves and others for the dissolution of a partnership unless "all the members,
however numerous .... [were] parties to the suit"); Leigh v. Thomas, 28 Eng. Rep. 201,
201-02 (Ch. 1751) (sustaining a demurrer for failing to bring the suit on behalf of the whole
crew when a bill was brought by two of a ship's crew, appointed under an agreement signed
by 64 of 80 crew members, to be agents for the rest on an accounting of prize money); see
also Evans v. Stokes, 48 Eng. Rep. 215 (Ch. 1836) (holding that all those interested had to
be parties to a suit for dissolution of a joint stock company because it could result in the
cancellation of approximately 4,000 policies, potentially harming absent plaintiffs).
36 See Barker v. Walters, 50 Eng. Rep. 36, 38-39 (Ch. 1844); Cockburn v.
Thompson, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809).
3 7 In Brown v. Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676), a parish was sued by a Vicar
for prescription rights to a portion of ore from mines. "Four [plersons were named by the
[m]iners to defend the [sluit for them," and the identity of claims between the
representatives and the class was the single issue of the Vicar's claim. Id. at 797. Although
the miners allegedly "named" their representatives, Vermuden, a miner, later argued that
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stage one, the binding effect of the privateer, association, and creditor suits was
ambiguous. Stage one, concerning the common interest of the crew, association
members, or creditors versus the ship owner, misappropriating officer, or
debtor, resulted in an interlocutory decree subject to revision in chancery.
Equity was to shape its decrees to protect the absent members, 38 and there was
authority that the absentee could challenge an unfavorable -decree.39 In related
cases, however, nonparticipating crew members were not permitted to attack
the final decree's declaration of the total prize belonging to the crew because
they had been given an opportunity to participate in the proportion
he should not have been bound by the action because he was not a party to it. Id. The court
rejected Vermuden's argument stating, "If the Defendant should not be bound, Suits of this
Nature, as in case of Inclosures, Suit against the Inhabitants for Suit to a Mill, and the like,
would be infinite, and impossible to be ended." Id.; see also Weale v. West-Middlesex
Waterworks Co., 37 Eng. Rep. 412, 416 (Ch. 1820); Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng.
Rep. 1153, 1159 (Ch. 1805); CALVERT, supra note 20, at *59-60 (noting that the effect of a
general right decree on those persons represented "does not appear to have been specifically
decided," but arguing that it ought to bind absentees in order to accomplish its purpose of
settling rights); STORY, supra note 25, § 120 (stating that "in most, if not in all... [general
right cases], the decree obtained upon such a bill will ordinarily be held binding upon all
other persons standing in the same predicament").
38 See Good v. Blewitt, 34 Eng. Rep. 542, 543 (Ch. 1815) (explaining that if the
absentee's share was liquidated and known to the master, the court sometimes made
provision for it in the final decree and kept the decree open so that the absentee might later
claim his share without having to initiate an entirely new proceeding).
39 See Barker, 50 Eng. Rep. at 38-39 (expressing the uncertainty about the effect of a
judgment adverse to absentees in a voluntary association suit); Good, 34 Eng. Rep. at 543
(permitting creditors coming in before the master to challenge the decree); Cockburn, 33
Eng. Rep. at 1007-08.
In Cockburn, the court stated:
The Court must always be open to questions upon the carriage of the cause,
applications for re-hearing, &c.; and I should upon principle find the means, if not
supplied by precedent,... of giving a creditor, coming in after the institution of a
suit, the opportunity of supporting his interest better than the Plaintiff-could.
Id. at 1008 (citing Gifford v. Hort, 1 Sch. & Lef. 386, 409 (Ch. 1804)). The statement in
Cockburn may be based in part on the nature of an interlocutory decree in equity. See also
STORY, supra note 25, § 96 (stating that persons not directly made parties may come in
under the decree and "take the benefit of it, or show it to be erroneous, or entitle
themselves to a rehearing").
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adjudication.40 Stage two of the privateer, voluntary association, and creditor
cases was not binding on absent class members.
The protection of absent members was supported during this era by the
following:
(1) The representative and class claims had to involve identical rights and
duties. Such identity meant that the self-interest of the representative would
encourage competency in presentation and avoid conflict or collusion. In
general, neither consent nor notice was required in fashioning a binding
decree where there was the requisite identity of claims, 41 but it was easy
for absentees to enter the suit if they wished. 42
(2) The court in equity was specifically charged with the duty to shape the
decree to protect absent members of the class. The identity requirement
together with this equity maxim meant that the decree could not benefit the
representative at the expense of the class.43
C. The American Precedent to 1938
In the United States, the rights of the individual to notice giving
opportunity to be heard were enshrined in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment" (as against the federal government) and of the Fourteenth
Amendment45 (binding on state governments) during 1791 and 1868,
respectively. The effect that these due process requirements had on the
enforceability of class judgments was compounded by the problems of
affording complete relief between courts of different states or between state and
federal courts. Construction and application of the Full Faith and Credit
40 For example, in Good, officers and crew of a privateer brought suit, according to
the ship's articles (signed by the crew), against the owners for an account of captures and
distribution of prize money. Good, 34 Eng. Rep. at 542. The chancellor issued a "decree
directing an inquiry, [as to] who [was] the person entitled with the Plaintiff to the produce of
[that] adventure, and in what shares and proportions, with advertisement for that
purpose... . Id. at 543.
41 Bone, supra note 18, at 260.
42 Id. at 250.
43 See Good v. Blewitt, 34 Eng. Rep. 542, 542 (Ch. 1815); Cockburn v. Thompson,
33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1008 (Ch. 1809); STORY, supra note 25, § 96 (John M. Gould ed.,
1892).
44 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Clause46 of the Constitution and res judicata principles included therein were
crucial in the enforcement of a class judgment against absent members of the
class who had received no notice giving opportunity to appear in court. The
class action concept as an exception to individual autonomy over litigation thus
faced constitutional limitations. 47
However, several factors tended to favor the development of class
procedure in the nineteenth century under the federal multistate system. It was
decided that federal subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity citizenship
required only that the citizenship of the named representatives be diverse from
the citizenship of the party opposing the class. Thus, diversity of citizenship
was not affected by the citizenship of absent class members. Therefore, those
seeking federal jurisdiction could choose representatives for the class who
accomplished this result. Moreover, compulsory joinder problems involving
jurisdiction over-the-person requirements, subject-matter jurisdiction, and
venue rules, which made litigation for or against absent necessary or
indispensable parties more difficult, were solved by representative lawsuits.
Justice Story, in his treatise on equity, attempted to state and simplify class
action procedure.48 Story categorized class suits developed from English
precedent into three types:
(1) Where the question is one of common or general interest and one or
more sue or defend for the benefit of the whole;
(2) Where the parties form a voluntary association for public or private
purposes, and those who sue or defend may fairly be presumed to represent
the rights and interests of the whole;
(3) Where the parties are very numerous, and, though they have or may
have separate and distinct interests, it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court. This category also requires a common or general
interest.49
Story's categories failed to make clear distinctions and reflected more
generalized description than analysis. Thus, instead of aiding the practitioner or
the judge, Story simply compounded confusion. It is clear enough that category
(2) was something different than (1) and (3), but (3) obviously overlapped (1)
46 U.S. CoNST. amend. IV, § 1.
47 The preference for individual control is further reflected in the class action
prerequisite that the parties be so numerous that it is impracticable to join them.
48 STORY, supra note 25, §§ 97-99, 103, 107, 110-11, 116, 120.
49 Id. §§ 97, 120; see also Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1853).
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because numerosity and impractical joinder were prerequisites to all class
categories. However, the main question is whether any of these categories were
binding on absent members of the class. Story did not clearly resolve this
issue.50
Legislative reform during this period also did not clearly resolve whether
class actions were binding on absent members. On the one hand, old Equity
Rule 48, adopted in 1842, made class actions nonbinding. Old Rule 48
provided:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and can not, without
manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before
it, the Court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and
may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the
adverse interest of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before
it.5 1
The Rule also provided that class suits were not binding on absentees, "[b]ut in
such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of the
absent parties." 52 This sweeping limitation on the utility of class suits was
contrary to English precedent, at least as to the general right cases. On the
other hand, the Field Code, adopted in New York in 1848 and in California in
1850, contained no limitation or insight as to the binding effects of class
judgments.53 The Code formally adopted the class device as follows: "[When
the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." 54
The Supreme Court faced the issue of the binding nature of class suits in
Smith v. Swormstedt.55 This landmark decision has guided our modem
5 0 Story failed to provide the necessary analysis and rationale for the different lines of
cases that he cites. Compare STORY, supra note 25, § 96 (stating that class actions are
binding) with STORY, supra note 25, § 126 (stating that some class actions may not be
binding).
5 1jAMES L. HoPKINs, THa NEW FEDERAL EQurTY RuLs 104 (8th ed. 1933).
52 Id. at 105.
53 See Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fifiieth Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Cvii Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 5 (1988).54 CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
5 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 301 (1853). The first class action in America was not
Smith, but West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424). Justice Story,
who wrote the opinion, explained in dictum the need for judicial efficiency in class suits,
including giving relief to named parties, without prejudicing absentees. Id. at 723. Story
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development of class action procedure. The Court charted its own ground,
citing, but stepping around, Justice Story's treatise 56 and reaching back to the
binding-by-representation characteristic of the English system.
The dispute in Smith arose between the northern and southern Methodist
ministers over the distribution of their assets when the Methodist Church
divided over the issue of slavery. A plaintiff class consisting of southern
Methodist members sued a defendant class consisting of northern Methodist
members for their proportion of the common property and funds held by the
unified Methodist Church.57
The Court categorized the interests of the members of both classes as being
separate and distinct, yet both the plaintiff and the defendant classes had a
"common interest" or a "common right."58 A common interest or right was
defined by reference to English precedent upholding, inter alia, tenants' suits
against the lord of the manor to establish a right to a mill or to cut turf and
suits brought by a parson against parishioners to establish rights to tithes. 59
The Court related the binding character of class actions to identity of
claims with this comment:
For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure ofjustice, a court of equity
permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the
decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court. The legal and
equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the court by representation,
and especially where the subject-matter of the suit is common to all, there can
be very little danger but that the interest of all will be properly protected and
maintained. 6
0
The Court said no more about the identity of claims requirement, but the
groundwork was laid for binding class actions. The key lies in an analysis of
the last sentence of the aforementioned quotation. First, the legal and equitable
rights and liabilities of all are before the court. Thus, class claims must be
encompassed within the claims of the representatives. Second, the subject
matter of the suit is common to all. Finally, the interests of the class must be
properly protected and maintained. It is unclear whether this final requirement
is just an effect of the first two requirements or a separate concern.
summarized English precedent and the general right, as described supra notes 25, 48-50
and accompanying text.
5 6 STORY, supra note 25, §§ 97-99, 103, 107, 110-111, 116, 120.
57 Smith, 57 U.S. at 307.
58 Id. at 302-03.
5 9 Id. at 302.
60 Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
[V/ol. 54:607
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
The Court upheld the class action as binding although the interests of the
members of both classes were separate and distinct'and no individual notice or
opportunity to be heard was given to absent class members. 61 This was a
substantial break from old Equity Rule 48 and a return to the binding-by-
representation characteristic of the English general right cases. 62
6 1 Id. at309.
62 The identity of claims requirement is further illustrated in a case decided 24 year's
before Smith, Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566 (1829), which allowed adjudication of
identical claims regarding the use of church premises. In Beatty, a group of plaintiffs
brought suit on behalf of a church group to enjoin, the retaking of property by legatees. Id.
at 579. The issue was whether a church graveyard was properly used for church purposes
as required in the bequest of the original donor. Id. at 579-81. The Court recognized that
this was the type of case where "certain persons, belonging to a voluntary society, and
having a common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and others having the like
interest, as part of the same society for purposes common to all, and beneficial to all." Id. at
585. Thus, identity of claims and remedy was satisfied by membership to a voluntary
association.
However, one year after Smith, in Ayres v. Carver, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 591 (1854), the
Court approached a defendant class warily. The complaint was filed against Joseph W.
Matthews and "some two hundred others," residents of .various states, seeking clarification
of property rights established by treaty with the Chickasaw Indians. Id. at 592. The case
was dismissed because the lower court's decision on a cross bill was not an appealable final
judgment. Id. at 595. In dictum, however, the Court said, "[lit is difficult to see any interest
or estate in common among these several defendants, that would authorize the rights of the
absent parties to be represented in the litigation by those upon whom process has been
served, and who have appeared to defend the suit." Id. at 594. In other words, binding
absent defendants would require some kind of estate in common in addition to identity of
claims.
Identity of claims was expanded upon in In re Englehard, 231 U.S. 646 (1913), which
held that a city acted as a proper representative defendant for all citizens interested in a suit
by a telephone company to redistribute excess charges. Because the single legal issue
automatically enured to the benefit or adversely affected all absent and named, the identity
of claims requirement was satisfied. Id. at 651.
The Court cited Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,
460 (1890), for the proposition that elected citizen representatives may stand for the absent
citizens in a suit against the state. In re Englehard, 231 U.S. at 651. Odcago, Milwaukee,
involved a railroad challenging state milk rates under the Due Process Clause, and it
confirmed the use of a representative suit for common rights or interests, i.e., identity of
claims and remedies. Chicago, Milwaukee, 134 U.S. at 453. This class of representative
suits is further supported by Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1920), which bound absent
members in a class of Indian tribes that was represented by a congressionally appointed
group of class members.
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The Court officially abandoned old Equity Rule 48 in 1912 and adopted
Equity Rule 38.63 This new Rule excluded the provision that class actions were
nonbinding. 64 This exclusion was in line with Smith65 and English precedent.
As one commentator stated:
Rule 38 was promulgated on the recommendation of the Bar Committee of the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit; the committee advising the
omission of the last sentence of former Rule 48, "for the reason that in every
true 'class suit' the decree is necessarily binding upon all parties included in the
decree." 6 6
During this period, circuit courts were also deciding the issue of the
binding effect of the class suit. Prior to the enactment of Equity Rule 38, the
binding effect of class actions was applied to union members. 67 Following the
enactment of Equity Rule 38, a defendant class involving claimants to an estate
was also upheld as binding.68
63 See HoPKiNS, supra note 51, at 145.
6 4 Id. at 238-39; cf id. at 104-05.
65 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
66 HoPKINs, supra note 51, at 240 (citing Coann v. Atlanta Cotton Factory Co., 14 F.
4 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1882) and American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers'
Unions, 90 F. 598 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898)).
67 In American Steel & Wire Co., 90 F. at 598, a defendant class suit against the
named elected representatives of a union and various members was allowed to bind absent
members of the union. The American Wire Company sought an injunction to restrain union
members from trespassing on the strike locked-out factory. Id. at 603. The complaint only
named the union representatives, but the court extended the injunction to a class of unnamed
union members. Id. at 605. The court stated that
it is one of the features of an interlocutory injunction that it reaches all who are
parties, whether they have been served with process of subpoena or not, whether
they have appeared or not, whether they have answered or not; and it binds all
who have notice of it, whether they are parties or not.
Id. at 604. Compare American Steel & Wire Co. with Hill v. Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co., 219
F. 719 (4th Cir. 1915), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 245 U.S. 275 (1917), which held that
representatives would not adequately serve to represent union members to litigate issues of
personal liability in a tort action because the common interest or identity of claims was
lacking. Hill, 219 F. at 720-21.
68 In McClelland v. Rose, 247 F. 721 (5th Cir. 1918), claimants to the estate of Peter
McClelland, Sr., not named in the state court action that distributed rights under the will,
were held to have had their rights adjudicated in a prior suit. The circuit court found that
the original action was binding because the subject matter was common and the named
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The Court readdressed the binding effect of class judgments in Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.69 In Cauble, some 524 representatives from states
other than Indiana filed a class action in federal court against an Indiana
fraternal organization, the Supreme Tribe, contending that its reorganization
was not valid. 70 The Court upheld the class suit as involving "common" and
"joint" interests and found for the fraternal organization. Later, various Indiana
members of the Supreme Tribe filed in Indiana state court against the
reorganization. 71 The claims were identical to those adjudicated in'the federal
court action. 72 The Supreme Tribe filed an ancillary bill in federal court
seeking to enjoin the maintenance of the state action, which would relitigate the
claims. 73
representatives adequately represented the class. Id. at 724-25. The basis for this binding
decree was a line of cases beginning with Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288
(1853). McClelland, 247 F. at 724.
The original action involved a defendant class and the court found that relief was
sought
not only against those who are brought before the court as defendants, but against
others similarly related to the subject of dispute, it is not necessary to aver in
terms that those who are made defendants are sued as representatives of the class
of which they are shown to be members, especially when it is disclosed that those
who defend contest the plaintiffs claim by setting up the caim that the subject of
the suit belongs in common to an entire class which they admit does or may
include others besides themselves.
Id. (emphasis added). The court was faced with a single res, claim, and defense that was
common to the defendant class. The court stated the following:
[This] shows plainly that in resisting the claim set up by the plaintiff they
were not acting for themselves alone, but were making a defense which inured
equally to the benefit of other unknown parties... [who had] inferred from the
record that the conclusion was reached that those of the testator's collateral heirs
who were brought before the court fairly represented the right asserted by them,
which was one belonging in common to all of the class of which they were
members, as well those who were not as those who were before the court.
Id. at 725-26. The prior class adjudication was, thus, declared binding.
69 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
70 Id. at 360-61.
71 Id. at 361-62.
72 1d. at 362.
73 Id. at 357:
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The Supreme Court, citing to Smith v. Swormstedt74 and English
precedent, emphasized the binding nature of a class judgment and the adequate
protection that follows from the identity of claims between the representative
and the class. The Court stated, "'The legal and equitable rights and liabilities
of all being before the court by representation, and especially where the
subject-matter of the suit is common to all, there can be very little danger but
that the interest of all will be properly protected and maintained.'" 75
The Court granted the injunction enforcing the class judgment and declared
the following:
If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are
obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all of the class properly
represented. The parties and the subject-matter are within the court's
jurisdiction. It is impossible to name all of the class as parties, where, as here,
its membership is too numerous to bring into court. The subject-matter
included the control and disposition of the funds of a beneficial organization
and was properly cognizable in a court of equity. The parties bringing the suit
truly represented the interested class. If the decree is to be effective and
conflicting judgments are to be avoided, all of the class must be concluded by
the decree. 76
Thus, prior to 1938, class actions involving a "common or general interest"
were permitted in equity.
The phrase "common or general interest" required an identity of claims
between the representative and absent members of the class. Such identity
existed if all class claims were encompassed within the claims of the
74 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
75 Cauble, 255 U.S. at 363 (1921) (quoting Sndth, 57 U.S. at 303).
76 Id. at 367. A decision restating the binding and conclusive effect of class judgments
is Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F.2d 256 (D.N.C. 1931). In Granding, a single taxpayer sued
the state on behalf of all taxpayers affected by a state shipping statute allegedly violative of
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 257-58. The court stated the following:
It is a class suit instituted in behalf of a large number of peach growers affected by
the statute; and we think that it may be maintained in equity for the purpose of
avoiding the multiplicity of suits which would otherwise result .... [S]ince the
adoption of the 38th Equity Rule (28 [U.S.C.A.] § 723), the right to maintain such
a suit cannot be denied.... IT]here can be no question [that maintaining this class
suit] is speedier, more efficacious, and more satisfactory for all parties concerned
than the institution of a hundred or more actions at law ....
Id. at 260. Ultimately, the court found that the identity of claims was sufficient to bind all
members of the group based on the litigation by the named parties. Id. at 261, 263.
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representatives, the subject matter of the suit was common to all, and the
interests of the class were properly protected and maintained. Identity of claims
did not require-that all class members seek identical damages. When identity of
liability claims existed, the absent members were fairly represented, and the
class judgment was binding. As shown by the next section, this identity of
claims requirement was given constitutional due process status in 1940.
III. DUE PROCESS APPLIED TO CLASS ACTIONS
In 1940, the Supreme Court made the identity of claims safeguard for
absent class members part of due process protection through its decision in
Hansbeny v. Lee.77 In Hansberry, the Court confronted an agreement among
land owners not to sell to or to permit occupancy of their land by African
Americans in areas of Chicago. The agreement was to go into effect upon
written approval by ninety-five percent of the owners within the specified
areas. 78 A class action was brought in Illinois state court to enforce the
agreement against four nonapproving individuals. 79 The parties stipulated that
ninety-five percent or more of the owners had signed the agreement.80 The
Illinois court upheld the validity of the covenant and held that this judgment
was binding upon all the land owners within the specified areas.
In a subsequent collateral attack on the Illinois judgment, Hansberry, who
was an absent member of the original class, challenged the covenant. 81
Hansberry claimed that he was not adequately represented and, thus, not bound
by the earlier class judgment and stipulation therein.
The Supreme Court held that a denial of due process may be raised by an
absent class member in a collateral attack on a class judgment;82 however, such
an attack is permitted "only in those cases where it cannot be said that the
procedure adopted [by the court issuing the first judgment], fairly insures the
protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it." 83 The
Court found that the Illinois judgment denied Hansberry his due process rights
because Hansberry was not in the same class as or adequately represented by
those who defended the covenant.8 4 Hansberry, who opposed the enforcement
77 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
7 8 Id. at38.
7 9 Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
80 It was subsequently developed that this stipulation was erroneous but not fraudulent
or collusive. Hansbeny, 311 U.S. at 39.81 Id. at32.
82 Id. at 40.
83 Id. at 42 (quoting Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897)).
84Id. at 44.
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of the covenant, could not have had an identity of claims and remedy with
those who favored the covenant's enforcement. The class judgment, therefore,
was void and subject to collateral attack.
The Court explained the due process requirement by a two-step analysis.
First, as a general proposition, a judgment has binding force only when the
parties had notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court stated the following:
[W]hen the judgment of a state court, ascribing to the judgment of another
court the binding force and effect of resjudicata, is challenged for want of due
process it becomes the duty of this Court to examine the course of procedure in
both litigations to ascertain whether the litigant whose rights have thus been
adjudicated has been afforded such notice and opportunity to be heard as are
requisite to the due process which the Constitution prescribes. 85
Second, there is a general exception to the requirement of notice and
opportunity to be heard. A judgment in a class suit, "to which some members
of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those represented
who were not made parties to it,"86 provided the following conditions are met:
(1) The class suit must involve a substantial number of people so that their
joinder as "parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is
impracticable;" 87
(2) "mhe interests of those not joined [must be] of the same class as the
interests of those who are" joined; 88 and
(3) Those joined must fairly represent the class "in the prosecution of the
litigation of the issues in which all have a common interest. .... 89
By this language, the identity of claims principle became essential to due
process approval. Various cases were cited by the Court to further clarify the
meaning of the phrases "same class," "fair representation," and "common
interest." 90 Moreover, the cases selected by the Court to illustrate when there
85 Id. at 40 (emphasis added) (citing Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261,
273 (1914)).86 Id. at 41.
87 Id.
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 Id. (emphasis added).
90 In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), the original class
action was brought by 524 beneficiaries of a fraternal benefit association. The legal issue
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is a lack of identity of claims are instructive in establishing this same
requirement. 91
was the validity of a reorganization plan adopted by defendant's governing body. Id. at 360.
The Court stressed that this issue involved a common and joint interest and held that the
adjudication was entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 366-67.
In Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barker, 245 U.S. 146 (1917), a class action was brought
by certificate holders against an insurance company involving the single issue of the validity
of a mortuary fund. Id. at 148. The claim of the class and the representatives was identical.
When an absent member of the class later sued on the same issue, the Court held that the
prior class judgment was entitled to full faith and credit effect over the later legal attempt.
Id. at 151.
In Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915), sixteen plaintiffs filed suit as a class
against their fraternal society. Id. at 536. The single issue was whether the society was
entitled to increase its rates against its members. Id. at 537. Because the identity of claims
between the representative and the class made the adjudication binding, when an absent
member of the class attempted to later raise the saume issue, that member was foreclosed by
res judicata.
For additional discussion of key terms embodied in the identity of claims principle, see
supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
91 In Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938), creditors brought suit against a
corporation and its shareholders as a class. The purpose of the suit was to force statutory
liability on the shareholders. Id. at 501. The shareholders had not, under the statute in
question, agreed to representation by the corporation on any issues. Further, there was a
lack of adequate representation because the claims and remedies of the corporation, as a
purported representative, were not identical to the interest of the members of the
shareholders class. Id. at 504.
In McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940), a
shareholder sued a corporation to cancel "A" stock issued in lieu of back dividends. Id. at
882. Because of their divergent interests, the court held that the "A" shareholders were not
adequately represented by the corporation on the issue of the validity of the stock. Id.
In Taggart v. Bremner, 236 F. 544 (7th Cir. 1916), a patent owner sued a defendant
class of several hundred dentists charging them with infringement. Id. at 544. The court
upheld the discretion of the trial court to dismiss and proceed against only a single named
defendant because separate issues would be involved as to each of the dentists. Id. at 547.
In Weidenfeld v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 129 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1904), a shareholder
sued a corporation alleging a conflict between the corporation and its principal shareholder.
Id. at 306. The court held that the corporation could not, under those circumstances, act as
representative for the principal shareholder. Id. at 311-12.
In Terry v. Bank of Cape Fear, 20 F. 777 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1884), a class of creditors
brought action against a class of shareholders of an insolvent corporation. Id. at 778. The
shareholder class included some absent parties who had an apparent valid defense of statute
of limitations. Id. at 779. The court held that the special category of shareholders were not
part of the same class because there were uncommon issues among class members. Id. at
782-83.
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Of special interest among the cases cited to illustrate a lack of identity of
claims and remedies is Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works,92 in which creditors
sued a corporation pursuant to a statute to force collection from shareholders
who had unpaid subscriptions. 93 The Court held that the corporation was an
adequate representative of the shareholders on the common issue of the
existence and amount of the debt claimed by the creditors. The Court held that
the corporation was not an adequate representative of the shareholders on other
issues, such as the special defenses of stockholders on their particular
subscription agreements. 94 Due to the inadequate representation, the earlier
adjudication directed against the shareholders on the uncommon issues was
deemed a denial of due process.
The Court made it clear in Hansberry v. Lee95 that this due process
limitation applied not only to federal courts but, according to the Fourteenth
Amendment, to state courts. 96 The following is the Court's reiteration of the
requirements of sameness of class, adequate representation, and common
interest for state courts:
Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to say that, when the
only circumstance defining the class is that the determination of the rights of its
members turns upon a single issue of fact or law, a state could not
constitutionally adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class
could stand in judgment for all, provided that the procedure were so devised
and applied as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent
and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration
of the common issue.97
The language of Hansberry does not establish the due process standard as a
balancing test of the same class, fair representation, and common interest
requirements. On the contrary, the due process principle requiring
representatives to satisfy these three requirements is declared in absolute and
certain terminology.
92 237 U.S. 413 (1915).
93 Id. at 416.
94 Id. at 423.
95 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
9 6 Id. at42.
97 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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IV. ORIGINAL FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23
According to the notes of the Advisory Committee on the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, Rule 23 "adopts the test of Equity
Rule 38, but defines what constitutes a 'common or general interest.'" 98
Hence, no novel or marked departure from prior law was intended. 99 Rule
23(a), as adopted in 1938, provided as follows:
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of
all, sue or be sued, when the character ofthe right sought to be enforced for or
against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought. 100
In his treatise on federal practice, Professor Moore described the three
subsections of Rule 23(a) as setting forth three previously recognized types of
class actions, which he described by the terms "true," "hybrid," and
"spurious."' 0' In the true class action, the rights of the class were "joint or
common." There was but a single claim for relief that accrued to or against a
multitude of parties. 10 2 The true class requirement of joint or common rights
was more restrictive than Equity Rule 38's requirement of common or general
interest. The earlier equity rule permitted class actions when there was not a
joint or common right held by members of the class. For example, in Smith v.
Swormstedt,103 the interests of the Methodist ministers were described as
98 See 3B JAMEs WM. MooRE & JOHN E. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACriCE
23.0112] (2d ed. 1985) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1937)).
99 See James Win. Moore, Federal Rules of avil Procedure: Some Problems Raised
by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. LJ. 551 (1937).100 MOORE& KENNEDY, supra note 98, 23.0111] (emphasis added).
101 Id. 23.0118].
102 See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852-53 (3d Cir. 1945); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1945);
Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 717
(3d Cir. 1956); Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Del. 1949).
103 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
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several and distinct.' 0 4  Moreover, suits by taxpayers, members of
unincorporated associations, and joint stock companies, freely permitted in
class action precedents, did not involve joint or common rights as those terms
were understood at common law. 105 By narrowing the application of Rule
23(a)(1) to classes having joint or common rights, protection for the absent
members was significantly enhanced, and historic identity of claims was clearly
satisfied.
When a true class action was presented, the judgment, whether adverse or
favorable, was binding on all members of the class. This binding effect applied
even if class members did not join in the prosecution of the action. Also, the
limits of a defendant's liability were determined by the initial judgment.10 6
In the hybrid class action, the rights of the members of the class were
several rather than joint or common. A hybrid suit was brought to establish the
class right to particular property. 107 The first stage of the suit focused on the
class's right to specific property; therefore, identity of claims was assured. In
stage two, when the class claimants competed against each other for
distribution of the property, identity of claims and remedy was absent and
notice to class members was customarily given.10 8
The judgment, whether adverse or favorable, was conclusive on the absent
members of the class regarding their rights in the res. The limit of a
defendant's liability to the class was determined in the initial litigation. 10 9
The spurious class action was recognized by the majority of courts and
commentators merely as a form of permissive joinder. The rights of class
members were several, each party necessarily suing upon his own claim for
relief. Professor Moore stated this proposition as follows:
The spurious class suit is a permissive joinder device. . . . There is no jural
relationship between the members of the class; ... they have taken no steps to
104 Id. at 302.
105 Original Rule 23 was drafted as part of the compulsory joinder provision and
reflected the meaning of joint and common rights as used in compulsory joinder law during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
106 See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Lowry v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1958); Stella v. Kaiser, 218
F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); System Fed'n No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1950).
107 See Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 980 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
875 (1952); see also MOORE & KENNEDY, supra note 98, 1 23.01[8].
108 The Committee refused to describe the res judicata effect of the rule, but Moore
specified the consequences in his treatise, which was accepted as authoritative. MOORE &
KENNEDY, supra note 98, 23.01[8].
109 See generally James Win. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions-
Jurisdiction & Effect ofJudgment, 32 ILL. L. Rnv. 555 (1938).
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create legal relationships among themselves. They are not fellow travellers by
agreement. The right or liability of each is distinct. The class is formed solely
by the presence of a common question of law or fact. 110
The spurious class action facilitated joinder and intervention. Numerous
cases honored the proposition that original Rule 23(a)(3) authorized federal
district courts to require that only the citizenship of the named representatives
be considered in meeting federal diversity rules. 111 Unlike the true and hybrid
class actions, it was well established that a judgment in a spurious class action
did not bind class members who were not named parties or who did not
formally intervene in the action. 112 Therefore, due process for unnamed
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S.
888 (1956), remanded, 355 U.S. 600 (1958); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 980
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952); Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d
387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944); Sperry Prods. Inc. v. Association of Am. R.R., 132 F.2d 408,
410-12 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943); Zelley v. Muehleck, 10 F.R.D.
62, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 7 F.R.D. 33, 34 (W.D.
Pa. 1947); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 243 (E.D. Ky.
1942).
112 See Martinez v. Maverick County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 219
F.2d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 1955) (stating that "[in a spurious class action the decree does not
bind the class, but binds only those actually before the court"); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197
F.2d 973, 978-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952); Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 742 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952); Schatte v.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 183 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1950);
California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 896-97 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947); Oppenheimer v. FJ. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d
Cir. 1944); Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101, 105 (8th
Cir. 1942) (citing with approval Judge Clark's statement before the Institute on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure held in Washington, D.C. in 1938 that "'Itihe first two [types of
class suits under FED. R. Civ. P. 231 are really the proper cases of class suits, where the
suing by the representative really should be binding and res adjudicata on those who are
represented'" (emphasis added)); Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R.D. 307, 311 (D.R.I. 1959)
(stating that "it is beyond dispute that 'the spurious class suit is a permissive joinder
device'"); Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 482 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (stating
that "[u]ltimately, the 'spurious' class action, so-called, is nothing more than pernissive
joinder"); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 9 F.R.D. 677, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(noting that all the parties and the court recognized that the plaintiffs' second claim was
intended to be a spurious class action), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); Hunter v.
Southern Indem. Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 243 (E.D. Ky. 1942) (stating that a
spurious class action is "merely a 'joinder device'"); see also 2 WILLIAM W. BARRON &
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spurious class members was usually not an issue. As a consequence of this
nonbinding aspect of spurious class suits, the authorities were in conflict as to
whether unnamed members of a class could benefit from the class judgment
through post judgment intervention; but these authorities reaffirmed that such
unnamed members did not bear the burden of an unfavorable adjudication. 113
Criticism of original Rule 23 commenced soon after its enactment. In a
widely cited article by Kalven and Rosenfield, 114 the authors argued that the
class device provided social and economic benefits and basic justice to
individuals who otherwise had little chance for legal redress. 115 The authors
concluded that the categories of original Rule 23, which limited binding class
judgments to cases involving either joint or common rights or several rights in
a particular property or fund, unduly restricted the use of the class action
device. 116 Moreover, Professor Chafee urged dropping the true, hybrid, and
spurious classifications and returning to the broader common or general interest
requirement as described in Equity Rule 38.117 As his commentaries suggest, if
classification does not carry the user forward to rational thought, what good are
the categories? This criticism of original Rule 23 was acknowledged by the
Advisory Committee, which adopted amended Rule 23 in 1966, expanding the
utility of the class device by adopting broader categories.118
Most important, original Rule 23 did not directly address procedures to
ensure fairness. Other than a general requirement that the representative must
guarantee adequate representation of all, there was no provision for certification
or decertification processes, definition of the class as to members and issues,
HON. ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 572 (1961); 6
CYCLOPEDIA OFFEDERAL PROCEDURE § 23.09 (3d ed. 1966).
113 See Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 336 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); McGrath v. Tadayasu Abo, 186 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 832 (1951); see also York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503,
528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
114 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function ofthe Class
Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Ray. 684 (1941).
115 Id. at 691-94.
116 Id. at 695-701.
117 CHAFEE, supra note 20. Chafee carefully traced the steps from the Bill of Peace to
representative suits to class actions and the development of Equity Rules 38 and 48.
118 See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARV. L. REy. 874, 931 (1958) (noting twenty years of confusing experience in the
federal courts attempting to deal with the true, hybrid, and spurious categories; confusion
between joint, common, or several rights and the somewhat absurd use of the word
"spurious" are all noted); Note, Federal Class Actions, a Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46
COLUM. L. REv. 818, 822 (1946) (stressing the confusion in the cases applying the true,
hybrid, and spurious categories of the original rule).
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guideline on proper notice, or establishment of rights of parties opposing the
class. These issues were not addressed until the adoption of amended Rule 23.
However, in one aspect, the original Rule gave greater protection than the
amended Rule. This safeguard was embodied in the judicial interpretation of
the original Rule that limited binding class judgments to true and hybrid
actions. Thus, a judgment was binding on absent class members only if the
rights asserted were joint or common, or rights in the same property or fund.
This ensured that historic due process, requiring an identity of claims between
the representatives and the class, was met.
V. AMENDED RULE 23 AND ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
The language and structure of amended Rule 23 weakened the due process
and fairness protection for absent class members. Adequacy of representation
was undercut by the adoption of numerous phrases having amorphous and
elastic meaning. Moreover, the categories and structure of the Rule, as well as
the alternative notice requirement enabling appearance or opt out, undercut the
adequacy of representation standards.
A. The Language of Amended Rule 23 and Adequacy of Representation
Generally, adequacy of representation has four aspects. First, the named
representatives and counsel must assert the claims of the absent members.
Second, the named representatives must have an identity with the claims of the
absent class members. Third, the named representatives and counsel must be
competent to present the issues. This includes an analysis of motivation,
willingness, financial ability, legal skills, reputation, and ethics of the
representatives and counsel. Fourth, there can be no conflict of interest between
the named representatives, their counsel, and the absent class members. This
"no conflict" requirement includes conflicts arising from choice of claims or
remedies. Although a conflict may also arise by reason of collusion, bribery, or
other relationship, this aspect of the no conflict requirement will not be
discussed herein."19
Amended Federal Rule 23(a) establishes four elements as a prerequisite to
all categories of class actions. 120 First, the class must be so large that it is
119 7A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: CIL
§ 1768 (2d ed. 1972).12 0 Section 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states the following:
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impracticable to join the members in court. 121 This factor reaffirms the
desirability of individual litigant autonomy. Only if joinder is impracticable are
class suits authorized notwithstanding the judicial efficiency of a representative
suit in smaller actions. Second, there must be one or more questions of law or
fact common to the class. Third, the claims or defenses of the representatives
must be typical of the class. Finally, the representatives must fairly and
adequately represent the class. 122
B. The Impact of Amended Rule 23 on Identity of Claims from 1966 to
General Telephone123
From 1966 to 1982, because of confusion caused by amended Rule 23, the
overwhelming majority of federal courts ignored historic identity of claims and
adopted legal standards for class certification that conflicted with traditional
due process concepts. Although these legal standards were overturned by
General Telephone,124 the misleading language of this period is still cited by
various courts. Each of the key phrases of the amended Rule cause some
confusion.
1. Commonality
Rule 23(a) requires that "there are questions of law or fact common to the
class." 125 The Rule refers to questions, not issues or claims, and does not
(a) Prerequisites to a Cass Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
121 This provision conflicts with the requirement that a (b)(3) class must receive notice
giving the right to make an appearance through counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). If (b)(3)
class members receive notice and do appear in large numbers, their appearance may make
maintenance of the suit difficult, if not impractical.
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
123 General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
124 Id.
125 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
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require that all or even a substantial number of questions be common to the
class. 126
The plural language suggests that there must be more than one question in
common; however, in practice, only one common question of law or fact will
suffice. 127 So long as any common question links the representative and the
126 However, in deciding whether to certify as a (b)(3) category, a court must find
"that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members.. . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
127 In Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980), 29 plaintiffs
engaged in various facets of the commercial seafood industry sued Allied for discharging
toxic effluence into the James River and Chesapeake Bay. Id. at 103. The plaintiffs sought
certification on behalf of all residents of Virginia and Maryland whose livelihood or income
was derived from catching, buying, selling, or processing seafood from the James River,
Chesapeake Bay, or their tributaries. Id. at 104. The court found commonality since the
standard requires only that there be some questions of law and fact in common and does not
require a coincidence of legal claims. Id. at 105.
In Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. IM. 1980), a single plaintiff, a black
woman, sued for sex and racial discrimination against the Chicago district office of the
Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 380. Commonality was satisfied by a single issue common
to all members of the class and across-the-board discrimination charges.
In Rental Car, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 496 F. Supp. 373 (D. Mass.
1980), an action was brought on behalf of all Econo-Car dealers throughout the
United States, including 178 car dealers and 122 past franchisees. Id. at 376. The court
carefully analyzed the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and state law breach of fiduciary duty
claims in order to determine commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. The
court found commonality as to the plaintiffs' allegations that the franchisees were
wrongfully precluded by the franchise agreement from purchasing automobile insurance
from anyone other than the franchisor and as to an alleged fleet purchase price fixing
conspiracy. Id. at 377-82.
In Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), an action by a black
employee alleging employment discrimination against the Tennessee Department of General
Services was certified. The complaint of the named plaintiff related to the defendant's
promotion practices, but the class action certification encompassed promotions, pay raises,
equal working conditions, and the failure to hire black applicants. Id. at 27, 37.
In Gramby v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 84 F.R.D. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1979), three
black individuals sued for racial discrimination on behalf of (1) all past and present,
professional and semiprofessional black salaried employees of Westinghouse and (2) all
past, present, and future black applicants for professional and semiprofessional positions. Id.
at 656. They also sought to represent the same groups in multiple plants of Westinghouse.
Id. at 659. These class claims spanned some fifteen different categories of allegedly
discriminatory acts, but the plaintiffs were complaining only of salary, promotion, and
access to overtime pay. The court found commonality. Id.
In Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336
(D. Mass. 1983), a class of women in Massachusetts who were exposed to DES by various
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class, the standard is met even though there are substantial divergent
questions.12 8 As shown by the cases, commonality did not require identity of
claims. So easily is the requirement satisfied that it is often conceded or
ignored. 129
As thus phrased and applied, the commonality requirement provides little
or no protection for absent members of the class. Neither identity of issues nor
manufacturers and who had yet to contract uterine or vaginal cancer was certified. Payton,
83 F.R.D. at 386. The legal issues resolved by the class suit included the right in
Massachusetts to an action for mental anguish under similar circumstances, whether
increased risk of cancer was a compensable injury, whethef a cause of action for injury to
the fetus existed, whether strict liability was appropriate, and whether a private right of
action existed under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id. Although plaintiffs
sought to certify a class including states other than Massachusetts, the court limited
certification to Massachusetts because of multiple choice of law problems that undercut
commonality. Id. But see Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 70 F.R.D. 656 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(action brought on behalf of all Vietnamese children who had not been legally released to
the United States for adoption and whose families wanted their return; class certification was
denied because numerosity and commonality were not clear because each Vietnamese child
"bought" during the orphan air lift had a unique set of facts).
128 In International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local 164 v. Nelson, 102 F.R.D. 457
(N.D. Cal. 1983), a class of plaintiffs sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
the United States Border Patrol for alleged unconstitutional raids on various work sites. Id.
at 460. The plaintiff representatives sought only declaratory and injunctive relief and made
no claim for monetary damages. Id. at 461. The court certified the action as a (b)(2) class
because the defendants' alleged systematic and uniform practices of conducting workplace
raids (common questions of fact) and the constitutionality of sich raids (common questions
of law) satisfied commonality, notwithstanding that there may have been individual factual
differences within the proposed class. Id. at 461-62.
In Coleman v. McLaran, 98 F.R.D. 638 (N.D. 11. 1983), nine taxpayers brought a
class action against various Illinois counties for unccinstitutional assessment of taxes on real
estate. Id. at 641. The court, noting the similarity of the legal issues being raised, found
commonality. Id. at 645.
In Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 685 (E.D." Pa. 1977), a shareholder received
(b)(3) certification for the defendant's alleged conspiracy to violate Rule 10(b)-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Commonality, defined and satisfied as a common
nucleus of operative facts, was established by the conspiracy allegations, although there
were different transactions and different documents involved in the alleged fraudulent or
concealed information. Id. at 690-91.
In Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977), a representative of a person
killed in a fire at a supper club sued on behalf of the 200 persons injured or killed in the
fire. Id. at 44. The court found commonality because the entire class consisted of business
invitees. Id. at 46.




competency of the presentation by representative or counsel are ensured by the
commonality provision.
2. Typicality
Rule23(a) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class .... "130 On its face,
typicality requires some nexus between representative and class claims or
defenses. However, by choosing a series of amorphous generalities-
"commonality," "typicality," and "adequacy of representation"-the rule
drafters duplicated, overlapped, and ultimately confused the law. For example,
in Rule 23(b)(3) (damage) class actions, the common questions must
predominate over the uncommon questions, but the requirements of Rule 23(a)
as to typicality and adequacy of representation also govern. 131 Thus, in (b)(3)
actions, even though it is contemplated that there will be some questions that
are not common, the typicality requirement must also be satisfied. Typicality
must, therefore, require something less than the historical identity of claims.
The meaning of typicality assigned by the federal courts is varied. A
number of the courts labelled typicality as confusing and without definition.132
Other courts concluded that typicality had no independent meaning, equating it
with commonality' 33 or adequacy of representation. 134 Furthermore, a
130 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
131 FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(3), 23(a)(3)-(4).
132 See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980); see also
Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 30 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (noting that typicality is the
most confusing part of Rule 23); Inmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode, 79 F.R.D.
228, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (noting the confusion as to the meaning of typicality and then
concluding that because all the named representatives were inmates, their claims were
typical); Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 475 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (noting
that there is a general confused state of the law as to what each of the elements of
Rule 23(a) requires).
133 In Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657 (E.D. Pa. 1980), a single white
female employed by Dean Witter in Pennsylvania sued on behalf a nationwide class, which
included minority groups, for alleged employment discrimination. Id. at 660. In defining
typicality, the court noted that it has historically had an illusive meaning and cited MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 98, for the conclusion that typicality has no meaning
separate from other subsections. Id. at 667.
134 In Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), an action
was brought by several black fire fighters alleging discriminatory policies and practices
within the four defendant municipalities' fire departments. Id. at 384. Plaintiffs sought
certification on behalf of all past, present, and future black employees of defendants' fire
departments. Id. at 398. The court stated that "[it] is questionable whether [the] Rule
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substantial number of courts held that the representative satisfied typicality if
the same position was taken by both the representative and the class on any one
of the common questions of law or fact.' 35
23(a)(3) requirement that plaintiffs' claims be 'typical' of those of the class has any meaning
independent of Rule 23(a)(2) (common question) or [23](a)(4) (adequacy of representation).
Much of the requirements of 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4) overlap and require joint consideration
here." Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
In Chevalier v. Baird Savings Association, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976), an action
was brought under the Truth and Lending Act against savings institutions, alleging that they
charged mortgagors interest from the date of settlement to the date of the first monthly
payment. Id. at 143. The court deferred discussion of the typicality issue because it was
ambiguous and added little or nothing to the other requirements of Rule 23. Id. at 144.
135 In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), a group of
female employees sued for sex discrimination. Id. at 714. The court of appeals rejected the
lower court's limitations on the action and declared that the trial court bore a special
responsibility to resolve the dispute by determining the facts regardless of the position of the
individual plaintiff. Id. at 715.
In In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 107 F.R.D. 703 (E.D. Mich. 1985), the
court, citing In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), held that objections by members of the class are not sufficient grounds
for disproving the settlement so long as the gross settlement amount is reasonable. In re
Jackson, 107 F.R.D. at 710. The court ran through the 23(a) factors in a cursory manner,
concluding that the claims of the named plaintiffs were typical. The result of the case was a
mass tort mandatory certification, cutting off constitutional rights of all prisoners. Id. at
710-14. Note that this case was decided after General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147 (1982).
In Lewis v. Capital Mortgage Investments, 78 F.R.D. 295 (D. Md. 1977), a single
shareholder alleging violation of the securities law was certified to sue on behalf of a class
of approximately 5,000 shareholders. Id. at 299-301.
In Fujita v. Sumitomo Bank, 70 F.R.D. 406 (N.D. Cal. 1975), a sex discrimination
suit was brought on behalf of all present and future female employees of Sumitomo Bank
throughout California who were denied employment and opportunity for advancement or
promotion, were hired at lower grades, or were otherwise denied employment opportunities
on the basis of sex. Id. at 408. The named plaintiffs were three terminated employees. The
class issues were broadly defined as being all sex discrimination issues. Because the hiring
policies were handled by a central personnel department, the claims, although they arose in
one branch, were deemed representative for all 21 branches of the bank without analysis of
divergence of issues, claims, and remedies. Id. at 410.
In Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp., 62 F.R.D. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a
single plaintiff sought monetary damages and recission of a merger that allegedly violated
securities laws. Id. at 415. The court narrowly defined qualifications of an adequate class
representative as being the competency of the attorney for the class and the avoidance of
collusive suits or antagonistic interests. Id. at 420. The court certified the class with only
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In Karan v. Nabisco, Inc.,136 a sex discrimination employment suit was
brought by two employees at Nabisco's Pittsburgh bakery on behalf of all
present and future female employees of Nabisco's bakeries throughout the
United States.' 37 The two individual plaintiffs complained of discrimination
against females in layoffs, seniority, wages, job classifications, promotions,
job transfers, overtime opportunities, shift selections, job biddings, grooming
policies, maternity benefits, and harassment of women who were placed in
male jobs.138 Although many issues were raised by the complaint, the named
representatives did not individually have claims for the complained injuries.
Moreover, Nabisco operated eleven other bakeries, each of which applied its
own terms and conditions of employment and bargained separately with
different local unions. 139 The court defined typicality as
directing an analysis into whether the factual and legal situations of the
representatives are similar to those of the rest of the class so that an inordinate
emphasis will not be placed on their unique individual circumstances, and
whether their contentions concerning the common factual and legal issues are
similar to those of the class. 140
Thus, Karan adds nothing to class analysis beyond the commonality
requirement. Under this approach, there is typicality between the named
plaintiffs and the class claims.
A standard similar to the one employed in Karan states that when absent
class members benefit from any question asserted by the representative there is
typicality. 41 Under this approach, typicality as a distinct requirement is almost
elminated.
one representative, although it was obvious that the possible claims and remedies within the
class differed as to recission and damage recovery. Id.
136 78 F.R.D. 388 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
137 Id. at 395.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 404.
140 Id. at 405.
141 In Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 946 (1978), the complaint alleged "across-the-board" discrimination in the areas
of training, transfers, promotional opportunities, and job classification, contending that the
union cooperated with the company in those practices. Id. at 1368. The court upheld the
trial court's ruling to certify the class under (b)(2) because of one common allegation of
racial discrimination, even though the named plaintiffs had in fact suffered by only limited
practices. Id. at 1372.
In Gill v. Monroe County Department of Social Services, 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y.
1978), an action was brought by 36 past, present, and potential employees of the county
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The nexus test adopted by some courts states that typicality is satisfied if
there is a nexus between representative and class issues. 142 Phrased yet another
way, typicality is met if the representative's claims bear a relationship to the
class claims. 143
According to a number of courts, if the representative's claims were
derived from the same course of conduct and were based on the same legal
theory, typicality was satisfied. 144  In Lewis v. Capital Mortgage
Investments,145 there were different documents involving purchases at different
times, which allegedly contained misrepresentations. Typicality was satisfied
because of the alleged common course of conduct. This represents another
"across-the-board" case. The limited claim of the named representative did not
provide motivation to litigate or settle all the class claims, yet if the
representative lost, the class was bound.
Department of Social Services on behalf of 120 members of the work force who alleged
employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin. Id. at 322.
Although the thrust of the representatives' complaints involved promotion discrimination by
various methods, including discriminatory civil service tests, lack of job posting, use of
provisional appointments, and lack of objective systems for evaluating job performance, the
class was certified to sue for alleged unequal pay, retaliatory action, discriminatory
demotions and layoffs, and discriminatory recruitment and hiring. Id. at 323-24.
142 In Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), the
Oneida Indian tribe sued for the rights to five million acres of land in the state of
New York. Id. at 703. The court certified a defendant's class with 152 named defendants as
representatives of the proposed class of all persons claiming property interests within the
relevant geographic area. The common legal issue involved was whether the validity of
certain transactions that occurred in 1785 and 1788 could be attacked. Id. at 705. Typicality
was satisfied without analyzing separate defenses available to various classes of homeowners
and the state. Id.
In Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20 (W.D. Mo. 1979), a plaintiffs' class alleging
violation of pension rights in connection with the acquisition and shutdown of various plants
was certified. Id. at 24. The court stated that the typicality requirement overlaps the
commonality issue, and all that need be established is that the plaintiff demonstrate some
nexus with the claims of the class. Id. at 35.
143 See Gramby v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.. 84 F.R.D. 655, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(holding that so long as the plaintiff's claim is not unique and particularized, there is
typicality).
144 In Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Ill. 1980), a single black female
plaintiff sued for sex and racial discrimination against the Chicago branch of the IRS. Id. at
379. The court held that typicality is satisfied when plaintiffs' claims arise from the same
event, practice, or course of conduct because the class claims and the plaintiffs' claims are
based on the same legal theory even though the acts and remedies differ substantially. Id. at
380-81.
145 78 F.R.D. 295, 301-02 (D. Md. 1978).
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Other commentators state that typicality is satisfied if the representative's
claims or defenses and the class's claims or defenses stem from a "single event
or are based on the same legal or remedial theory." 146 The cases cited as
supporting this standard are primarily single legal issue cases in which the
defendants were accused of violating a single constitutional or other legal
standard, and the factual differences among the class had little or no relevance
to the desired remedy. 147 To illustrate, if the complaint alleges a denial of
due process in the changing of Medicaid rights without adequate notification, a
class suit is appropriate to determine the due process right to notice. .This is a
single legal issue. On the relevant fact of whether due process requires notice,
the representative and class claims are identical and the class adjudication is
desirable.
Such cases should not be interpreted as saying that identity of legal theories
between the class and the representative necessarily justifies class certification.
For example, one prison inmate claiming civil rights violations for violence
against him cannot justify a class in other institutions involving different acts
and practices merely because the same legal theory of civil rights is asserted.
Still other courts have defined typicality by adopting a "markedly different
position" test. Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane discussed this test as
follows: "Rule 23(a)(3) may have independent significance if it is used to
screen out class actions when the legal or factual position of the representatives
is markedly different from that of other members of the class even though
common issues of law or fact are raised." 148 Precisely when a position is
"markedly different" is undefined, and some courts have loosely applied this
standard to undermine the identity of claims requirements. 149 The test refers to
positions, not claims or the liability elements of claims. 150 Under this standard,
146 See Kuenz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 104 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
(certifying an action brought for sex discrimination against Goodyear by two named women
alleging nationwide discrimination); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 119, § 1764.
147 See Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 958 (11th Cir. 1985); Weiss v. York
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 809-10 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); De La
Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983).
148 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 119, § 1764.
149 See, e.g., Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
150 In Peil v. Speiser, 97 F.R.D. 657 (E.D. Pa. 1983), a securities class action based
on allegedly false and misleading information distributed to stockholders was certified. The
court found that the fact that there may be defenses applicable to the named representative's
claim that are atypical of the class does not defeat the representation. Id. at 659-60.
In Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1980), a single white
female employed by Dean Witter in Pennsylvania sued on behalf of a nationwide class of all
female, black, and Spanish-surnamed Americans and other minority employees and job
applicants of Dean Witter. The court cited to Wright and Miller's definition that there is
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the representative with one claim may represent unrelated class claims so long
as the factual position on the unrelated claims is similar. The class is not
thereby protected, however, by the self-interest of the representative claimant.
Only a small number of federal courts between 1966 and 1982 made a
rigorous examination of representative and class claims and concluded that such
claims must be the same' 5' or coextensive 52 in accordance with historically
approved standards.
3. Adequacy of Representation Prior to General Telephone
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 153 Although the Rule obviously
overlaps "commonality" and "typicality," those concepts more specifically
refer to issues, claims, and defenses. To minimize duplication and confusion,
the overwhelming majority of federal courts from 1966 to 1982 chose to
restrict (a)(4) analysis to issues of competency in presentation and conflicts of
interest. Adequacy of representation by such interpretation did not require an
analysis of identity of claims as between the representative and the class. 154
typicality so long as the legal or factual position of the representatives are not markedly
different from that of the class. Id. at 667-73. Typicality also exists where the plaintiff has
demonstrated some nexus. The court said that the nexus definition does not differ from the
"markedly different" position formulation of typicality. Applying these definitions, the court
upheld a class on behalf of all females nationwide including applicants for hiring; however,
the named plaintiff could not represent black and other minority groups. Id. at 660-62.
In Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978), 20
Baskin-Robbins franchisee owners brought an antitrust action against the ice cream
company alleging various violations from tie-in sales to fixing wholesale and resale prices.
Id. at 112. There were differences within the franchisee class in part because they were
from different regions and each region was administered separately. Id. at 114. Moreover,
the named representatives made numerous unauthorized substitutions of supply items and
had not followed the suggested retail prices of Baskin-Robbins. Id. Nevertheless, the court
certified the class under the markedly different position test. Id. at 114-16. See also Barlow
v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 88 F.R.D. 619 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
151 See Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1983); Coleman v. McLaren, 98
F.R.D. 638 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 93 F.R.D. 45 (D.
Or. 1981); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D.
336 (D. Mass. 1983).
152 See Rental Car, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 496 F. Supp. 373 (D. Mass.
1980); Chmieleski v. City Prods. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
153 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
154 The cases cited supra notes 132-141 define and apply (a)(4) adequacy of
representation as not including identity of claims. See also Alexander v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1371-73 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding, on a direct interlocutory
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Evidence that "adequacy of representation" does not require an identity of
claims is further supported by the fact that the requirement applies to (b)(3) as
well as (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories. A (b)(3)'action, by definition, involves
questions of law and fact common to the class which dominate questions
affecting only individual members. Thus, (b)(3) class actions potentially
involve both disparate and homogeneous interests on liability as well as damage
elements. However, Rule 23(a) requires that "adequacy of representation" in
(b)(3) cases. Maintaining this requirement in class cases involving disparate
appeal, class certification in a civil rights "across-the-board" case), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
946 (1978); Yearsly v. Scranton Hous. Auth., 487 F. Supp. 784, 786-87 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
(defining adequacy of representation as competency of counsel plus absence of proof that
the plaintiff has a conffict of interest; moreover, the court noted that there were a number of
possible factual distinctions within the class and failed to consider the possible range of
remedies which might have been sought by such class); Kane Assoc. v. Clifford, 80 F.R.D.
402, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that the standard for determining adequacy is not
whether the representative has identical issues with absent class members, but whether the
representative may be expected to prosecute the class claims vigorously and whether the
representative has claims antagonistic to the claims of the class); Richardson v. Hamilton
Int'l Corp., 62 F.R.D. 413, 420-21 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (defining adequacy of representation
as the qualifications of the attorney for the class and the avoidance of collusive suits or
antagonistic interests; using this definition, the court certified the class with only one
representative although it was obvious that the possible claims and remedies of members of
the class might differ); see generally Bowen v. General Motors Corp., 685 F.2d 160 (6th
Cir. 1982); Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978); Garonzik v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 574 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976); Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1976); Michaels v.
Ambassador Group, Inc., 110 F.R.D. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); International Molders' & Allied
Workers' Local 164 v. Nelson, 102 F.R.D. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1983); In re Victor Tech. See.
Litig., 102 F.R.D. 53 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 99 F.R.D. 60 (D.
Or. 1983); Barlow v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 88 F.R.D. 619 (M.D. Fla. 1980);
Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Morgan v. Laborers Pension
Trust Fund, 81 F.R.D. 669 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Gill v. Monroe County Dep't of Social
Servs., 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Inmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode,
79 F.R.D. 228 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 685 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Black Grievance Comm. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 79 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Krehl
v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Coburn v. 4-R Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682
(D.D.C. 1977); Chevalier v. Baird Say. & Loan Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Bentowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
For a scholarly analysis of adequacy of representation see MOORE & KENNEDY, supra
note 98, 23.07; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 119, §§ 1766, 1767, 1769.1.
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issues undercuts the position that identity of claims is a part of adequacy of
representation.
An additional standard included in (a)(4) adequacy of representation is an
absence of a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest inquiry centers primarily
on interests outside the lawsuit, which bear on competency of presentation and
not on identity of claims, except in a limited manner. 155 In particular, a conflict
of interest standard does not limit an overreaching representative or counsel
from asserting claims beyond those possessed by the representative. 156
Historically, identity of claims was the primary protection for absent
class members.157 If the representative was asserting the same claims as those
possessed by the class, then the economic interest of the representative and of
the class was one, and the presumed self-interest of the representative would
ensure competent presentation of the class issues. The underlying assumption
was that all persons desire a greater share of goods and wealth. Moreover, a
representative with the same claim as the class presumably has sufficient
evidence, individual injury, and emotional involvement to present the claim
ably. The representative and counsel who aver claims beyond their own
evidence, injury, and direct concern are "overreaching." In presentation, and
more significantly in settlement, overreaching claims lack focus and effort and
may be ignored or traded away in order to reach a result favorable to the
named representative.
There are various influences which encourage overreaching claims and
may lead to judgments or settlements in which substantial claims of
class members are lost by res judicata. It is in the self-interest of the class
counsel and representatives to frame the complaint as broadly as possible,
thereby gaining more bargaining chips for settlement, legal fees, and trial. The
persons opposing the class also desire broad definitions of class claims in order
to enlarge the scope of res judicata and ensure universal release should they
settle or win in whole or in part. At trial, the representative may throw away or
weakly represent certain class claims because of a lack of personal interest and
155 Conflicts of interest may cover a situation when there is substantial conflict within
the class as to whether a claim should be enforced, particularly if the representative would
obtain a preference or benefit at the expense of the class.
156 An overlapping requirement means that both the representative and the class must
have standing to sue. Thus, the named representative and the class must have suffered
threatened or actual injury. Although the standing requirement does not require identity of
claims betwebn the named representative and the class, the standing requirement is met
even if the representative asserts a claim involving an injury that is separate and different
from the class's injury.




evidence. Similarly, in settlement negotiations the representative and the
counsel may throw certain class claims "into the winds" in order to obtain a
favorable and quick result.158 Ultimately, the losers in the overreaching
scenario are the absent class members.15 9
VI. CLASS ACTION CATEGORIES AND THE WEAKENING OF NOTICE
RIGHTS UNDER AMENDED RULE 23
In many class actions, particular issues are atypical and cannot be
adequately represented. To illustrate, in a mass product liability action the issue
of liability may be typical and adequately represented, but the causation and
damage issues may differ for each absent member of the class, ultimately
barring inclusion within the representative's claims. Similarly, in a fraud
action, reliance and damages may differ for each member of the class and
cannot be adequately represented using historical identity of claims
requirements. In these cases, notice giving opportunity to appear or opt out
becomes essential to bind a judgment on the atypical issues.
Notice giving opportunity to appear or to opt out fulfills fairness and
due process in class cases as follows: (1) if the absent class member appears
and participates pursuant to notice, the class member has had her day in court,
and the case is no longer a representative action as to the appearing party; (2) if
the class member opts out, she is not bound, and there can be no due process
violation by the class action judgment; (3) if the class member neither appears
158 See National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 16-18
(2d Cir. 1981).
159 In Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1979), an employee's
civil rights action was barred by resjudicata. The court held that resjudicata was
appropriate although the claims in the class action were not identical to the employee's
individual claims. Id. at 1052.
In Wren v. Smith, 410 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969), a group of prisoners at the Georgia
State Penitentiary sued to block integration of prison facilities. Integration had been ordered
in a prior class action and the prisoners were within the class designated as plaintiffs. Id. at
390. The court held that they were bound by the prior class action and dismissed their
petition. Id. at 391.
In Los Angeles Unified School District v. NAACP, 714 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court held that a prior action settled not only every issue that was raised but also every issue
that might have been raised. id. at 940. Hence, all claims prior to the adjudication of the
prior action were barred by resjudicata. Although the class was not formally certified, the
matter was handled as a class action, and the court held that relitigation was inappropriate.
Id. at 945. See aso King v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 790 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.
1986); Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1979).
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nor opts out, she may be deemed to have waived any objection and to have
consented to be bound by the representation on the atypical claims, remedies,
or issues. 160 All due process rights are personal and may be waived or satisfied
by consent. 161 The principles of waiver or consent assume that notice fully
informs the absent class member of the situation so that a considered choice is
possible. 162
During the certification process, the scope of claims within the class as
compared to the named representatives and possible conflicting claims among
members of the class may be unclear. Notice giving opportunity to appear or to
opt out assists in clarifying the scope of class claims, remedies, and issues in
relation to the representative claims. 163 Presumably, notifying all absent
members of the class in a properly worded notice that clearly defines class and
representative claims will encourage some response from class members. This
response may lead to a better evaluation of the representation, a redefining of
the class or its issues, or even decertification. Moreover, the failure to receive
any response to a properly worded notice is evidence that adequacy of
representation is satisfied.
The Advisory Committee drafting amended Rule 23 created four
categories, based on uncertain generalities, that established a class right to
notice giving opportunity to be heard or to opt OUt. 164 These categories were
not created to protect absent class members, but, rather, turned on technical
language that distracted from fairness and due process considerations.
Under Rule 23, there is no class right to notice giving opportunity to
appear or opportunity to opt out if a class action is classified as a (b)(1)(A),
(b)(1)(B), or (b)(2) action, although a court, in its discretion, may give such
160 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
161 Id. at 812-13; see also Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1982).
162 Many, if not most, class action notices are inadequate and misleading. Typically,
notice does not describe the atypical issues and problems of adequacy of representation.
Notice may be misleading in stating that adequacy of representation has already been
established by the court in a certification hearing. For a class member to properly make the
decision to waive rights or consent to representation, the notice should describe with
specificity the representative claims, the class claims, and the differences therein, if any, as
well as the qualifications of the representative and counsel.
163 Although this discussion links opportunity to appear and opportunity to opt out
under Rule 23(c)(2), the two concepts are separate. Due process may be satisfied by waiver
or consent based upon notice giving opportunity to be heard without opt out rights or based
upon notice giving opt out rights without an opportunity to be heard.
1 6 4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
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rights.165 Such actions have been labelled as "mandatory" class actions in the
sense that the parties must remain in the action and are thereafter bound.
A. The (b)(1)(A) Category
The (b)(1)(A) category is defined by the interests of the opponent to the
class. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) states that if the opponent is facing incompatible
standards of conduct from the contentions of divergent parties, a class action is
appropriate.166
The breadth of the language is astonishing. All litigation, even litigation for
damages, has the potential to affect a defendant's standard of conduct. For
instance, a suit for nuisance damages may be won by some claimants and lost
by others, thereby creating incompatible standards of conduct for the person
opposing the class. 167 Thus, damage actions which are normally construed as
(b)(3) actions may also fall within the language of (b)(1)(A), 168 and the court
165 Id.
166 Section 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
167 Also consider a governmental authority with responsibility to build a dam. This
authority may face a multipolar community reaction: some oppose the dam, some favor it
only if limited in area, others desire a larger dam with a larger lake in order to provide
more electric power. Although some of these litigants are seeking damages and others are
seeking injunctions, there are still incompatible standards of conduct facing the opponent.
168 The incompatible conduct language in (b)(1)(A) is similar to Rule 19, also
amended in 1966. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. However, this phrase is only one factor in
determining indispensable or necessary parties under Rule 19. In complying with Rule 23,
the remaining factors bearing on compulsory joinder under Rule 19 are ignored.
Incompatible standards of conduct become the basis of a binding mandatory class action
regardless of other factors or competing interests. Rule 19, for example, requires an
examination of the interests of the claimant, the interests of the absent members, and the
social interest in the light of "equity and good conscience." See generally Provident
Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
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may deny notice giving opportunity to appear or to opt Out. 169 This possible
confusion has caused some courts to say that (b)(1)(A) does not apply to
damage actions. 170
The (b)(1)(A) category contemplates antagonistic interests within the class
that cause the defendant to engage in divergent and incompatible standards of
conduct. Such divided interests raise an adequacy of representation concern,
especially since notice giving opportunity to appear, which might reveal the
range of contentions or a need for additional representatives or subclasses, is
not required.
However, in a (b)(1)(A) class, the focused coicern is on the party opposing
the class, not the protection of absent class members. As such, it may be
rational to deny opt out rights in these cases in order to have an effective
resolution of all the claims imposing conflicting standards on the party
opposing the class. This is particularly true when there are inconsistent
injunctive orders being sought that would subject the person opposing the class
to divergent orders and the possibility of civil or criminal contempt enforceable
by fines or incarceration. A conflicting injunctive order situation would also
fall within the (b)(2) category, discussed below.
Denying opt out rights to the absent class members in (b)(1)(A) cases does
not mean that notice giving opportunity to appear should also be denied, as is
now authorized by Rule 23. Indeed, the multipolar conflicts within the class
strongly suggest that opportunity to be heard should be given so that all of the
protesting points of view can be brought forth and fairly adjudicated, so
questions of the adequacy of representation can be fully revealed. 171
B. The (b)(1)(B) Category
The (b)(1)(B) category stresses the interests of the members of the class
whose claims may be impaired or impeded unless a class action is certified. 172
169 See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA,
556 F.2d 682, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1977).
170 See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 (6th Cir. 1984); Green
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 119, § 1773 n.4.
171 Defining and applying the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements
becomes difficult under (b)(1)(A). If adequacy is reduced to a typicality standard, how could
an adequate representative be typical with respect to the class, and thereby operate to bind
all absent members, if the class has incompatible positi6ns and interests? This would clearly
violate both identity of claims and conflicts of interest concepts unless subclasses are
created.172 Section 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
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However, the chosen phrase, "impaired or impeded," is broad and
uncertain. 173 Court holdings, commentaries, and historical precedent show that
class actions may be used to prevent a "race to judgment" in which the first
claimants to execute are paid in full but later claimants receive nothing due to
depleted assets. 174 A related type of case involves claims to a single piece of
property by multiple members of a class. In these "limited fund" cases, an
individual judgment clearly impairs or impedes the interests of other claimants.
The (b)(1)(B) category is not restricted to limited fund situations. The
impairing or impeding concept is potentially one of great elasticity. 175 For
instance, does the offering of a settlement "fund" satisfy the standard? If the
"impaired or impeded" language is satisfied whenever a settlement is offered
for less than the total amount of the claims, any damage action may be easily
converted into a (b)(1)(B) action, and rights to appearance and to opt out are
denied.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests ....
FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
173 The (b)(1)(B) category is not a restatement of the old hybrid class action which
involved class interests in the same property or subject matter of the action. The (b)(1)(B)
category does not require a claimed interest in the same fund or property; it turns on the
practical effect of the classification upon the members of the class. Language of similar
effect is found in Rule 24. FED. R. CIrv. P. 24. However, the language adopted by the
committee for the (b)(1)(B) action is free from historic restraints imposed by related
Rules 19 and 24. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 24.
174 See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA, 556
F.2d 682, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528,
536-37 (S.D. Fla. 1986). See generally Brown v. Bolger, 102 F.R.D. 849 (D.D.C. 1984).
175 Is this standard satisfied when potential class claims exceed the assets of the
defendants? How is the total amount of potential claims to be evaluated? By what process
are the potential assets of the defendants (including insurance coverage) to be weighed?
What investigation of potential liability versus potential assets should be made by the court?
See In re Bendectin Prods. .ab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Greenman
Sec. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 273 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.
Ky. 1977).
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Impairing or impeding the interest of class members is an uncertain guide.
This language, used in Rules 19 and 24, has been construed to be satisfied
when the absent party is adversely affected by the stare decisis effect of
litigation. However, if absent class members impaired by stare decisis qualify
under (b)(1)(B), every potential class action is classifiable as (b)(1)(B), and
notice giving appearance and opt out rights may be denied. For this reason,
some courts have interpreted the impaired or impeded standard as not including
stare decisis effects. 176
C. The (b)(2) Category
The (b)(2) category involves either injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief. 177 Of course, any type of action may involve declaratory
relief, at least in part. An action for product liability, for example, may initially
request a declaration of liability against the defendant.178 The declaratory
ruling may have utility in obtaining an injunction in a subsequent proceeding as
well as providing a basis for damages. As such, any case may qualify for
potential declaratory relief on certain issues even though the ultimate objective
of the case may be either injunctive relief or damages. The issue is whether
such cases involve "corresponding declaratory relief" within the meaning of
(b)(2).
A related issue is whether combined injunction and damage actions may be
certified as (b)(2) when the predominant objective is damages. The courts are
in conflict on this issue. Some courts have held that the possibility of a damage
award means that the full (b)(3) rights must be afforded even in a declaratory
176 See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th
Cir. 1973); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 119, § 1774 n.4.
177 Section 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
178 WRIGIT ET AL., supra note 119, § 1775 n.20.
[Vol. 54:607
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
relief action. 179 Other courts have held that claims which combine injunctive
and damage relief should be classified as mandatory. 180
D. The (b)(3) Category
The (b)(3) category of class actions is for damages. In order to maintain a
(b)(3) action, the requirements of Rule 23(a) and additional special
requirements must be met. 181 Rule 23(c)(2) provides that, in a (b)(3) action,
notice giving opportunity to appear and to opt out must be given in the best
179 See Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 1983);
Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. General
Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1979).
180 See Dosien v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.
1981); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1981); Laskey v.
International Union, 638 F.2d 954, 956-57 (6th Cir. 1981); Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d
280, 284 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977).
181 Section 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(b) Class Adions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
FEDR. Ciw. P. 23(b)(3).
These requirements obviously bear upon all class action categories. The structure of
Rule 23(b)(3) does not mean that (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions may have predominating
uncommon questions, that the class device need not be superior to other procedural devices
such as stare decisis, interpleader, or intervention, that the individual's interest in
controlling litigation is irrelevant to (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, or that judicial economy and
manageability are not concerns in the (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases. Numerous cases cited below
apply the above requirements to (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions as well as (b)(3) class actions,
although such conditions are not apparent from the face of the Rule.
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practicable manner,182 including individual notice if the names and addresses of
the class are available upon reasonable inquiry. Such notice may be something
beyond the reasonable notice required by the constitutional Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 183 standard and may be expensive, a factor
prompting some federal judges to classify actions as (b)(1) or (b)(2).184
E. The Impact of Categorization
Rule 23 leaves the giving of notice, appearance rights, and opt out rights
on (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases to the discretion of the trial judge. This fails to
recognize that such orders may, in certain cases, be mandated under due
process. 185 As a part of the discretionary notice provisidn, Rule 23 lists some
of the advantages of notice for absent members of the class: notice may inform
the court whether the class considers the representation to be fair and adequate
and notice may influence the class to intervene and present claims, defenses, or
otherwise appear in the action. 186
182 FED. R. CiV. P. 23(c).
183 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
184 A key pragmatic factor is the issue of who pays for notice. Absent a settlement,
notice costs in the federal system are initially advanced by the plaintiff or class counsel.
Hence, the avoidance of substantial up-front costs is additional motivation for class
representatives and counsel to seek certification as something other than a (b)(3) class.
185 In explaining discretionary notice, the Advisory Committee commented indirectly
that, to the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in the class and that representation is
adequate, the need for notice will be minimal. The Advisory Committee observed that
mandatory and discretionary notice provisions are designed to fulfill requirements of due
process, citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee's
note (1966). However, Rule 23, itself, fails to alert the legal community to the requisite
analysis of claims which are essential in evaluating cohesiveness or unity of the class.
186 Section 23(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions.
(2) Requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(2).
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The court is empowered to create subclasses and to appoint adequate
representatives for each of the subclasses. The court further has the power to
limit the issues as well as define the scope of the class action. By making such
limitations, potential due process problems may be alleviated; 187 however,
listing techniques for solving due process is not a substitute for clarity within
Rule 23 when there is a due process issue.
The adverse impact of the categories and structure of the amended Rule
may be summarized as follows:
(1) Distraction and confiusion resulting from combining two separate
and distinct issues. (A) Should a class action that is the superior device in
efficiently resolving disputes be permitted? (B) What protection should be
given as a matter of fairness and due process to absent class members?
The categories have outlived their utility. Class actions are now
accepted as efficient. The only test should be, "Is the device superior to
other procedural methods of adjudication?" The categories demand
extensive legal effort and hairsplitting, thereby distracting from the analysis
of fairness.
(2) The fallacy of mandated notice for.(b)(3) but not for (b)(1) or (b)(2)
actions. In determining whether notice is required, the primary issue
should be adequacy of representation through identity of claims. If there is
historic identity of claims, fairness and due process are satisfied and notice
is not required, although discretionary notice may be appropriate. If there
is not an identity of claims or if evidence of identity is insufficient, notice
should be required.
The (b)(1) and (b)(2) (no notice required) versus (b)(3) (notice
required) categories are not structured according to identity of claims. For
instance, a case seeking declaratory or injunctive relief ((b)(2)) involving
integration in Los Angeles schools may involve diverse claims and
conflicting remedies. Yet classifying this action as (b)(2) means that notice
and opportunity to be heard as well as opt out rights are not required. On
the other hand, a (b)(3) action may involve "homogeneity" and identity of
claims if all claimants have a single interest in the maximum recovery of
damages on a single issue. However, in (b)(3) actions, notice and opt out
rights are required.
187 Rule 23(b)(3) does not discuss the issue of binding out-of-state claimants, nor does
it make observations or requirements for the special problems of defendant class actions.
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(3) The irrational linking of notice giving opportunity to appear with
notice giving opportunity to opt out. These* two concepts have different
rationales and purposes. To illustrate, in (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B) cases,
opt out rights should ordinarily not be given because the exercise of such
rights: (A) defeats the resolution of divergent claims seeking incompatible
standards of conduct or (B) may result in a race to judgment. On the other
hand, because of the conflicting and divergent interests of the class, notice
giving opportunity to be heard should be afforded. 188 This combination of
opportunity for hearing and opt out rights has caused many courts to refuse
notice altogether.
The Advisory Committee's explanation as to why notice is required
under (b)(3) and not under the other categories is that individual interest is
greater in a (b)(3) claim. 189 It assumes that there is less individual interest
in seeking damages than in pursuing actions involving injunctions or
declaratory relief, actions in which an entity opposing the class may face
incompatible standards of conduct, or actions in which absentee parties
may, as a practical matter, have their interests impaired. The Advisory
Committee gives no reason for making these tenuous assumptions.
(4) The conflicting structure of (a)(3) and (a)(4) requirements in )(3)
cases. The (a)(3) (typicality) and (a)(4) (adequacy of representation)
188 Some confusion is generated by labeling (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes as "mandatory"
and (b)(3) classes as "discretionary." These labels focus on the right to opt out. If the focus
is notice, it may be argued that a (b)(3) class action is "mandatory" because notice must be
given and a right of opt out must be afforded, whereas (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions are
"discretionary" because the giving of notice and opt out rights is not required.
189 Section 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment, Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the
member so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through counsel ....
FD. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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requirements historically require an identity of liability claims between
representative and class. However, (b)(3) cases may include claims in
which there are nonpredominating liability questions affecting only
individual members of the class. How can representative claims be typical
so long as there are uncommon liability claims, and how can uncommon
liability claims be adequately represented under an identity of claims
standard? 190 Rule 23 should make it clear that if there are
nonpredominating liability claims affecting only individual members,
fairness and due process are satisfied by notice giving appearance and opt
out rights. The nonexercise of appearance or opt out rights acts as consent.
VII. GENERAL TEPHONE Co. v. FALCON AND THE RESTORATION OF THE
IDENTITY OF CLAIMS STANDARD
In General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,191 an across-the-board racial
discrimination class action was brought against General Telephone by one of its
employees who individually complained of denial of promotions and also
asserted class claims for racial discrimination in hiring. The class was broadly
defined as all those who suffered racial discrimination, including past, present,
and future employees, as well as applicants for employment. 192
A unanimous Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
subject to class action rules pertaining to commonality, typicality and adequacy
of representation.' 9 3 Furthermore, the Court stated that these concepts tend to
merge, serving as guideposts for determining whether maintenance of a
class action is economical and whether the interests of the absent class members
will be fairly and adequately protected.' 94
The standard of adequate protection requires that the class representative be
part of the class and "('possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as
the class members."' 95 Rule 23(a) requirements "effectively ('limit the class
claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff's claims.'- 196
190 See Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 128 F.R.D. 17 (D. Mass. 1989), in which the
court found typicality and adequacy of representation ((a)(3) and (a)(4)) but denied (b)(3)
certification because the uncommon claims predominated. Id. at 19-20.
191 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
192 Id. at 151.
193 Id. at 157-61.
194 Id. at 157 n.13.
195 Id. at 156 (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395, 403 (1977)).
196 Id.
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The Court noted the district court's error in certifying without carefully
evaluating whether the named plaintiff was a proper class representative. The
Court stated the following:
The District Court's error in this case, and the error inherent in the
across-the-board rule, is the failure to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the
named plaintiff's plea that he is a proper class representative under
Rule 23(a).... Sometimes the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to
determine whether the interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed
within the named plaintiff's claim, and sometimes it may be necessary for the
court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification
question. Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to
modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation. 197
Thus, according to the Court's analysis, it is error to presume an identity of
claims without identifying the questions of law or fact common to
representative and class.
The need for the identity of claims requirement was evidenced by the
Court's reference to the specially concurring opinion of Judge Godbold in a
Fifth Circuit decision:
'[Without reasonable specificity the court cannot define the class, cannot
determine whether the representation is adequate, and the employer does not
know how to defend .... ' He [Judge Godbold] termed as 'most significant'
the potential unfairness to the class members bound by the judgment if the
framing of the class is overbroad .... "And he pointed out the error of the
'tacit assumption' underlying the across-the-board rule that 'all will be well for
surely the plaintiff will win and manna will fall on all members of the
clas.... With the same concerns in mind, we reiterate today that a Title VII
class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court
is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied. 198
The requirement that class claims be fairly encompassed within the
representative's claims was repeatedly stressed by the Court, which illustrated
how to meet the "fairly encompassed" standard. 199 In the Court's illustration,
197 Id. at 160.
198 Id. at 161 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 417 F.2d 1122,
1125-27 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., specially concurring)).
199 "If petitioner used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both applicants for
employment and incumbent employees, a class action on behalf of every applicant or
employee who might have been prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)." Id. at 159 n.15.
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the individual plaintiff is motivated and has evidence to prove the defendant's
use of a biased testing procedure in hiring.200 The evidence supports the claims
of the entire class that has been injured by the same biased testing procedure,
even though each class member must establish its own damage. The
self-interest of the representative inures to the benefit of the class. 201
Having based its decision on the Rule's language, the Supreme Court did
not find it necessary to define the constitutional due process requirements.
Thus, the full impact of this decision on state court class actions under the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment was not addressed.
The commentaries have ignored the language and reasoning of General
Telephone by restricting its holding to civil rights cases. 2°2 According to
Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane, typicality is satisfied if the representative
uses the same legal or remedial theory as the class.203 Similarly, Professor
Newberg does not alter his analysis of typicality and adequacy after General
Telephone and relegates the impact of that decision to employment
20 0 Id.
201 Id. The next part of the illustration is less clear. It states as follows:
Significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees
if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the
same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes. In this regard it is noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory
employmentpractices, not an abstract policy of discrimination.
Id.
To apply this general'policy exception, suppose the plaintiff alleged: (1) there was a
general policy by the employer to discriminate racially in all employment practices, (2) this
policy was applied in conjunction with all subjective decisionnaking, and (3) plaintiff was
denied promotion by reason of discrimination pursuant to this policy. Proof by the plaintiff
under (1) and (2) will prove the class claims and, thus, "fairly encompass" them if the
"general policy exception" means that a single policy of discrimination governed all
subjective decisionmaking. The clear rejection of the across-the-board approach and the
repeated mention of same interest, same injury, and fairly encompassed class claims as
standards represent, in effect, the restoration of the historic requirement of identity of claims
between the class and the representatives.
2 02 WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 119, § 1771.2 03 Id. §§ 1764-65; see also MooRE& KENNEDY, supra note 98, 23.06-.07.
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discrimination cases. 204 Moreover, a number of law review articles have failed
to note the impact of General Telephone.20 5
We now turn to a circuit-by-circuit analysis of the cases applying (and in
some cases ignoring) the General Telephone principles. We shall then analyze
the meaning of identity of claims in specific contexts, including antitrust,
mass torts, securities, contract, employment discrimination, and other civil
rights cases.
VIII. CIRcurr-BY-CIRcUrr ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF GENERAL
TELEPHONE
This circuit-by-circuit analysis is based on a sample of approximately seven
hundred published federal class action opinions for the years 1982 through
1991.206 The results of the survey are organized by each of the twelve federal
circuits. The following sections begin by dividing the circuit cases which have
followed the identity of claims approach of General Telephone by topic
areas.207 Most sections then include a more detailed discussion of a few select
opinions that most closely followed or strayed from the General Telephone
guidelines.
204 4 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcrIoNs §§ 24.24, 24.29 (2d ed.
1984).
205 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: .Economic Analysis and Recommendations
for Refonn, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 84 (1991) (defining adequacy without regard to identity
of claims); George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Predusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69
VA. L. REv. 11, 35-36 (1983); George M. Stricdkler, Jr., Protecting the Class: The Search
for the Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAuL L. REV. 73, 132-61
(1984); Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Cvil Rights
Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 299-305 (1985); Note, Certifing Classes and
Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619, 620, 623-33 (1986).
206 The sample was drawn from listings in two Shepard's United States 0tations
publications. First, the sample includes all cases listed under General Telephone Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), in Shepard's United States Ctations 1984 through the
December 1991 supplement. SHEPARD'S UNrTD STATEs CrrATIoNs (1984-supp. 1991).
Second, the sample includes those cases listed under Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule 23(a)(4) in
Shepard's United States Ctations 1986 through 1990, including the December 1991
Supplement. SHEPARD'S UNrrED STATES CiTATIONS (1986-supp. 1991). This method was
selected in an effort to create a sample that would be manageable for research purposes yet
provide a representative picture of the law in this area.
207 Some of these cases include, as dicta, language which may be construed and




Federal courts within the First Circuit have followed the General
Telephone208 standard in civil rights, 209 securities,2 10 and single-issue cases. 211
The standard was closely followed in the recent case of In re One Bancorp
Securities Litigation.212 The named plaintiffs in this securities fraud action
sought to certify a class that included all purchasers of the defendant's publicly
traded securities in a nineteen and one-half month period beginning in
March 1988. The court began its consideration of the certification issue by
quoting its general duty under General Telephone to certify a class only "if it is
'satisfied, after rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied.'" 213
208 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
209 See Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 131 (lst Cir. 1985) (racial
discrimination in hiring action in which class was limited to applicants or applicants for
transfer to same welding job as named plaintiff).
210 See In re One Bancorp See. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 526, 528 (D. Me. 1991) (restricting
certified class to purchasers of common stock and refusing to allow named plaintiff who
purchased stock through corporation of which he was president to represent class); In re
Bank of Boston Corp. See. Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1525, 1530 (D. Mass. 1991) (using
standing analysis to eliminate from class of open market purchasers those who purchased
after named plaintiff); Adair v. Sorenson, 134 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D. Mass. 1991) (using
standing analysis to reject "common course of conduct" as sufficient to permit plaintiff to
represent subsequent purchasers); cf. Grace v. Perception Technology Corp., 128 F.R.D.
165, 169 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding access to unique information through personal contact
with corporate offices and special meetings rendered two of four named plaintiffs atypical to
class); Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771, 774-77 (D. Mass. 1988)
(certifying class that included purchasers of options as well as purchasers of common stock);
Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D. Mass. 1988) (allowing named plaintiffs, who
continued to purchase stock after company disclosure of losses, to represent earlier
purchasers); Gorsey v. I.M. Simon & Co., 121 F.R.D. 135, 138-39 (D. Mass. 1988)
(differences in reliance did not defeat typicality); Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552,
556-57 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding class period covering release of different documents
appropriate if the documents repeated the same misrepresentations as part of a single
common course of conduct); Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 308 (D.
Mass. 1987) (holding allegation of "common course of conduct" allowed named plaintiffs to
represent subsequent purchasers whose reliance was based on interrelated and cumulative
misrepresentations during a limited three month period).
211 See Tyler v. United States Dep't of Labor, 752 F. Supp. 32, 44-45 (D. Me. 1990)
(denying certification in challenge to interpretation of Trade Act of 1974 because same
relief was obtainable through individual injunction or corresponding declaratory relief).
212 136 F.R.D. 526 (D. Me. 1991).
213 Id. at 528 (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
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The court focused most of its attention on the typicality requirement of
Rule 23(a)(3). It quickly rejected one of the proposed named plaintiffs because
the stock purchases attributed to him actually were made by a corporation of
which he was the president.214 The court held that because the plaintiff "never
purchased One Bancorp stock, his claims [were] not typical of those of the
class." 215 The court used a similar rationale to exclude from the class those
who purchased company securities other than common stock. The court held
that because all of the named plaintiffs were purchasers only of common stock,
their claims were atypical "of claims of persons who traded in One Bancorp
securities other than common stock."2 16
The court rejected, for the purposes of certification, a defense contention
that differences in reliance between named plaintiffs and the proposed class
rendered the claims atypical because the class and representatives all relied on
the integrity of the artificially inflated market price. 217 The court also rejected a
defense contention that the claims of the named representatives were atypical of
at least part of the class because the named representatives purchased late in the
class period and, therefore, did not properly represent earlier purchasers.218
The court concluded that such differences did not render the claims of later
purchasers atypical because the complaint was based on the theory that the
defendants had "engaged in a scheme or common course of conduct designed
to deceive the investing public," 219 and the plaintiff pointed to specific and
identified documents which contain interrelated and cumulative
misrepresentations. 220
B. Second Circuit
Federal courts within the Second Circuit have followed the General
Telephone221 standard in civil rights,222 antitrust, 22 securities,2 24 mass tort 225
constitutional law,226 bankruptcy, 227 and single issue228 cases.
2 14 Id. at 530.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 531-32.
217 Id. at 530.
218 Id. at 530-31.
219 Id. at 531.
220 Id.
221 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
222 See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 596-600 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding typicality satisfied in sex discrimination action by showing that company used same
subjective evaluation system for all members of the class and decisions made by "same
central group of people"); see also Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corps.,
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746 F. Supp. 301, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (certifying class in challenge to alleged
discriminatory apartment rental policy because showing made that defendant discriminated
against plaintiff using one established policy which discriminated against minorities);
Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 82, 88-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (limiting class of
non-Asian and non-Japanese employees in discrimination claim to employees of New York
office); Ashe v. Board of Elections, 124 F.R.D. 45, 48-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding 11
named plaintiffs in voting rights action satisfied typicality because allegation was that they
were discriminated against by series of acts which encompassed the class claims); Strykers
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 695 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding alleged oral promises made to named representatives in action challenging
urban renewal plan rendered their claims atypical because subject to unique defenses);
AFSCME v. Nassau County, 664 F. Supp. 64, 67-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying class of
female employees alleging discrimination because they were employed in "traditionally
female jobs" because case involved one comprehensive plan and was not based on
individual decisions in hiring and promotion); Jane B. v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 117 F.R.D. 64, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding typicality in action by two juveniles
broadly challenging conditions at two centers for adolescent girls with behavioral and
emotional problems because conditions affected all members of class and were based on
same legal theory); Louis M. by Velma M. v. Ambach, 113 F.R.D. 133, 137 (N.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding, in action to enforce provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act,
differences in individual factual circumstances did not affect central legal claim); Selzer v.
Board of Educ., 112 F.R.D. 176, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1986Y (finding typicality in action by
female guidance counselors alleging sex discrimination in selection for administrative and
supervisory jobs because affidavits supported their claim that they were discriminated
against by the same central group of people "in same general fashion" as other female
employees); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 567, 573-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (certifying class claiming discrimination in favor of Japanese males);
Moses v. Avco Corp., 97 F.R.D. 20, 23 (D. Conn. 1982) (declining to certify across-the-
board employment discrimination case because named plaintiffs could not represent both
union and nonunion class members); Warren v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 95
F.R.D. 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding named representative in sex discrimination
employment case could not represent class of those denied promotions because she never
sought promotion); Meyer v. Macmillan Publishing Co., 95 F.R.D. 411, 414-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing named plaintiffs complaining of sex discrimination in
promotions to repmsent class that included applicants because affidavits provided
"'significant proof [of]... a general policy of discrimination'... [which] 'pervades'...
all personnel decisions").
223 See Vasiliow Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 345, 347-48 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (certifying plaintiff class of independent beer wholesalers in the State of New York in
horizontal price-fixing case based on system of exclusive territory contracts, but declining to
certify plaintiff class in vertical price-fixing claim or to certify defendant class as either a
vertical or a horizontal claim); Uniondale Beer Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D.
340, 342-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying statewide plaintiff class of beer retailers in
horizontal price-fixing case based on use of exclusive territory agreements but declining to
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certify defendant class based on failure to show numerosity); see also Rios v. Marshall, 100
F.R.D. 395, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (limiting claims to those years in which named plaintiffs
raised claims in action alleging conspiracy to replace citizen farmworkers).
224 See Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no abuse of discretion by district court in ruling
that unique defenses against named plaintiff made class certification inappropriate); Epifano
v. Boardroom Business Prods., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (certifying
purchaser of initial public offering as class representative when same alleged
misrepresentation made to entire class through registration statement, prospectus, and press
releases); CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding access to special information not privy to rest of class made claim
by underwriter atypical to class because of differences in reliance); see also Landry v. Price
Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 123 F.R.D. 474, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting
named representative because inside information made him subject to unique defenses
regarding reliance); Kamerman v. Steinberg, 123 F.R.D. 66, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(certifying on reconsideration of earlier denial because of conflicts between class attorneys);
In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding some
factual differences in prospectus did not defeat typicality when each omitted the same
material matters relating to financing and the promoters); Bresson v. Thomson McKinnon
Sec., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 339, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding typicality in case concerning
sale of limited partnerships where communications to class members all contained the same
omissions and half-truths); Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 183
(D. Conn. 1987) (holding named plaintiff who purchased interest in partnership from third
party could not represent class of investors who purchased interests in the same partnership
directly from defendant); Koenig v. Benson, 117 F.R.D. 330, 339-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(certifying later purchaser who acquired stock to represent earlier purchasers because the
same misrepresentation was contained in both purchasers' annual reports); Genden v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
variations in interest due or dates and amounts of redemption did not defeat typicality in
action over misrepresentations in sale of trust bonds); In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.,
122 F.R.D. 424, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding differences involving date, type, and
manner of purchase, investor's perception of the transaction, or information furnished did
not destroy typicality if named plaintiff was "victim of same material omissions and the
same consistent course of conduct"); Kamerman v. Steinberg, 113 F.R.D. 511, 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting two named plaintiffs because they were simultaneously pursuing
derivative action creating conflict of interest); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer
Litig., 112 F.R.D. 383, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding certification of class that included
tenderers of shares and purchasers of calls during tender period was proper because both
were affected by same misrepresentations that artificially inflated the price of company
securities); Kamerman v. Ockap Corp., 112 F.R.D. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
long-standing antagonism toward company rendered named representative atypical because
subject to unique defenses); Shankroff v. Advest, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding typicality satisfied because same omissions affected representative and the
class); Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 110 F.R.D. 316, 318-19
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(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding claim of failure to pay cash promptly after tender of stock
constituted "common course of conduct" that satisfied typicality requirement); Michaels v.
Ambassador Group Inc., 110 F.R.D. 84, 88-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding conflicts
between early and later purchasers did not defeat typicality because misrepresentations or
omissions relied upon were interrelated and relied upon by the entire class); Klein v. A.G.
Becker Paribas Inc., 109 F.R.D. 646, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding later purchasers could
not represent earlier purchasers because disclosures rendered their claims atypical);
Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding
purchases by plaintiff after disclosure did not render claim atypical because materiality of
alleged omissions is judged by objective, not subjective, standards and applied to entire
class).
In some securities cases, however, the General Telephone standard has not been
followed. See Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1402-04 (D. Conn. 1988)
(finding that a series of press releases that contained different alleged misrepresentations
were a "common course of conduct" satisfying typicality); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 689 F.
Supp. 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (certifying class of purchasers in investment vehicles over 15
year period even though each vehicle was different and not all plaintiffs invested in all
vehicles).
225 See McKeran v. United Technologies Corp., 120 F.R.D. 452, 453 (D. Conn.
1988) (finding claims of named plaintiff who sold his helicopter not typical of those who still
owned their helicopters in product liability action against manufacturer); see also In re Joint
E. & S. District Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 819-20 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
226 See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 121 F.R.D. 215, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (creating subclasses among employees who were challenging drug-testing program);
see also Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(refusing to allow nonusers of marijuana to represent class that included users or vice
versa).
227 See In re Broadhollow Funding Corp., 66 B.R. 1005, 1007 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986) (certifying defendant class in action over ownership of mortgages only after creating
subclass to represent different types of holdings).
228 See Devine v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 989, 996 (D. Conn. 1991)
(limiting class of participants in early retirement benefit plan to employees at single plant
location because of differences in promises contained in documents distributed to employees
at other locations); Goetz v. Crosson, 728 F. Supp. 995, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (challenge
by patients involuntarily retained at state psychiatric center to hearing procedure related to
confinement); see also Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 127 F.R.D.
84, 88-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding differences in qualifications of named plaintiff did not
defeat typicality in action by female high school students challenging use of Scholastic
Aptitude Tests as sole basis for awards in state scholarship program); Luyando v. Bowen,
124 F.R.D. 52, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (certifying plaintiff and defendant classes in action
challenging "pass through" policy in state welfare program application); Doe v. Coughlin,
697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (certifying, on court motion, class of inmates in state
correction facilities challenging policy of transferring inmates who tested HIV positive);
David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 756-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
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A sample decision within the Second Circuit which follows General
Telephone on its facts but uses ambiguous language is In re Energy Systems
Equipment Leasing Securities Litigation.229 In this case, investors alleging
securities fraud and RICO violations sued multiple entities who were involved
in offering lease and service agreements regarding energy conservation
devices. 23 0 The defendants allegedly prepared standardized and virtually
identical offering materials and related documents that misled
lessors/purchasers by way of misrepresentations and omissions. 23 1 On these
facts, the representatives' claims fairly encompass the class claims, but the
language of the opinion is far broader than the General Telephone standard. To
illustrate, consider standards set by the Energy Systems court, including
"factual differences will not defeat class certification where the various claims
arise from the same legal theory" 23 2 and "[actual differences] have their
(finding typicality satisfied in copyright infringement action because there was a
"congruence of interests" between named and unnamed plaintiffs in that they were asserting
the identical legal issue); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 122 F.R.D. 436,
438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding retirees could represent class of plaintiffs that included
present employees of company that terminted pension plan while in bankruptcy
reorganization); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding
challenge to Medicaid eligibility criteria by class of aliens met typicality requirement
because claims of named plaintiffs and class "rest[ed] on identical legal theories"); Follette
v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 504-09 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (certif ing plaintiff and defendant
classes in challenge to state wage garnishment law); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554,
558 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding differences in evidence regarding residency did not defeat
typicality in action challenging city housing authority tenancy termination policy);
DeAllaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D. 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (certifying plaintiff and
defendant classes in action alleging state failure to properly adhere to regulations governing
low income energy assistance program); McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F.
Supp. 233, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (challenge by low income tenants to policies when
subsidies were suspended because of landlord's failure to make repairs); Koster v. Perales,
108 F.R.D. 46, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding typicality met in action seeking improved
provision of emergency shelter because legal issues of named plaintiffs' claims were
"central" to both their claims and those of other class members).
229 642 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Because the opinion purports to and does
follow General Telephone on its factual holding, it is classified as following General
Telephone, notwithstanding its loose language.
23O Id. at 724.
231 Id. at 730.
232 Id. at 750.
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genesis in the same alleged course of conduct." 233 These standards, applied
alone, may lead to results contrary to General Telephone.23 4
C. Third Circuit
Federal courts within the Third Circuit have generally followed the
General Telephone2 5 standard in civil rights, 236 antitrust,2 37 securities,
238
233 Id.
234 The court in In re Lilco Securities Litigation, 111 F.R.D. 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1986),
similarly uses such broad language. On the alleged facts, the defendants, in order to sell
stock, failed to disclose or misrepresented the cost, completion date, and management of a
nuclear facility as well as misrepresenting need, income, and operating profit projections.
Id. at 664-67. Differences in reliance were rejected as largely irrelevant because the court
presumed reliance. Id. at 668. The court then declared that "class certification should not be
denied because the common course of conduct included.., different activities ... or there
were multiple disclosures by defendants ... ." Id. at 669.
235 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
236 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 122-25 (3d Cir. 1985)
(narrowing class to eliminate claim of discrimination in initial alsignment because statute of
limitations barred such complaints by named plaintiffs); see also Taylor v. White, 132
F.R.D. 636, 647-48 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (certifying class attack on general policy of
discrimination against Medicaid patients in nursing home assignments although the
particular injuries differed); Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910, 919 (D.N.J. 1986)
(holding differing factual circumstances did not defeat typicality in suit alleging elections
violations because of claim that instructions promulgated by board of elections encouraged
harassment of minority voters); Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington,
109 F.R.D. 89, 91 (D. Del. 1985) (finding typicality satisfied in reverse discrimination suit
because all applicants for promotion were subject to same testing procedures); Ladele v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 95 F.R.D. 198, 200-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (rejecting certification of
across-the-board class in employment discrimination action because named plaintiff, a
former employee, could not represent rejected applicants).
237 See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 810-11 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiff
who was denied staff privileges by hospital could represent class that included osteopaths
who did not apply because all were part of class of "intended victims" of hospital's
discriminatory policy); Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 120 F.R.D.
642, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding typicality satisfied in claim of horizontal price-fixing in
containerized garbage disposal industry because it operated on a standardized nationwide
basis); In re Chlorine & Caustic Soda Antitrust Litig., 116 F.R.D. 622, 625 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (holding typicality satisfied in horizontal price-fixing case because named plaintiffs
had to prove same elements as the class in establishing a conspiracy, its effectuation, and
resulting damages).
238 See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 372-73 (D. Del. 1990)
(allowing call option purchaser to represent class that included common stock purchasers
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mass tort,239 RICO,240 labor law, 24 1 contract, 242 and single iSSUe 43 cases. In
some instances, however, the standard has been disregarded. 2'
because both relied on fraud-on-the-market theory); see also Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128
F.R.D. 624, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding typicality satisfied even though named plaintiff
was a takeover arbitrageur who was alleged not to have relied on integrity of market); In re
Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp. See. Litig., 125 F.R.D. 625, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(finding typicality satisfied in class of original purchasers of bonds because alleged material
misrepresentations and omissions were contained in offering statement); In re IGI Sec.
Litig., 122 F.R.D. 451, 456 (D.N.J. 1988) (focus of typicality inquiry in securities case on
defendant's, not plaintiff's, behavior); Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 122 F.R.D. 177, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding uniform statements in offering
circulars satisfied typicality in case alleging excessive and unconscionable markups of bond
sales); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 121 F.R.D. 642, 647-48 (M.D. Pa.
1988) (finding reliance on news reports did not defeat typicality in case alleging misleading
proxy statements in connection with merger); In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D.
629, 634 (D.NJ. 1988) (holding alleged reliance on uniform public statements satisfied
typicality requirement); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1460-61 (D.N.J.
1987) (finding typicality satisfied because claims of fraud and misrepresentation were based
on same series of reports and news releases); Snider v. Upjohn Co., 115 F.R.D. 536, 538
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding typicality satisfied because misrepresentations and omissions were
contained in public statements common to class); Gavron v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 115
F.R.D. 318, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding defendant's claim that named plaintiff relied on
oral communications of broker did not defeat typicality in claim based on
fraud-on-the-market theory); Glick v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 106 F.R.D. 446, 447-48 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (holding failure to show reliance on standardized oral or written
misrepresentations defeated typicality); Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102 F.R.D. 880, 887-
88 (D.NJ. 1984) (finding typicality lacking in claim based on oral misrepresentations
because of lack of proof of "essentially identical communications" to other class members);
Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust, 96 F.R.D. 567, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (upholding
typicality when alleged defense affected ultimate right to recover).
239 See Sala v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(certifying class of train accident victims; typicality was satisfied though damage issues
would differ); see also In re Fleet, 76 B.R. 1001, 1008-09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
(certifying debtor class allegedly subject to same unfair or deceptive acts of bankruptcy
service company; typicality was not contested); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422,
427-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (certifying nationwide class of public and private school districts
because named plaintiffs' claims were sufficiently coextensive with those of the class to
insure full, fair, and vigorous prosecution).
240 See McMahon Books, Inc. v. Willow Grove Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 32, 35-36 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (holding former tenant and tenant who signed lease after shopping mall opened
could represent all former and current tenants in action alleging misrepresentations by mall
owners because same alleged misrepresentations made to all tenants).
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241 See McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 39, 42 (D.N.J. 1986)
(certifying nationwide class in action alleging layoffs to cut pension liability because rules
regarding plan were the same at all company plants).
242 See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola, 98 F.R.D. 254, 266-68 (D. Del. 1983)
(holding that differences in state law defeated typicality in claims alleging breach of contract
but not claims involving interpretation of terms of consent decrees); see also Curley v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (D.N.J. 1989) (class allegations
that defendant extorted confessions and payments lacked commonality and typicality); cf
Perez v. Government of Virgin. Is., 109 F.R.D. 384, 387 (D.V.I. 1986) (various policy
holders and those with claims against holder suing government concerning a collapsed
insurance company; court held no common or typical issues).
243 See Grant v. Sullivan, 131 F.R.D. 436, 447 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (holding claims of
class "encompassed" within named plaintiff's claim in action to reverse decisions because of
bias of administrative law judge); Safran v. United Steelworkers, 132 F.R.D. 397, 402
(W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding seniority status of named representatives did not defeat typicality
in action charging violation of collective bargaining agreements regarding contracting work
because all plaintiffs had interest in proving violation; however, typicality defeated in claim
that named plaintiffs were deprived certain retirement benefits because representatives did
not stand in identical position to all members of class); Hohe v. Casey, 128 F.R.D. 68, 70
(M.D. Pa. 1989) (holding, in action by nonunion state employees challenging "fair share"
union fee arrangement, typicality satisfied because all plaintiffs represented regardless of
whether they objected to fee deduction); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 123 F.R.D. 500, 503
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (injunction sought to prevent interference with those performing or seeking
abortions during protest by antiabortion group); Lloyd v. City of Philadelphia, 121 F.R.D.
246,249 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (narrowing class to include only those employees who objected to
practice in action challenging compulsory union membership of city employees); In re
Whittaker, 84 B.R. 934, 939 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (certifying class of debtors whose
electric service was terminated prior to bankruptcy filing and not restored after filing);
Troutman v. Cohen, 661 F. Supp. 802, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding individual
circumstances did not defeat typicality in action challenging state administrative hearing
process for determining level of required nursing care); Cristiano v. Courts of the Justices
of the Peace, 115 F.R.D. 240, 248 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that admission by named
plaintiff of validity of her debt did not defeat typicality in action by union members
challenging state wage attachment statute); Malloy v. Eichler, 628 F. Supp. 582, 589 (D.
Del. 1986) (allowing siblings in action alleging violations of Medicaid Act, to represent
class that included siblings and grandparents because each group relied on same legal
arguments); Kromnick v. State Farm, 112 F.R.D. 124, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding named
plaintiffs typical in challenge to insurance company's failure to pay postmortem work loss
benefits under state no-fault act because interests of class coincided); Ortiz v. Eichler, 616
F. Supp. 1046, 1056-57 (D. Del. 1985) (permitting recipients to represent class that
included applicants in challenge to state procedures for administration of three federal public
assistance programs because all subject to same hearing procedures); Paskel v. Heckler, 99
F.R.D. 80, 83 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that, in action challenging termination of disability
1993]
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D. Fourth Circuit
Federal courts within the Fourth Circuit have followed the General
Telephone2 45 standard in civil rights, 246 antitrust, 247 securities, 24
8 mass tort,24 9
benefits, the "typicality prerequisite guarantees that the class representative's claim fairly
encompasses the issues common to the class").
244 See Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1988) (certifying class of
inmates making broad complaint about state prison conditions even though not all named
plaintiffs were subject to all conditions alleged in complaint); Freedman v. Arista Records,
Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (determining that typicality was not a stringent
requirement); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 579, 582-83 (D.NJ.
1986) (finding typicality but refusing to certify under (b)(3) because atypical issues
predominated); Shamberg v. AhIstrom, 111 F.R.D. 689, 695-97 (D.N.J. 1986) (certifying
class that included later purchasers despite allegations of different misrepresentations and
nondisclosures because all potential members were part of a common scheme to defraud);
see also Grasty v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 828 F.2d 123, 129-30
(3d Cir. 1987) (certifying class of union workers alleging federal law violations against their
union because claims were part of a "single course of conduct," even though named
plaintiffs did not share all of the claims of the class).
245 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
246 See Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 215-16 (4th Cir. 1984) (restricting
class of office and management employees to sales and supervisory positions because wider
class "encompassed" jobs for which no evidence was presented); Adams v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 736 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to certify broad class in employment
discrimination case based on "mere existence" theory of class-wide harm); Lilly v.
Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 332-34 (4th Cir. 1983) (allowing class to include
those discriminated against in promotion only after intervention by named representatives
who claimed to have been subject to such discrimination); cf Bennett v. Westfall, 640 F.
Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.W. Va. 1986) (declining to certify former prisoner to represent class
of current jail inmates challenging conditions); Price v. Cannon Mills, 113 F.R.D. 66, 68
(M.D.N.C. 1986) (holding failure to show class harmed in same way as plaintiff in sex
discrimination action rendered claim atypical); Harris v. Marsh, 100 F.R.D. 315, 321-24
(E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding statistical evidence showing African-American employees
promoted in numbers in proportion to number in work force defeated typicality).
247 See Butt v. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 116 F.R.D. 486, 490 (E.D. Va.
1987) (holding that evidence that some defendants might have varied from alleged
price-fixing conspiracy in dealings with some class members defeated typicality).
248 See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1118 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding district court's denial of certification because named plaintiff voted against merger
was error as a matter of law because reliance is not an element of proxy fraud claim).
249 See Plotkin v. Association of Eye Care Centers, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 156, 160
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (finding no typicality because plaintiffs did not present evidence that other
members of class were victims of misrepresentation or bad faith); In re Johnson, 80 B.R.
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constitutional law,250 labor law, 251 and single issue25 2 cases. Some civil
rights253 and mass tort254 cases, however, have not followed General
Telephone.
791, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987) (finding typicality in claim against trustee of alleged
pyramid scheme operator because all asserted a single claim that the funds held by the
trustee were not part of the bankruptcy estate).
250 See Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305
(4th Cir. 1991) (holding a lack of injury by named plaintiffs in dispute over union use of
union dues rendered them atypical of potential class members who might have suffered
injury); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 143 (4th Cir. 1990) (overruling district court grant
of certification because no typicality in case of state employees who alleged improper
partisan political concerns impacted employment decisions); Irby v. Fitz-Hugh, 693
F. Supp. 424, 431 (E.D. Va. 1988) (declining to certify statewide class in challenge to
statute allowing appointed rather than elected school commissions because not all school
districts had significant black populations that might be subject to discrimination); Brooks v.
Ward, 97 F.R.D. 529, 533 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (holding action challenging conditions in 12
prisons need not have named representatives from each prison because complaints about the
facilities arose out of the common design of all 12 facilities, and the challenged
administrative procedures were uniform).
251 See Phillips v. Brock, 652 F. Supp. 1372, 1378-79 (D. Md. 1987) (holding action
challenging housing provisions for farm workers' class limited to commuter workers
because plaintiffs were commuters); Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 575 (E.D.N.C.
1986) (finding substantial similarity of facts satisfied typicality in case alleging violations of
farm workers' rights in substandard housing, unitemized pay statements, and failure to keep
required records of payroll deductions).
252 See Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc., v. Lukhard, 661 F. Supp. 300, 307
(E.D. Va. 1987) (certifying defendant class in action challenging exemption of church day
care centers from state licensing requirement because constitutional claims and defenses
typical for class); Jordan v. Lyng, 659 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Va. 1987) (action challenging
inclusion of income from some types of educational loans in determining eligibility for food
stamps); George v. Baltimore City Pub. Sch., 117 F.R.D. 368, 370 (D. Md. 1987) (holding
plaintiffs represented by right-to-work group that required them to sign retainer and
disclosure agreements were not rendered atypical because group was a bona fide
independent legal aid organization); Lester v. Lukhard, 622 F. Supp. 316, 318 (W.D. Va.
1985) (stating plaintiff could not represent class challenging state procedure for determining
eligibility for disability benefits because her case was certified for payments).
253 See Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1440, 1443-46 (W.D.N.C. 1983)
(certifying broad class of black employees in discrimination suit because, although injuries
were different, all were results of "subjective" decisionmaking process of "overwhelmingly
white management/supervisory... force").
254 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 727 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989). In Robins, the representative claim was that Aetna, the products liability
insurer, was a joint tortfeasor by reason of its conduct. 880 F.2d at 710. This claim




Federal courts within the Fifth Circuit have followed the General
Telephone255  standard in civil rights,25 6  securities, 257  mass tort,258
In approving a mandatory (non-opt out) settlement, the court noted that, in light of the
magnitude of the problem and the need for innovative approaches, it found no abuse of the
trial court's discretion to certify. Id. at 752.
255 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
256 See Trevino v. Holly Sugar Corp., 811 F.2d 896, 906 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
plaintiff whose individual claims were found groundless could not represent class); Merrill
v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding tenure decisions
turned on unique facts not typical to any one member of class); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1986) (deeming common class treatment
inappropriate because of differences in methods of statistical proof used in proving applicant
and promotion discrimination); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1198-99
(5th Cir. 1984) (holding reliance on general policy of discrimination exception misplaced
because defendant relied on two "objective inputs" in making hiring decisions); Richardson
v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing female employee to represent
class that included employee applicants because same alleged discriminatory policy that
restricted transfer opportunities limited hiring decisions); Fleming v. Travenol Lab., Inc.,
707 F.2d 829, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding a hired female plaintiff in sex discrimination
case could not represent class that included applicants for employment, transfer, and
promotion because she had no claim in those areas); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State
Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing hourly employees to represent class
that included salaried employees in race and sex discrimination action because
discrimination based on university-wide "channeling policy"); Wheeler v. City of
Columbus, 703 F.2d 853, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying certification to across-the-board
class when plaintiff only alleged discrimination in its widest sense); Everitt v. City of
Marshall, 703 F.2d 207, 210-11 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding plaintiff in employment
discrimination case could not represent class that included claims in recruiting, hiring,
promotion, job assignment, or compensation because plaintiff was not subject to
discrimination in those areas); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 122 F.R.D. 502, 506
(N.D. Miss. 1988) (certifying class of those denied applications for employment because
representatives alleged systematic policy of refusing to give job applications to blacks);
Shafer v. Commander, Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 667 F. Supp. 414, 432 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (limiting class to promotion and job assignment claims and allowing broad challenge
to "mobility policy" because it had same effect on all female employees); Young v. Pierce,
628 F. Supp. 1037, 1041-42 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (holding HUD discrimination in federal
housing program constituted "single-uniform policy" of supporting segregated housing); Ivy
v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 108 F.R.D. 118, 122 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding
typicality satisfied if one general policy of alleged discrimination is manifested through an
"entirely subjective decision-making process" with ultimate review by the president and
secretary-treasurer); Fischer v. Dallas Fed. Say. & Loan, 106 F.R.D. 465, 470-73 (N.D.
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constitutional law,259 labor law,260 and immigration law cases. 261 In some
cases, however, the General Telephone standard has not been followed.262
F. Sixth Circuit
Federal courts within the Sixth Circuit have followed General Telephone263
in civil rights, 264 securities, 265 antitrust, 266 single issue,267 mass tort,268 breach
of contract, 269 and various other cases.270
Tex. 1985) (holding claims of named plaintiffs encompassed claims of class because all
were denied residential loan in minority area).
257 See Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313, 324 (S.D. Miss.
1985) (holding case based on oral misrepresentations inappropriate for class treatment
because of individual nature of communication).
258 See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985). In
Jenlns, all personal injury asbestos cases in the district were certified because the degree of
harm would not defeat typicality as long as the harms were of the same type. A special
master was appointed to determine disparity between representative and class claims. Id. at
272.
259 See Dallas Gay Alliance, Inc., v. Dallas City Hosp. Dist., 719 F. Supp. 1380,
1391-92 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (denying certification based on theory that claims were but
"examples" of discrimination to be proved at trial after claims of named plaintiff in action
challenging care for AIDS patients were rendered moot because of changes in hospital
policy); K v. Complaints Comm. of Miss. State Bar, 618 F. Supp. 307, 313 (S.D. Miss.
1985) (finding individual nature of bar complaint procedure rendered claim atypical of other
potential class members).
260 See Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F.2d 1341, 1351 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding, in action
challenging employment promises made to farm workers, class could include crew leaders
and workers because predominant liability questions were common to the class).
261 See Doe I v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 1572, 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (declining to
certify class of all persons seeking political asylum but denied work permits because
determinations handled on case-by-case basis rendered typicality impossible).
262 See Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d 1368, 1370 (5th Cir. 1987) (declining to rule on
"scope" of class because parties resolved issue by agreement); International Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 136
F.R.D. 113, 120-25 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (allowing male dominated union to represent class of
female employees for some claims in sex discrimination case); see also Longden v.
Sunderman, 123 F.R.D. 547, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (certifying class that included 4,000
investors in 121 limited partnerships over five years because of "high incidence of similarly
misleading financial information common throughout all of the [offerings]").
263 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
264 See Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-13 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (using subclasses, each being represented, to assure that three claims of
agricultural workers were adequately represented); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467,
500 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (rejecting single class certification because interests of black and
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white inmates regarding affirmative action program diverged); Rosenberg v. University of
Cincinnati, 654 F. Supp. 774, 776-77 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that without centralized
decisionmaking, university-wide sex discrimination case was not certifiable); Huguley v.
General Motors Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1301, 1302-03 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding varying
factual circumstances among class members would not defeat typicality if all complained of
the discriminatory effect of same employee performance appraisal system); Ramirez v.
Webb, 102 F.R.D. 968, 970 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (using multitude of representatives to
challenge various acts by law enforcement resulting in harassment of individuals of Hispanic
appearance).
265 See Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 612-13 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (five subclasses used, each encompassing purchasers pursuant to a different
misrepresentation).
266 See Thompson v. Midwest Found. Indep. Physicians Ass'n, 117 F.R.D. 108, 111
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding typicality for the federal claims of physicians under contract with
defendant because policies and practices were the same on a class-wide basis; refusing to
certify pendent state claims because of individualized issues of fact and law); see also
Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc., v. Cleveland Press Publishing Co., 102 F.R.D. 183, 189 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (advertisers sued newspapers for creating a monopoly; certification denied
because named representatives used only several of the over 100 advertising rates allegedly
increased by the violation and members of the class suffered different injuries).
267 See Gould v. Sullivan, 131 F.R.D. 108, 114 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (challenge to
inclusion of AFDC benefits in computation of Supplemental Security Income benefits when
former would terminate upon receipt of latter); Maenner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 127 F.R.D. 488, 490 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (question of theft coverage for numerous
ranchers in same cattle leasing program); see also Knisley v. Bowman, 656 F. Supp. 1540,
1543-44 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (limiting class to those taxpayers referred to tax refund
intercept program); Cottrell v. Lopeman, 119 F.R.D. 651, 654 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding
that denial of access to files of unemployment board amounted to a due process violation);
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 110 F.R.D. 576, 581 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(allowing certification of defendant class of city attorneys and prosecutors to enforce
remedies after finding abortion statute unconstitutional); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp.
463, 487-88 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (discontinuation of social security without adequate
procedural protections).
268 See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988)
(allowing personal injury and property liability claims in class action on behalf of residents
living near corporation's chemical waste burial site; individual damage claims tried
separately).
269 See Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1271, 1273-74 (N.D. Ohio
1986) (limiting class and excluding plaintiffs who had not signed accord and satisfaction
agreements altering health coverage during retirement).
270 See Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1471 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying
certification because representative was not a member of purported class but a representing
attorney); Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583 (S.D. Ohio 1987)




The courts of the Seventh Circuit have, with few exceptions, followed
General Telephone271 in civil rights,2 72 securities,2 73 antitrust, 274 single
Samuels v. Heckler, 668 F. Supp. 656, 665-66 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (challenging types of
conduct utilized by state agency in qualifying social security and disability payments;
multiple representatives used to encompass all allegations).
271 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
272 See Majeske v. City of Chicago, 740 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(limiting class to white officers or creating subclasses to protect all interests involved before
certifying reverse discrimination case); Talley v. Leo J. Shapiro & Assocs., 713 F. Supp.
254, 257 (N.D. IMl. 1989) (limiting employment discrimination claims by employees to
those actually hired and excluding applicants not actually employed); Meiresonne v.
Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622-23 (N.D. 111. 1989) (certifying claims of sexual
discrimination and pervasive sexual harassment in national class of management employees
relying on standard operating procedures as a general policy; focus was on disparate impact
and statistical proof); Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 659-60 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (limiting class to job applicants who actually applied and were rejected because all
applicants were not typical of those discouraged from applying); Riordan v. Smith Barney,
113 F.R.D. 60, 62-64 (N.D. IM. 1986) (finding typicality in securities fraud action despite
possible varying oral representations to class members and possible unique defenses because
the "heart of the complaint" was the private placement memorandum); Berggren v.
Sunbeam Corp., 108 F.R.D. 410, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (no showing to meet burden of
typicality by female outside salespersons); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 595 F. Supp. 557, 561
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (raising concern over ability of a white person with Jewish heritage to be
adequate representative for African Americans allegedly discriminated against based on
race); Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend, 555 F. Supp. 921, 925 (N.D.
Ind. 1983) (refusing to certify claims of proposed class because of vagueness and lack of
injury to representatives); Lawson v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 102 F.R.D. 783, 791-92
(N.D. MI1. 1983) (limiting class to persons who experienced enumerated types of
employment discrimination during preceding five years); Rosario v. Cook County, 101
F.R.D. 659, 661-63 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding representatives who alleged discrimination in
promotion could not represent those deterred from applying); Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45,
52-55 (N.D. I1. 1983) (class claims based on FDIC's disparate examination used for
advancement; class limited to those actually taking the exam and receiving unsatisfactory
marks, not those "chilled" from taking the examination).
273 See Fry v. UAL Corp., 136 F.R.D. 626, 631-34 (N.D. 111. 1991) (allowing two
professional investors to represent class of all investors in stock, despite allegations of
nonreliance on the market and sophistication disparity); In re VMS Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D.
466 (N.D. M]1. 991) (using subclasses of purchasers in public offering and purchasers from
market); Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 131 F.R.D. 118, 126-27 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (allowing
executor of purchaser to represent class of those defrauded by offering materials, but
executor could not represent direct purchasers because decedent purchased from market);
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issue,275 mass tort,276 breach of contract, 277 constitutional law,2 78 and various
other cases.279
Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (deeming
representative who purchased stock after partial disclosure typical with all purchasers denied
full disclosure); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding
that one representative sold more shares than he purchased during period of nondisclosure
and was, therefore, not typical); Goldwater v. Alston & Bird, 116 F.R.D. 342, 347-48
(S.D. Ill. 1987) (holding unique defenses such as nonreliance on market and disregard of
offering materials not to defeat typicality); Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 100
F.R.D. 781, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding unique defenses such as being a sophisticated
investor or reliance on third-party sources did not defeat typicality in securities fraud case);
McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 334-35 (N.D. IMl. 1982) (holding
critical unique defenses to both representatives defeated by typicality and prevented
adequate representation).
274 See United Nat'l Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 178, 180-82 (N.D. 11.
1983) (effectively utilized two subclasses to deal with differing burdens of proof for groups
of purchasers).
275 See Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying AFDC benefits to
children whose parents were illegal aliens maintainable as class action); Evans v. City of
Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding assignees of judgments against
city had interests and defenses sufficiently different from judgment creditors to preclude
certification); Bennett v. Tucker, 127 F.R.D. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (due process challenge to
state agency's failure to properly pursue claims that necessarily prevented wronged plaintiffs
from recovery), aff'd, 956 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1992); Jones v. Bowen, 121 F.R.D. 344
(N.D. I. 1988) (challenge to denial of Social Security numbers or cards without procedural
protections); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 117 F.R.D. 394 (N.D. 111. 1987)
(challenge to state's failure to establish procedures to identify and accommodate school
children with limited English proficiency); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D.
11. 1985) (certifying a constitutional challenge to state restrictions on abortions brought by a
class of doctors and a class of women against a class of state's attorneys), aft'd in part,
vacated in part, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988); Marcus v. Heckler, 620 F. Supp. 1218
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (challenging state's failure to seek medical equivalence findings with regard
to qualification for certain entitlement programs); Lewis v. Tully, 96 F.R.D. 370 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (challenging practice of retaining discharged prisoner for return to central jail before
release).
276 See Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to
approve settlement, noting conflict between those seeking to liberalize benefit qualifications
and those who were unrepresented and sought only to recover for negligent asset
management; both groups were originally certified as a single class).
277 See Jeannides v. United States Home, 114 F.R.D. 29, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding
breach of contract to construct home too individual and atypical to authorize class
certification); Wucsina v. Reliance Elec. Co., 129 F.R.D. 164, 168-69 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
(holding different dates of layoff precluded class treatment because each required a separate
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and alleged breaches therein).
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An understandable, but unfortunate, failure to apply the General Telephone
standard occurred in De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.280 In De La
Fuente, a group of migrant farm workers brought suit under the Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Act.281 The farm workers alleged that the defendant
failed to comply with several recruiting and disclosure requirements concerning
the terms and conditions of employment.282 The Act also required that the
defendant obtain insurance and maintain payroll records.283 The court, in a
sweeping generality, declared:
"A plaintiffs claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his
or her claims are based on the same legal theory." ... The typicality
requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions .... Thus,
similarity of legal theory may control even in the face of differences of fact.284
Applying these broad standards, the court did not compare the violations
alleged by the representatives and the violations suffered by the class. 285 The
result was a judgment that precluded recovery for the class on all other
violations of the Act. The class was not protected because the violations against
it were not encompassed within the representatives' claims. 2 86
278 See Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 734 (N.D. ii. 1988)
(deeming suspended or fired officers not typical of employed officers in dispute over
constitutionality of drug testing).
279 See Gilpin v. AFSCME, 875 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989) (refusing to certify
due to conflict of motivation between two subparts of proposed class); Coe v. National
Safety Assocs., Inc., 134 F.R.D. 235, 238 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding typicality in class
challenge to pyramid scheme, excluding only high level participants or those who made a
profit); Heastie v. Community Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 676 (N.D. Ml1.
1989) (finding typicality in credit fraud class action based on identical contract provisions
and deletions); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 702 F. Supp. 1391, 1394-95 (N.D. IM. 1988)
(allowing representatives hired before lowering of wages and breach of contract to represent
class including those hired after the breach); United Indep. Flight Officers v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (N.D. Il1. 1983) (denying certification because of
conflict of interest within proposed class of airline pilots suing on pension rights).
280 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983).
281 Id. at 229.
2 82 Id. at 231.
283 Id. at 230.
284 Id. at 232 (quoting 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcrboNs §
1115(b), at 185 (1977)).
285 Id. at 232-33.
286 Ld.
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A case which also ignored General Telephone is Patrylas v. Gomilla.287
This case involved a raid on a gay bar by drug enforcement officers with the
assistance of the Chicago police.288 There were no warrants nor was there
probable cause, and all patrons were forced to lie face down on the floor for
one to three hours. 289 The court found typicality and certified the class because
the essence of the plaintiffs' claims and the class's claims was unconstitutional
mass detention.290 This holding is consistent with General Telephone, but the
alleged class claims went beyond detention to include searches, use of excessive
force, interrogation and photographing, and individual mental distress. There
was no comparison of the representative's claims and the class's claims on
these issues and, to this extent, General Telephone was ignored. The court
made a sweeping statement that the same course of conduct or similarity of
legal theories controlled. 291
H. Eighth Circuit
Federal cases within the Eighth Circuit have followed General
Telephone292 in civil rights,293 securities, 294 antitrust,295 mass tort,296 and
various single issue decisions.297
287 121 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
288 Id. at 359-60.
289 Id. at 360.
290 Id. at 361-62.
291 Patqykus, 121 F.R.D. at 362; see also Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60
(N.D. M. 1986).
292 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
293 See Chaffin v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 904 F.2d 1269, 1276 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying
certification where plaintiffs anecdotal and statistical evidence did not raise an inference of
class claims); Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming
decertification of two subclasses (applicants and terminated employees) prior to ruling on
merits due to a lack of motion to certify and lack of representation); Roby v. St. Louis S.W.
Ry., 775 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1985). (affirming decertification of broad employment
discrimination class because the claims of those who failed an examination were not typical
of those not promoted for violating company rules); Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d
552, 562 (8th Cir. 1982) (allowing use of subclasses, each represented, to deal with
multiclaim employment discrimination class action); O'Neal v. Riceland Foods, 684 F.2d
577, 581 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to allow discharged plaintiff to represent claims of
discrimination in hiring; evidence revealed that representative had no claim); f. McKenzie
v. Crotty, 738 F. Supp. 1287 (D.S.D. 1990) (allowing individual ex-inmate to press civil
rights class claim against prison authorities despite release immediately after filing of suit);
Wakefield v. Monsanto Co., 120 F.R.D. 112, 115-17 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (limiting class to
black nonexempt employees who received discriminatory treatment in pay and promotion;
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court saw no conflict between present and former employees); Holden v. Burlington N.,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1398, 1408 (D. Minn. 1987) (allowing expansion of employment
discrimination class to include rejected applicants and approving negotiated settlement
agreement over objection of five named plaintiffs).
294 See Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 480, 486 (D. Minn. 1987)
(finding typicality when some plaintiffs relied on same oral and written representations of
broker to the class; "fraud-on-the-market" creates a presumption of reliance); cf. Irvin E.
Schermer Trust v. Sun Equities Corp., 116 F.R.D. 332, 337 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding fact
that plaintiff was a sophisticated investor who considered defendant a "greenmailer"
precluded it from being sufficiently typical of class); In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig.,
116 F.R.D. 216, 220-21 (D. Minn. 1986) (finding typicality in Rule 10(b)-5 action despite
possible defenses regarding reliance; however, not certifying a common-law fraud and
negligent misrepresentation class because of variation in applicable state law); TBK Partners
v. Chomeau, 104 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (finding the fact that a very high
percentage of shareholders voted in favor of merger precluded representative from having
requisite typicality; established a conflict of interest in an action to reverse merger);
Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1385-86 (D. Minn. 1984) (finding no typicality
because no representatives had shares directly traceable to initial public offering of stock).
295 See Powell v. NFL, 711 F. Supp. 959, 966-69 (D. Minn. 1989) (deeming several
players typical in class challenge to college draft system; subclasses of veteran players and
drafted rookies created to protect divergent interests); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust
Litig., 128 F.R.D. 268 (D. Minn. 1989) (allowing five named representatives with
backgrounds of various uses and time frames to represent broad class of purchasers).
296 See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 729 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (finding
typicality but denying (b)(3) certification because superiority and predominance
requirements were absent).
297 See Jackson v. Rapps, 132 F.R.D. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (challenge to Missouri's
process of reimbursement from noncustodial parents for AFDC benefits paid to custodial
parents); Abernathy v. Yeutter, 725 F. Supp. 459 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (class challenge of
method used to compute overpayment of food stamps when individual simultaneously
received AFDC benefits); Weaver v. Reagen, 701 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. Mo. 1988)
(challenge of Missouri's failure to cover AZT for qualified Medicaid patients with AIDS);
Hedge v. Lyng, 689 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn. 1987) (challenge to the procedural
improprieties in the election of Farmers Home Administration Board); Freeman v. Hayek,
635 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D. Minn. 1986) (due process challenge to city's termination of
water service to residences based on charges due from previous owner without procedural
protections); Linquist v. Bowen, 633 F. Supp. 846, 859 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (challenge to
benefit reduction resulting in a dollar-for-dollar loss of income for recipients of Social
Security and Railroad Retirement Act benefits).
1993]
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I. Ninth Circuit
Federal courts within the Ninth Circuit have followed General
Telephone298 in decisions concerning civil rights,299 constitutional law,300
securities, 30 1 antitrust, 302 single issue,303 and mass tort304 cases.
298 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
299 See Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 508, 509-10 (D. Or.
1982) (allowing broad sex discrimination case to proceed only as far as a named
representative had suffered each injury alleged in the class).
300 See Hagen v. City of Winnemucca, 108 F.R.D. 61, 65-66 (D. Nev. 1985) (finding
constitutional challenge to rules governing prostitution not certified because risk of
representative's deportation precluded typicality and adequate representation); Wilkinson v.
FBI, 99 F.R.D. 148, 158-59 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (allowing class to include "sustaining
members," all members of at least one year, in Fifth and First Amendment challenge by
organization allegedly harassed by FBI).
301 See Rolex Employees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 136 F.R.D.
658, 662 (D. Or. 1991) (finding that trust's continued trading in stock after curative
disclosure made it atypical of purported class of investors); Weinberger v. Thornton, 114
F.R.D. 599 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (allowing certification of single class represented by one
purchaser from the market and one from public offering; also certifying pendent state law
claims holding that typicality did not require similarity of reliance or damages); Schwartz v.
Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (deeming stockowner who bought and sold
during period of nondisclosure to be sufficiently typical in conjunction with two other
representatives); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 99 F.R.D. 60, 72-73 (D. Or. 1983) (finding
that arbitrageurs were atypical because of differing motivations for purchase in fraud action
surrounding tender offer); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(allowing initial public offering purchasers to represent market purchasers but denying
certification of pendent state law claims in broad securities fraud action).
302 See Mularkey v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 118 (D. Ariz. 1988) (limiting
certification to issue of liability only in action brought by past distributors on behalf of
present and future distributors; additional representatives required for damage issue because
of inherent conflict between subparts of class).
303 See Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 682
F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (right to representation and due process of detainees
removed to a detention center prior to deportation hearing); Cruz v. Bowen, 672 F. Supp.
1300, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (challenge to special standards applied to Filipino persons
applying for Social Security benefits); Nehmer v. United States Veterans' Admin., 118
F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (certifying as (b)(2) an administrative law challenge to
the Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which limits compensation to one
skin condition); National Assoc. of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 111 F.R.D. 595 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) (constitutional challenge to attorney's fees limits set in death and disability cases
of veterans); W.C. v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 791, 795 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (challenge of
procedure by which judges have rulings reviewed on administrative appeal); Stolz v. United
[Vol. 54:607
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
At least one district court decision departs somewhat from General
Telephone. In Lubin v. Sybedon Corp.,305 an investor in limited partnerships
brought a class action against a developer general partner, a group of
accountants and lawyers, and others alleging violation of federal and state
securities laws.3 6  The court certified the class finding that the
misrepresentations and omissions were the same for the representatives and the
class.307 Typicality of the requisite reliance element is normally resolved in
securities cases by use of the fraud-on-the-market concept which presumes
reliance by class and representative. However, in Lubin, reliance was highly
individualized, and there was no fraud-on-the-market.30 8 Without a
presumption of reliance, the court certified, citing language in Newberg on
Class Actions,30 9 not to General Telephone.310
J. Tenth Circuit
Cases in the Tenth Circuit have followed General Telephone311 in
securities, 3 12 antitrust,3 13 single issue,3 14 and breach of contract decisions. 3 15
Bhd. of Carpenters, 620 F. Supp. 396 (D. Nev. 1985) (alleging violation of federal law
when increased dues issue was tacked onto other motion).
304 See Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (finding
nationwide class of pet owners poisoned by product not certified due to differences in state
law and differences in the type and extent of damages suffered); Wehner v. Syntex Corp.,
117 F.R.D. 641 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (allowing property owner to bring class claims for
damages against dioxin manufacturer despite variations in extent and type of injuries, noting
subclasses might be necessary if conflicts arose later in litigation).
305 688 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
306 Id. at 1431.
307 Id. at 1457-63.
308 Id. at 1459-60.
309 5 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTIoNs § 8816 (1977).
310 Lubin, 688 F. Supp. at 1461. Compare Lubin with In re Unioil Securities
Litigation, 107 F.R.D. 615 (C.D. Cal. 1985), in which the same misrepresentations and
omissions were made to the class. Id. at 618-19. The defendant argued that representatives
who purchased after "curative" disclosures (a single press release) could not satisfy
typicality. The court went forward with certification and refused to rule on the effect of the
curative disclosure. Id. at 620-21. This case was eventually dismissed and sanctions were
imposed on plaintiffs counsel. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.
1986).
311 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
312 See Spivak v. Petro-Lewis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 693, 698 (D. Colo. 1987)
(determining, in tender offer, that holders who failed to sell and were "frozen out" were not
typical of investors who surrendered shares voluntarily; court created subclasses for each);
In re Texas Int'l Sec. Litig., 114 F.R.D. 33, 44 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (finding the fact that
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K. Eleventh Circuit
Federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit have followed General
Telephone316 in civil rights,317 single issue,318 and securities cases. 319
various representatives purchased at different times after same misrepresentations did not
defeat typicality); In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 113 F.R.D. 113 (D. Colo.
1986) (relying on fraud-on-the-market theory as well as a common scheme to certify broad
securities fraud class action); Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322, 324 (D. Colo. 1984)
(holding that substantial defenses unique to the named representatives and perceived conflict
within proposed class precluded typicality and adequate representation).
313 See Dubin v. Miller, 132 F.R.D. 269, 274-75 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding, in
securities action based on fraud-on-the-market theory, that reliance on company insiders and
nonmarket information might defeat typicality); Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 121 F.R.D. 417, 422-24 (D.N.M. 1988) (certifying, in antitrust and contract
action, class of all customers who purchased wire maintenance via either negative option or
pursuant to misrepresentations; court retained state law claims where no obvious conflicts
existed among relevant laws of seven states); Steiner v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 127 F.R.D.
192, 193-94 (D. Colo. 1987) (finding that, in class extending over period of five years,
relative time of purchase or sophistication of investor did not defeat typicality).
314 See Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 136 F.R.D. 672, 680 (D. Kan. 1991)
(challenge, based on Due Process Clause and federal statutes, to reduction of agricultural
subsidies to wheat farmers).
315 See Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665 (D. Kan. 1989)
(allowing former employee to represent class including current employees in fraud and
breach of contract action against employer for the computation of compensation under same
written documents).
316 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
317 See Coon v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to certify across-the-board discrimination case in which a single representative
alleged discrimination in promotion); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1531-32 (11th Cir.
1985) (22 named representatives challenging post office's multicomponent promotion
process as discriminatory; certifying class of those adversely affected in advancement);
Nelson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 678-80 (11th Cir. 1983) (refusing to certify
without proof of Rule 23 factors); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1346-
47 (11th Cir. 1983) (declining to include applicants in class involving discrimination in
advancement and layoff procedures); Evans v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d
925, 928-30 (11th Cir. 1983) (refusing to certify proposed across-the-board class action;
remanded for consideration of numerosity of class limited to those adversely impacted by
discrimination in promotion); Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 663,
670-72 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (limiting class in employment discrimination to those who were or
had been employees at facility, excluding those who merely applied); Washington v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 106 F.R.D. 592, 594 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (denying certification
because representative showed no nexus to the class); Jordan v. Swindall, 105 F.R.D. 45,
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47-48 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (finding typicality in challenge of allegedly discriminatory
advancement and training in police force based on a subjective evaluation process); Grimes
v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 265, 267-70 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (denying certification
based on individuality of claims and defenses and lack of showing of numerosity); Johnson
v. Montgomery County Sheriffs Dep't, 99 F.R.D. 562, 564-66 (M.D. Ala. 1983)
(allowing a class sex discrimination attack on behalf of applicants and employees because
the hiring, promotion, and transfer policies were interrelated by one general discriminatory
policy); Jackson v. City of Belle Glade, 95 F.R.D. 384, 386 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (refusing to
find typicality based merely on common racial background absent proof of harm typical to
the representatives and class members); Hawkins v. Fulton County, 95 F.R.D. 88, 92-93
(N.D. Ga. 1982) (refusing to certify an across-the-board discrimination case but leaving
open the possibility of future reconsideration with appropriate subclasses); Nation v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 85-88 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (refusing to certify an
across-the-board race discrimination case absent significant proof that the defendant
operated under a general policy of discrimination).
318 See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864, 866 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(challenge to allegedly illegal burden of proof and procedural mechanisms in review of
applications for residency under the Special Agricultural Workers Program); Warren v.
City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1061-62 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding adequacy of
representation not undermined because some members of class wished to proceed to trial
seeking a different relief while representatives chose to settle; there was no sacrifice of
interest of some class members to other class members); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640
F. Supp. 1347, 1372 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (challenge to at-large election of county
commissioners based on the Voting Rights Act); Armstead v. Pingree, 629 F. Supp. 273,
275, 278-79 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (mentally retarded and diseased patients' challenge to
various acts by state based on constitutional grounds; subclasses used to group those with
typical harms based on injuries and diagnoses); Lawson v. Wainwright, 108 F.R.D. 450,
452 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (alleging constitutional violation by Florida prison officials' refusal to
allow Hebrew Israelites access to religious literature); Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp.
492, 498 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (challenge by Social Security beneficiaries to Secretary's failure
to follow binding case precedent regarding requirements for termination of previously
determined benefits); Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 136 (M.D. Ala. 1984)
(challenge of underrepresentation of African Americans as polling officials under Voting
Rights Act; certified plaintiff class of African-American residents of Georgia and defendant
class of each county's appointing officials); NAACP v. State, 99 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(granting conditional (b)(2) certification and allowing a number of African-American
children to challenge state practices which placed a disproportionately high percentage of
African Americans in predominantly African-American classes); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank
of Atlanta, 97 F.R.D. 683 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (concerning validity of utilizing 360-day year
for interest computations and meaning of "prime rate" under a specific loan agreement).
319 See Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485, 1489 (11th Cir. 1988) (allowing certification,
finding typicality in fraud-on-the-market case where the representative did not receive
offering materials); Ross v. Bank S., 837 F.2d 980, 990-91 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding
typicality despite concurrent reliance of one representative on oral statements of broker);
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
An illustrative contract decision in which the court refused to find
typicality is Brooks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.320 The
dispute involved employment benefits arising in separate contracts, letters,
instructions, or oral representations. The laws of four different states were
applicable.321
L. District Of Columbia Circuit
Federal courts within the District of Columbia have followed the General
Telephone322 standard in civil rights, 323 securities, 324 mass tort,325 contract, 326
and single issue327 cases.
Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722-23 (lth Cir. 1987) (finding
typicality in a fraud-on-the-market action despite possible individual reliance on oral
representations by broker; state law actions deemed inappropriate for class treatment);
Sheftelman v. Jones, 667 F. Supp. 859, 863-64 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (finding representative's
claims typical based on fraud-on-the-market theory despite allegations that his additional
individual misrepresentation claim made him atypical and that he could not adequately
represent those who had not read the offering materials); Anderson v. Bank of the S., 118
F.R.D. 136, 142 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (considering subclasses based on time of purchase
relative to several curative disclosures and available market information because of
prolonged period of sale for bonds); Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/American Express,
Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (concluding that reliance concerns and
largely oral representations precluded adequate representation and (b)(3) predominance; no
fraud-on-the-market because issue was not publicly traded).
320 133 F.R.D. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
321 Id. at 56-58.
322 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
323 See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1409
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (narrowing class in racial employment discrimination suit to exclude
challenge to job requirement of high school diploma because named plaintiffs were not
injured by that requirement); Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 588-94 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding allegation of bias in performance rating system insufficient to allow plaintiff to
represent class that included disappointed job applicants because they were not subjected to
performance rating system); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (determining that issue not suitable for class treatment because individual issues
regarding detention overrode class issues); Gonzalez v. Brady, 136 F.R.D. 329, 330-31
(D.D.C. 1991) (holding lack of showing that others in class had been discriminated against
precluded class certification); cf. McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(allowing journeymen to represent class that included those seeking promotion beyond
journeymen status because typicality satisfied when similar employment practices applied to
related employment decisions); Rodriguez v. Department of the Treasury, 131 F.R.D. 1, 7
(D.D.C. 1990) (declining to include discouraged applicants due to their speculative
existence caused class to fail on numerosity); Mayfield v. Meese, 704 F. Supp. 254, 258
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IX. IDENTrrY OF CLAIMS AFTER GENERAL TELEPHONE
Before examining identity of claims in antitrust, mass tort, securities, and
employment discrimination and other civil rights claims, we make two
observations. First, identity of claims during the certification process does not
include identity of remedies. It has never been required that each member of
the class seek the same damages, only that the liability elements must coincide.
Even if the relief being sought is equitable, possible differences in proposed
injunctive relief do not defeat certification. The courts have properly concluded
that speculative differences in eventual relief should not prevent the preliminary
finding of certification.328 Thus, a remedies analysis normally is deferred until
settlement or trial. However, this generality has a caveat. If the remedies
(D.D.C. 1988) (declining to expand class represented by plaintiff who did not apply for
promotion to include those who applied for promotion); Sperling v. Donovan, 104 F.R.D.
4, 6 (D.D.C. 1984) (denying certification of class of white employees in reverse
discrimination case because across-the-board racial allegations do not satisfy Rule 23
requirements).
324 See Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622, 625 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding
that plaintiff's unique defense based on difference in reliance rendered claim atypical); Kas
v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 453, 461 (D.D.C. 1985) (denying
certification because of atypical defenses applicable to representative).
325 See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding
class certification inappropriate because failure to show common defect in transmission
meant no commonality of fact between class members); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130
F.R.D. 260, 264 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding class treatment inappropriate because common
issues of law and fact did not predominate and class unmanageable because of complexity of
issues).
326 See Committee of Blind Vendors v. District of Columbia, 695 F. Supp. 1234
(D.D.C. 1988) (allowing leaders of business association to represent class because claims
based on statutory and contract violations common to class).
327 See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (D.D.C. 1989) (challenge to
District of Columbia juvenile curfew law); Duggan v. Bowen, 691 F. Supp. 1487, 1502
(D.D.C. 1988) (stating Rule 23 requirements met when "a class action would serve as an
efficient method of litigating the issues in the case"); Littlewolf v. Hodel, 681 F. Supp. 929,
936 (D.D.C. 1988) (permitting class challenge to constitutionality of Indian Claims Act of
1985 because it concerned same event and course of conduct); Vargas v. Meese, 119
F.R.D. 291, 293 (D.D.C. 1987) (single issue concerning cutoff date for filing of adjustment
status for immigration purposes).
328 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1785 (2d ed. 1972); see also Rental Car, Inc., v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 496 F. Supp.
373, 381 (D. Mass. 1980); cf. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).
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requested at the certification hearing reveal a clear conflict of interest within the
class or between counsel and class, certification will be adversely affected. 329
Second, the requirement of standing to sue, discussed in various class cases
only necessitates that the representative and the class have suffered some injury
and seek some relief.330 The standing requirement does not require that the
representative claim be the same as the class claim. 331
A. Identity of Claims in Antitrust Actions
Identity of claims requires sameness of the essential elements of an action.
Courts generally have found identity of claims in antitrust conspiracy cases
because "[iln order to prevail on the merits... the plaintiffs will have to prove
the same major elements that the absent members of the class would have to
prove[:] . . . a conspiracy, its effectuation and resulting damages." 332
Similarly, courts have certified both horizontal333 and vertical334 price-fixing
329 See Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 698 (7th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to approve settlement noting conflict between those seeking liberalized benefit
qualifications and those who were unrepresented and sought only to recover for negligent
asset management; both groups were originally certified as a single class); see also Gonzales
v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1973); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Assoc.,
Local 550 v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 (1974); Mularkey v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 118, 121 (D. Ariz. 1988)
(limiting representation by past distributors on behalf of present and future distributors to
issue of liability only; additional representatives required for damage issue because of
inherent conflict between subparts of class).
330 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-95 (1973) (named plaintiff must have
suffered injury), vacated, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 780 (7th
Cir. 1975) (class must have suffered injury); Mary K. Kane, Standing, Mootness, and
Federal Rule 23: Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 94-99 (1976).
331 See Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1009 (D. Mass. 1979); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 119, § 1761 nn.3-4.
332 Cumberland Farms, Inc., v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 120 F.R.D. 642, 647 (E.D.
Pa. 1988); see also In re Chlorine & Caustic Soda Antitrust Litig., 116 F.R.D. 622, 626
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
333 See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 810-11 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiff
who was denied staff privileges by hospital could represent class that included osteopaths
who did not apply because all were part of class of "intended victims" of hospital's
discriminatory policy); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 268, 271 (D).
Minn. 1989) (nationwide price-fixing of wirebound boxes); Cumberland Farms, Inc., 120
F.R.D. at 645 (holding typicality satisfied in horizontal price-fixing claim against
containerized garbage disposal industry; the industry operated on a standardized nationwide
basis); Vasiliow Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 345, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
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cases provided the same conspiracy and the same acts affect representative and
class.
However, if different conspiracies or acts of conspiracy affected
representatives and class members, the class will not be certified. In Jackshaw
Pontiac v. aeveland Press,335 advertisers sued newspapers for creating a
monopoly, but certification was denied because the named representatives
utilized only several of the over one hundred advertising rates that were
increased because of the alleged conspiracy. 336 In such a case, the
representative lacks motivation to litigate, prove, and settle the nonsimilar
elements among claims. 337 In some instances, the lack of identity may be
solved by creating subclasses (with appropriate representatives) or by naming
additional representatives. 338
Whether pendent state claims will be certified turns on the same analysis. If
the essential elements are the same, the pendent state claims are certified as part
(alleged price-fixing by brewers and beer franchise wholesalers against independent
wholesalers); Uniondale Beer Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 340, 342-45
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying statewide plaintiff class of beer retailers in horizontal price-
fixing case based on use of exclusive territory agreements but declining to certify defendant
class because no numerosity); In re Chlorine & Caustic Soda Antitrust Litig., 116 F.R.D at
625 (holding typicality satisfied in horizontal price-fixing case because named plaintiffs
would have to prove same elements as the class in establishing a conspiracy, its effectuation,
and resulting damages); Rios v. Marshall, 100 F.R.D. 395, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (limiting
claims to those years in which named plaintiffs raised claims in action alleging conspiracy to
replace citizen farm workers); United Nat'l Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 178,
182 (N.D. MI1. 1983) (alleged nationwide conspiracy to fix prices of records and tapes).
33 4See Mularkey v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 118, 122 (D. Ariz. 1988)
(alleged conspiracy to fix prices paid to independent distributors of baked goods).
335 102 F.R.D. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
336 Id. at 190-92.
337 See also Vasiliow Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 345, 347-48
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying plaintiff class in horizontal price-fixing case based on system of
exclusive territory contracts; declining to certify plaintiff class regarding vertical price-
fixing claim or to certify defendant class as to either vertical or horizontal claim); Butt v.
Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 486, 490 (E.D. Va. 1987); (defeating
typicality because of evidence that some defendants might have varied from alleged
price-fixing conspiracy in dealings with some class members).
338 See Powell v. NFL, 711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. 1989); In re Wirebound Boxes
Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 268 (D. Minn. 1989).
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of the federal action. 339 If the elements differ, the pendent claims are not
certified. 340
B. Identity of Claims in Mass Torts
Although "[i]n the past, courts have not looked favorably upon class
certification in mass tort cases on the ground that 'significant questions, not
only of damages, but of liability and defenses of liability would be present,
affecting the individuals in different ways [such that class actions] would
degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried,'" 341 --,rts have
increasingly accepted its use.342
In a typical mass bus, train, or airplane accident, the essentiai .nents of
duty, negligence, or strict liability and causation do not differ between
representative and class; thus, a class action is appropriate. One district court
stated the following:
In mass tort accidents, the factual and legal issues of a defendant's liability do
not differ dramatically from one plaintiff to the next. No matter how
individualized the issue of damages may be, these issues may be reserved for
individual treatment with the question of liability tried as a class action. 343
As with other types of class actions, differences in damages are not enough to
deny certification, particularly in cases of mass disaster in which individual
defenses are unlikely to be raised. 344
339 See Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 121 F.R.D. 417, 427-36
(D.N.M. 1988).
340 See Thompson v. Midwest Found. Indep. Physicians Assoc., 117 F.R.D. 108,
113-16 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding typicality for the federal claims of physicians under
contract with defendant because policies and practices were the same on a class-wide basis;
refusing to certify pendent state claims because of individualized issues of fact and law
under state law).
341 Sala v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(quoting FD. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note).
342 Id. at 496-97; see also Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.
1986).
343 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988).
344 See Sala, 120 F.R.D. at 497-98 (certifying class of train accident victims;
typicality satisfied though damage issues would differ); In re Johnson, 80 B.R. 791, 796
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987) (holding typicality met in claim against trustee of alleged pyramid
scheme operator because all asserted a single claim that the funds held by the trustee were
not part of the bankruptcy estate); In re Fleet, 76 B.R. 1001, 1008-09 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) (certifying debtor class allegedly subject to same unfair or deceptive acts of
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If the mass tort involves product liability, toxic waste, or similar
circumstances, the essential elements of duty, negligence, strict liability,
causation, breach of contract or warranty, and adequacy of warning may differ
within the class. In a few such cases, the courts have certified class actions after
careful analysis of the issues. For example, in Wehner v. Syntex Corp.,345 the
court allowed a property owner to bring class claims against a dioxin
manufacturer despite variations in extent and type of injuries, noting that
subclasses could be necessary later in litigation.346
In the majority of such cases, however, the courts have denied certification
because "no one set of operative facts establishes liability, no single proximate
cause equally applies to each potential class member and each defendant, and
individual issues outnumber common issues." 347 For example, in Ikonen v.
Hartz Mountain Corp.,348 a class of pet owners suing a -manufacturer of
allegedly poisonous flea and tick spray was denied certification. 349 The court
found that the individual case histories of the pets concerned different
"negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty, fraud, and adequacy
of warning issues."350
bankruptcy service company); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 427-30 (E.D.
Pa. 1984) (certifying nationwide class of public and private school districts because named
plaintiffs' claims were sufficiently coextensive with those of the class to insure full, fair, and
vigorous prosecution).
345 117 F.R.D. 641 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also Sterling, 855 F.2d 1188 (allowing
personal injury and property liability claims in class action brought on behalf of residents
living near corporation's chemical waste burial site; individual damage claims would be
tried separately); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (certifying
all personal injury asbestos cases in district as one because degree of harm would not defeat
typicality as long as harm was of same type; a special master was appointed to determine
disparity between representative and class claims).
346 Wehner, 117 F.R.D. at 643-45.
347 Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1197; see also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000,
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding class certification inappropriate because failure to show
common defect in transmission means no commonality of fact between class members);
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 260, 264 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding class treatment
inappropriate because common issues of law and fact did not predominate and class
treatment was unmanageable because of complexity of issues); McKernan v. United
Technologies Corp., 120 F.R.D. 452, 453 (D. Conn. 1988) (holding claims of named
plaintiff who sold his helicopter not typical of those who still owned their helicopters in
product liability action against manufacturer).
348 122 F.R.D. 258 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
349 Id. at 266.
350 Id. at 262. In some product liability cases, issues of conflicting state laws and
general complexity of issues have rendered class treatment inappropriate. See Walsh v.
Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 260, 276 (D.D.C. 1990); Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,
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The rejection of certification in the nonaccident mass tort cases is a correct
application of General Telephone351 and the historical standard of identity of
claims. With differing duty, causation, negligence, and state laws, the
representative lacks the motivation and proof to establish the differing class
claims. The self-interest of the representative may cause a settlement which
disfavors or rejects the differing claims. In short, the self-interest of the
representative does not benefit the entire class, and class treatment is, therefore,
improper. Of course, most mass tort cases are in the (b)(3) category, in which
notice and the opportunity to appear or to opt out are required, thereby
possibly curing fairness and due process problems. 352
C. Identity of Claims in Security Cases: Same Misrepresentations or
Nondisclosures
Identity of claims in securities actions requires that the representative and
the class complain of the same misrepresentations. If the representations differ,
certification is generally denied. 353 Similarly, if the case involves failure to
122 F.R.D. 258, 265-66 (S.D. Cal. 1988); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 724
(W.D. Mo. 1985).
351 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
352 E.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989).
353 See VMS Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 466, 474-76 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (using subclasses
of purchasers in public offering and from the market); In re Bexar County Health Facility
Dev. Corp. See. Litig., 125 F.R.D. 625, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding typicality satisfied in
class of original purchasers of bonds because same alleged material misrepresentations and
omissions were contained in offering statement); In re IGI See. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 451, 456
(D.NJ. 1988) (focusing typicality inquiry in securities case on defendant's, not plaintiff's,
behavior); Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 177, 180-
81 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding uniform statements in offering circular satisfied typicality in
case alleging excessive and unconscionable markups in bond sales); Keyser v.
Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 121 F.R.D. 642, 647-48 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding
reliance on news reports did not defeat typicality in case alleging misleading proxy
statements in connection with merger); In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629,
634 (D.NJ. 1988) (alleging reliance on uniform public statements satisfied typicality
requirement); Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552, 556-57 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding
class period covering release of different documents appropriate if the documents repeated
the same misrepresentations); In re Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 679 F. Supp.
165, 183 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding named plaintiff who purchased interest in partnership
from third party could not represent class of investors who purchased interests in same
partnership directly from defendant because different representations were involved); In re
ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1460-61 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding typicality satisfied
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disclose, the same nondisclosures must affect the representative and the class in
order to satisfy identity of claims.35
4
because claims of fraud and misrepresentation based on same series of reports and news
releases); Koenig v. Benson, 117 F.R.D. 330, 339-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying later
purchaser who acquired stock to represent earlier purchasers because actionable
misrepresentation was contained or concealed in earlier annual report); Kirby v. Cullinet
Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 308 (D. Masg. 1987) (holding that allegation of "common
course of conduct" allowed named plaintiffs to represent subsequent purchasers whose
reliance was based on interrelated and cumulative misrepresentations during a limited three-
month period); Snider v. Upjohn Co., 115 F.R.D. 536, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding
typicality satisfied because misrepresentations and omissions contained in public statements
were common to the class); Gavron v. Blinder Robinson & Co. 115 F.R.D. 318, 323 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (determining that defendant's allegation that plaintiff relied on oral
communications of broker did not defeat typicality in claim based on fraud-on-the-market
theory); Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 48, 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding variations in interest due or dates and amounts of redemption did
not defeat typicality action over same misrepresentations in sale of trust bonds); In re
Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 424, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding differences
involving date, type and manner of purchase, investor's perception of the transaction, or
even information furnished did not destroy typicality if named plaintiff was "victim of same
material omissions and the same consistent course of conduct"); Caleb & Co. v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 110 F.R.D. 316, 318-19 (S.ID.N.Y. 1986) (finding a claim of
failure to pay cash promptly after tender of stock constituted "common course of conduct"
that satisfied typicality requirement); Michaels v. Ambassador Group Inc., 110 F.R.D. 84,
88-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that conflicts between early and later purchasers did not
defeat typicality where the misrepresentations or omissions relied on were interrelated and
relied on by the entire class); Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(deeming stockholder who bought and sold during period of nondisclosure to be sufficiently
typical in conjunction with two other representatives); Glick v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 106
F.R.D. 446, 447-48 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding failure to show reliance on standardized oral
or written misrepresentations defeated typicality); In re Consumers Power Sec. Litig., 105
F.R.D. 583, 612-13 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (five subclasses used, each encompassing
purchasers pursuant to a different misrepresentation); Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp.
1375, 1385-86 (D. Minn. 1984) (finding no typicality in case involving initial public
offering because no representatives had shares directly traceable to initial public offering);
Seller v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102 F.R.D. 880, 887-88 (D.N.J. 1984) (finding no typicality
in claim based on oral misrepresentations because of lack of proof of "essentially identical
communications" to other class members).
354 See In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D. Conn. 1988)
(holding that some factual differences in prospectus did not defeat typicality when each
omitted same material matters relating to financing and the promoters); Bresson v.
Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 339, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding typicality
in case concerning sale of limited partnerships where communications to class members all
contained the same omissions and half-truths); Shankroff v. Advest, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 190,
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The above principles control claims based on written misrepresentation.
The general rule is that an action based substantially on oral rather than written
communications is inappropriate for treatment as a class action. 355 Certification
in such cases, however, is permissible if the "allegedly fraudulent oral
communications were standardized."356 One court has ruled that such
circumstances exist if the oral statements originate from a "common source,"
such as the same documents, or an identical negligent refusal by broker-dealers
to "conduct their own investigations." 357
1. 7iming of the Purchases by the Representative and the Class
An interrelated issue is whether an earlier purchaser may represent later
purchasers and vice versa. In general, if the same misrepresentations or
nondisclosures affect each time period, certification is granted.
In In re One Bancorp Securities Litigation,358 the defense contended that
the representative claims were atypical of at least part of the class because the
named representatives purchased late in the class period and could not properly
represent earlier purchasers. 359 The court concluded that such differences did
not render the claims of later purchasers atypical because the misrepresentations
were interrelated, cumulative, and came from specific documents. 360
194 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding typicality satisfied because same omissions affected
representative and the class).
355 See Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313, 324 (S.D. Miss.
1985) (holding that a case based on oral misrepresentations inappropriate for class treatment
because of individual nature of communication); see also Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102
F.R.D. 880, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
356 Seiler, 102 F.R.D. at 888; see also Glick v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 106 F.R.D. 446,
449 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
357 In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 424, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
358 136 F.R.D. 526 (D. Me. 1991).
3 5 9 Id. at 530.
360 Id. at 529-31; see also Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D. Mass. 1988)
(allowing named plaintiffs who continued to purchase stock after company disclosure of
losses to represent earlier purchasers); Anderson v. Bank of the S., 118 F.R.D. 136, 142
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (considering subclasses based on time of purchase relative to several
curative disclosures and available market information because of prolonged period of sale
for bonds); In re Texas Int'l See. Litig., 114 F.R.D. 33, 44 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (holding
that the fact that various representatives purchased at different times after same
misrepresentations did not defeat typicality); Klein v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 109 F.R.D.
646, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding later purchasers could not represent earlier purchasers
because disclosures rendered their claims atypical); Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, 104
F.R.D. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding purchases by plaintiff after disclosure did not
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Another issue, related to the timing of the purchase, is that if there have
been material disclosures between the time of purchase by the representative
and the time of the purchase by the class, such disclosures create substantial
differences in representation and reliance elements and certification is not
permitted.361 Only a small number of cases are contrary to the foregoing
analysis and must be deemed contrary to General Telephone.362 These courts
have usually been misled by ambiguous formulas such as "common course of
conduct," "same legal theory," or "markedly different positions." 363
Because representations (and reliance) must be the same, the representative
and the class must have owned the same stock.364 However, purchasers of call
or put options are acceptable representatives for a class of purchasers. 365
render claim atypical because materiality of alleged omissions was judged by objective not
subjective standard and applied to entire class); cf. In re Bank of Boston, 762 F. Supp.
1525, 1532 (D. Mass. 1991) ("a plaintiff has standing to challenge only those events
occurring prior to the date of his last purchase or sale of stock; it is impossible for a plaintiff
to have been misled by events occurring afterward"); Adair v. Sorenson, 134 F.R.D. 13
(D. Mass. 1991).
361 See Klein, 109 F.R.D. at 652-53.
362 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
363 See Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1402-04 (D. Conn.
1988) (holding a series of press releases that contained different alleged misrepresentations
were a "common course of conduct" satisfying typicality); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 689 F.
Supp. 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (certifying class of purchasers in investment vehicles over
15-year period even though each vehicle was different and not all purchasers invested in all
vehicles); Longden v. Sunderman, 123 F.R.D. 547, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (certifying class
that included 4,000 investors in 121 limited partnerships over five years because of "high
incidence of similarly misleading financial information common throughout all of the
[offerings]"); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache See., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 579, 582-83 (D.NJ.
1986) (finding typicality but refusing to certify under (b)(3) because atypical issues
predominated); Shamberg v. Ahlstrom, 111 F.R.D. 689, 695-97 (D.N.J. 1986) (certifying
class that included later purchasers even though there were allegations of different
misrepresentations and nondisclosures over period of time because all were part of a
common scheme to defraud).
364 See Fry v. UAL Corp., 136 F.R.D. 626 (N.D. 111. 1991); In re One Bancorp Sec.
Litig., 136 F.R.D. 526, 528 (D. Me. 1991) (restricting certified class to purchasers of
common stock and refusing to allow named plaintiff who purchased stock through
corporation of which he was president to represent class); Spivak v. Petro-Lewis Corp., 120
F.R.D. 693, 698 (D. Colo. 1987) (determining, in tender offer, that holders who failed to
sell and were "frozen out" were not typical of investors who surrendered shares voluntarily;
subclasses created for each).
365 See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 372-73 (D. Del. 1990)
(allowing call option purchaser to represent class that included common stock purchasers




The justifiable reliance of the plaintiff is an essential element in fraud and
securities cases. Reliance on its face is individualized. Hence, reliance by a
representative does not prove reliance by the class members. This can be a
serious barrier to class certification.
In the federal courts, the "fraud-on-the-market theory" creates a
presumption of reliance for all those who purchase from the market relying on
the market's integrity. Fraud directed to artificially inflate market price has a
presumed effect on all class members. Open market purchasers who claim they
were damaged by a fraud-on-the-market are not required to "prove individual
reliance on particular misrepresentations or omissions if the misrepresentations
or nondisclosures are material. 366 Thus, if the fraud-on-the-market theory is
applicable, the element of reliance at the onset is identical for the representative
and the class.367
The fact that the representative concurrently relies on the market and on a
third party, such as a broker, does not alter this result.368 A basic part of the
Supp. 771, 774-77 (D. Mass. 1988) (certifying class that included purchasers of options as
well as purchasers of common stock); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 112
F.R.D. 383, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (certifying class that included tenderers of shares and
purchasers of calls during tender period because both affected by same misrepresentations
that artificially inflated the price of company securities).
366 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972);
Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981); Blackid v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
906-07 (9th Cir. 1975).
367 See In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 113 F.R.D. 113 (D. Colo. 1986)
(relying on fraud-on-the-market theory as well as a common scheme to certify broad
securities fraud class action).
368 See Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485, 1489 (11th Cir. 1988) (allowing certification,
finding typicality in fraud-on-the-market type case where the representative did not receive
offering materials); Ross v. Bank S., 837 F.2d 980, 990-91 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding
typicality despite concurrent reliance of one representative on oral statements of broker and
fraud-on-the-market); Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722-23 (1lth Cir.
1987) (finding typicality satisfied in a fraud-on-the-market action despite possible individual
reliance on oral representations by broker); Sheftelman v. Jones, 667 F. Supp. 859, 863-64
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (finding representative's claims typical based on fraud-on-the-market
theory, despite allegations that his additional individual misrepresentation claim made him
atypical and he could not adequately represent those who had not read the offering
materials); Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 480, 486 (D. Minn. 1987) (finding
typicality when some of the plaintiffs relied on same oral and written representations of
broker to the class; "fraud-on-the-market" created a presumption of reliance).
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representative's claim-that the deception caused general reliance on inflated
market conditions-inures to the benefit of the class by-providing motivation to
litigate and to settle. An additional claim by the representative does not modify
this analysis.
3. Unique Defenses
The defendant can rebut the presumption of reliance by presenting evidence
that the individual representative did not rely on the market, the claimed
misrepresentation, or the nondisclosure. These are labeled "unique defenses,"
which defendants argue defeat typicality.
Most importantly, unique defense situations do not necessarily fail the
General Telephone369 standard. The representative in a unique defense situation
is still presenting all of the elements of the fraud claim which are identical to
and inure to the benefit of the class. The class claims are encompassed within
the representative's claim, and both identity of claims and General Telephone
are satisfied.
Unique defenses focus on a separate issue: whether the claims will be
competently presented given the unique situation of the representative. If the
unique defense causes the focus to be on this question, the case for the class
may be weakened and inadequately presented. On the other hand, if the
claimed unique defense is insignificant in relation to the overall proof of
claims, the defense will not affect the representative's overall presentation of
the class claims. Because the evaluation of defenses is fact-particularized (the
defense will substantially affect the competent presentation of the class claims),
there is more difficulty in reconciling the court decisions in this area than in the
more objective comparison of representative and class claims under the General
Telephone standard. There are many recent cases finding that unique defenses
both defeat certification 370 and do not defeat certification. 371
369 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
370 See Gary Plastic Packaging v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903
F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding unique defenses against named plaintiff made class
certification inappropriate); Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622, 625 (D.D.C.
1991) (holding plaintiff subject to unique defense based on difference in reliance rendered
atypical); Rolex Employees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 136 F.R.D. 658,
662 (D. Or. 1991) (finding that trust's continued trading in stock after curative disclosures
mide it atypical of purported class of investors); Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 131 F.R.D. 118,
126-27 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (allowing executor of purchaser to represent class of those
defrauded by offering materials, but executor could not represent direct purchasers in
offering because decedent purchased from market); Grace v. Perception Technology Corp.,
128 F.R.D. 165, 169 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding access to unique information through
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personal contact with corporate offices and special meetings rendered two of four named
plaintiffs atypical to class); CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D.
454, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding access to special information not available to rest of
class made claim by underwriter atypical to class because of differences in reliance); Landry
v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 123 F.R.D. 474, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(rejecting named representative because inside information made him. subject to unique
defenses regarding reliance); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (finding that one representative sold more shares than he purchased during period of
nondisclosure and was, therefore, not typical); Irvin D. Schermer Trust v. Sun Equities
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 332, 337 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that because plaintiff was a
sophisticated investor and considered defendant a "greenmailer," he was precluded from
being sufficiently typical of class); Kamerman v. Ockap Corp., 112 F.R.D. 195, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding antagonism toward company rendered named representative
atypical because subject to unique defenses); Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 105
F.R.D. 453, 461 (D.D.C. 1985) (denying certification because of atypical defenses
applicable to representative); Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322, 324 (D. Colo. 1984)
(holding that substantial defenses unique to the named representatives and perceived conflict
within proposed class precluded typicality and adequate representation); Beebe v. Pacific
Realty Trust, 99 F.R.D. 60, 72-73 (D. Or. 1983) (finding arbitrageurs were atypical and
could not be certified because of differing motivations for purchase in fraud action
surrounding tender offer); McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 340 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (holding critical unique defenses to both representatives defeated typicality and
prevented adequate representation).
371 See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1118 (4th Cir. 1989)
(certifying class because reliance not an element of proxy fraud claim); Fry v. UAL Corp.,
136 F.R.D. 626, 631-34 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (allowing two professional investors to represent
class of all investors in stock and sellers of puts, despite allegations of nonreliance on the
market and sophistication disparity); Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 628 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (holding typicality satisfied even though named plaintiff was takeover arbitrageur who
was alleged not to have relied on integrity of market); Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc., 122
F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (deeming representative who purchased some stock
after partial disclosure typical with all purchasers before full disclosure); Gorsey v. I.M.
Simon & Co., 121 F.R.D. 135, 138-39 (D. Mass. 1988) (finding differences in reliance did
not defeat typicality); Goldwater v. Alston & Bird, 116 F.R.D. 342, 347-48 (S.D. InI. 1987)
(holding unique defenses such as nonreliance on market and disregard of the offering
materials deemed not to defeat typicality); Weinberger v. Thornton, 114 F.R.D. 599 (S.D.
Cal. 1986) (allowing certification of single class represented by one purchaser from the
market and one from public offering; certified pendent state law claims finding that
typicality did not require similarity of reliance or damages); Grossman v. Waste
Management, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 781, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding unique defenses such as
being a sophisticated investor or reliance on third party sources did not defeat typicality in
securities fraud case in which fraud-on-the-market created presumption of class reliance);
Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 96 F.R.D. 567, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding
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4. Pendent State Law Claims
Pendent state common-law claims create a troublesome issue in security
class actions. In general, the courts refuse to certify unless the
fraud-on-the-market theory is applicable to the state claim.
The refusal to certify such claims is proper because "[u]nder a common
law fraud claim, each plaintiff must demonstrate his individual reliance upon
defendants' misstatements .... Since individual, not common issues,
predominate with respect to... common law fraud claims [certification is not
appropriate]." 372 One court declined to certify even though there was no
constitutional bar to applying the law of the forum state to the claims because
"class members have a significant interest in individually controlling the
prosecution of these tort claims in the forum of their choice because of the
significant variations in state law with regard to the alleged common law
torts." 373
Another court found that state claims could not be certified because they
"would require application of the standards... of the state in which each
purchase was transacted." 374 However, some courts have allowed pendent state
claims for fraud,375 negligent misrepresentation, 376 or both. 37 7
typicality not defeated when alleged defense affected ultimate right to recover, not the
presentation of liability issue).
372 Gavron v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 115 F.R.D. 318, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see
also In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 116 F.R.D. 216, 220-21 (D. Minn. 1986)
(finding typicality in Rule 10(b)-5 action despite possible defenses regarding reliance but
holding common-law fraud and negligent misrepresentation not certifiable because of
variation in applicable state law); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (allowing purchasers in initial public offering to represent purchasers from the market
but not allowing certification of pendent state law claims in broad securities fraud action).
373 In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Lifig., 116 F.R.D. at 223.
374 Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 (11th Cir. 1987).
375 See Fry v. UAL Corp., 136 F.R.D. 626, 631 (N.D. 111. 1991); In re
Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 424, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
376 See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 379-80 (D. Del. 1990); In
re IGI Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 451, 461-62 (D.NJ. 1988); Weinberger v. Thornton, 114
F.R.D. 599, 606 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
377 See In re Bank of Boston Corp. Sec. Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1525, 1535 (D. Mass.
1991); In re VMS See. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 466, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Adair v. Sorenson,
134 F.R.D. 13, 20 (D. Mass. 1991); In re Boardwalk Marketplace See. Litig., 122 F.R.D.
4, 8 (D. Conn. 1988); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. SiIpp. 1449, 1458-64 (D.NJ. 1987).
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A few cases certify pendent state claims without a fraud-on-the-market
theory, citing misleading course of conduct language. 378 These cases are
inconsistent with General Telephone.379 The representative cannot prove
reliance under state law for the entire class, and the claims become subject to
proof deficiencies and settlement manipulation without protection for the rights
of absent state class members. 380
D. Breach of Contract
In breach of contract cases, federal courts have closely followed the
General Telephone3"' standard. Thus, "[i]f proof of the representatives' claims
would not necessarily prove all of the proposed class members' claims, the
representatives' claims are not typical of the proposed members' claims." 382
Applying this principle, the representative and the class must be complaining
under identical contracts383 and the same breaches of contract must be
averred. 384
378 See In re VMS Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. at 480; Adair, 134 F.R.D. at 20; In re
Boardwalk Markeqplace Sec. Litig., 112 F.R.D. at 8.
379 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
380 A court might address this problem by limiting the issues in the state class action to
elements other than reliance and damage. If the notice informs of deficiencies in
representation on certain issues, court directed notice and opportunity to appear or to
opt out may provide adequate protection.
381 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
382 Brooks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 133 F.R.D. 54, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(citing Am/Comm Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 101 F.R.D. 317, 321 (E.D.
Pa. 1984)).
383 Id. at 58; see also Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665 (D.
Kan. 1989) (allowing former employee to represent class including current employees in
fraud and breach of contract action against employer in computation of compensation);
Committee of Blind Vendors v. District of Columbia, 695 F. Supp. 1234 (D.D.C. 1988)
(allowing leaders of business association to represent class because claims based on statutory
and contract violations common to class); Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, Inc., 661 F. Supp.
1271, 1273-74 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (limiting class, excluding plaintiffs who had not signed
accord and satisfaction agreements altering health coverage during retirement); Perez v.
Government of Virgin Is., 109 F.R.D. 384, 387 (D.C.V.I. 1986) (holding no common
issues in which various policy holders and those with claims against holder sued government
concerning a collapsed insurance company).
384 See Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (D.NJ.
1989) (holding class allegations that defendant extorted confessions and payments lacked
commonality and typicality); Jeannides v. United States Home, 114 F.R.D. 29, 30 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (deeming breach of contract to construct home too individual and atypical to
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Because breach of contract claims are governed by state law, courts also
require that the claims of the representative and the class be governed by the
same law. "The absence of one uniform law applicable to all of the class
members' contractual claims will potentially result in as many separate
adjudications as there are states whose law governs the various members'
contractual claims." 385 Such differences in the law applicable to the class will
defeat certification.
X. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL TELEPHONE ON SPECIFIC CASES AND
DECISIONS
A. Civil Rights Employment Discrimination
The impact of General Telephone is substantial and clear in employment
discrimination cases. Across-the-board discrimination allegations are not
permitted. The representative must establish that the same specific injuries
suffered by the representative are also suffered by the class. 386
authorize class certification); Wucsina v. Reliance Elec. Co., 129 F.R.D. 164, 168-69
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding different dates of layoff precluded class treatment because each
required a separate interpretation of collective bargaining agreement and alleged breaches
thereo).
385 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D. 254, 266 (D. Del. 1983).
386 See Coon v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to certify single representative who alleged discrimination in promotion and, based
on bare allegations, attempted to certify an across-the-board discrimination case); Briggs v.
Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming decertification of two subclasses
(applicants and terminated employees) prior to ruling on merits due to a lack of motion to
certify and lack of representation); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1531-32 (11th Cir.
1985) (certifying a class of those adversely affected in advancement in case challenging
multicomponent promotion process of discrimination in post office); Adams v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 736 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to certify broad class in
employment discrimination case based on "mere existence" theory of class-wide harm);
Nelson v. United States Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 678-80 (11th Cir. 1983) (refusing to
certify without any proof of Rule 23 factors); Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 703 F.2d 853,
854-55 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to certify across-the-board class when plaintiff only alleged
discrimination in its widest sense); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(allowing journeymen to represent class that included those seeking promotion beyond
journeymen because typicality satisfied when similar employment practices applied to
related employment decisions); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 595 F. Supp. 557, 561 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (raising concern over ability of a white person with Jewish heritage to be adequate
representative for blacks allegedly discriminated against based on race); Minority Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend, 555 F. Supp. 921, 925 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (refusing to
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This showing must include injury to the representative and injury to the
class with a "sameness" or nexus between the representative and the class
injury. 387 A plaintiff whose individual claims are without substance cannot be a
representative. 388
Lack of claim identity may require a narrowing of the class389 or the
creation of subclasses, each with an appropriate representative.390 If each claim
is unique and individual, certification will not be granted. 391 Illustrative of
certify claims of proposed class because of vagueness and lack of injury to representatives);
Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 508, 509-10 (D. Or. 1982)
(allowing broad sex discrimination case to proceed only so far as a named representative
had suffered each injury alleged in the class); Jackson v. City of Belle Glade, 95 F.R.D.
384, 386 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (refusing to find typicality based merely on common racial
background absent proof of a harm typical to the representatives and class members).
387 See Chaffin v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 904 F.2d 1269, 1276 (8th Cir. 1990)
(denying certification where anecdotal and statistical evidence did not raise an inference of
class claims); Gonzalez v. Brady, 136 F.R.D. 329, 330-31 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding lack of
showing that others in class were discriminated against precluded class certification);
International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
AFL-CIO v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 136 F.R.D. 113, 120-25 (N.D. Tex. 1991);
Price v. Cannon Mills, 113 F.R.D. 66, 68 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (finding failure to show class
harmed in same way as plaintiff in sex discrimination action rendered claim atypical);
Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 106 F.R.D. 592, 594 (M.D. Ga.
1985) (holding class not certified because representative showed no nexus to the class);
Lawson v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 102 F.R.D. 783, 791-92 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (limiting
class to persons who experienced enumerated types of employment discrimination during
preceding five years).
Reverse discrimination suits also require identity of claims. See Majeske v. City of
Chicago, 740 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (requiring subclasses or, in the
alternative, limiting class to white officers to protect all interests involved before certifying
reverse discrimination case); Sperling v. Donovan, 104 F.R.D. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1984)
(denying certification of class of white employees in reverse discrimination case because
across-the-board racial allegations did not satisfy Rule 23 requirements).
388 See Trevino v. Holly Sugar Corp., 811 F.2d 896, 906 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
plaintiff whose individual claims were found groundless could not represent class).
389 See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1409
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (narrowing class in racial employment discrimination suit to exclude
challenge to job requirement of high school diploma because of named plaintiffs injured by
that requirement).
390 See Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 (8th Cir. 1982) (allowing use
of subclasses, each represented, to deal with multiclaim employment discrimination class
action).
391 See Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1986)
(tenure decisions turning on unique facts not typical to any one member of class); Grimes v.
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these principles are cases from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. In Holsey v.
Armour & Co., 3 92 the court restricted a class of office and management
employees to those in sales and supervisory positions because a wider class
"encompassed" jobs for which no representative or evidence was presented.3 93
Similarly, in Everitt v. City of Marshall,394 an employment discrimination case,
the court held that the plaintiff could not represent the class because the
plaintiff was not subject to discrimination in the same areas as the class. 395
The identity requirement normally means that the job status of the
representative and the class must be identical. 396 For example, those who were
hired cannot represent applicants who were not employed. 397
A representative who applied for and was denied promotion cannot
represent those who did not apply for promotion. 398 Thus, if the representative
Pitney Bowes Inc., 100 F.R.D. 265, 267-70 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (refusing to certify because
of individuality of claims and defenses).
392 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984).
393 Id. at 215-16.
394 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1983).
395 Id. at 210-11.
396 See Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 139 (lst Cir. 1985) (racial
discrimination in hiring action in which class limited to applicants or applicants for transfer
to same welding job as named plaintiff).
397 See Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 588-94 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding allegation
of bias in performance rating system insufficient to allow plaintiff to represent class that
included disappointed job applicants because they were not subjected to performance rating
system); Fleming v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 707 F.2d 829, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding
hired female plaintiff in sex discrimination case could not represent class that included
applicants for employment, transfer, and promotion because she had no claim in those
areas); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1983)
(declining to include applicants in class in Title VII case involving discrimination in
advancement and layoff procedures); Talley v. Leo J. Shapiro & Assocs., 713 F. Supp.
254, 257 (N.D. IM. 1989) (limiting employment discrimination claims by employees to
those actually hired and excluded applicants not actually employed); Calloway v.
Westinghouse EIec. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 663, 670-72 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (limiting class in
employment discrimination case to those current or future employees at facility, excluding
those who merely applied or would apply); cf. Rodriguez v. United States Dep't of
Treasury, 131 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1990) (declining to include discouraged applicants
because of their speculative existence caused class to fail on numerosity); Holden v.
Burlington N., Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1398, 1408 (D. Minn. 1987) (allowing expansion of
employment discrimination class action to include rejected applicants and approving
negotiated settlement agreement over objection of five named plaintiffs and others citing
cases); Ladele v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 95 F.R.D. 198, 200-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(rejecting certification of across-the-board class in employment discrimination action
because named plaintiff, a former employee, could not represent rejected applicants).
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was injured by denial of promotion, only class promotion claims will be
certified. 399 A discharged employee cannot represent those who were not
hired.4°° A representative applicant cannot represent those who did not
apply. 40 1 Further, employees in one location cannot sue as representatives of
employees of other locations, absent a showing of identity of policy,
decisionmaking, and claims. 402
398 See Mayfield v. Meese, 704 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1988) (declining to expand
class represented by plaintiff who did not apply for promotion to include those who applied
for promotion); Rosario v. Cook County, 101 F.R.D. 659 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding
representatives who alleged discrimination in promotion could not represent those deterred
from applying); Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45, 52-55 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (class disparate
impact claims based on FDIC examination used for advancement; limiting class to those
actually taking the exam and receiving unsatisfactory marks, not those "chilled" from taking
the examination); Warren v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 425, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding named representative in sex discrimination in employment case
could not represent class of those denied promotions because she never sought promotion).
399 See Roby v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 775 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming
decertification of broad employment discrimination class action as representatives did not
have claims sufficiently typical of those of the proposed class and claims regarding
promotion by those who failed examination not typical of those not promoted for violation
of company rules); Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 332-34 (4th Cir.
1983) (allowing class to include those discriminated against in promotion only after
intervention by named representatives who claimed to have been subject to such
discrimination); Evans v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 928-30 (11th
Cir. 1983) (refusing to certify proposed across-the-board class action but remanding for
consideration of numerosity of class limited to those adversely impacted by discrimination in
promotion); cf Wakefield v. Monsanto Co., 120 F.R.D. 112, 115-17 (E.D. Mo. 1988)
(limiting class to black nonexempt employees who received discriminatory treatment in pay
and promotion; court saw no conflict between present and former employees); Shafer v.
Commander, Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 667 F. Supp. 414, 432 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
(limiting class to promotion and job assignment claims and allowing broad challenge to
"mobility policy" because it had same effect on all female employees).
400 See O'Neal v. Riceland Foods, 684 F.2d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
allow discriminatorily discharged plaintiff to represent claims of discrimination in hiring
when evidence revealed representative had no claim).
401 See Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(limiting class to those who actually applied and were rejected because applicants were not
typical of those discouraged from applying).
402 See Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, 133 F.R.D. 82, 88-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (limiting




B. Biased Testing Procedure Decisions
Footnote fifteen of General Telephone4°3 illustrates how evidence of a
biased testing procedure supporting the representative's claim might establish
the class claim so as to meet the "fairly encompassed" standard, even when
different job categories are involved.4°4 In the Court's example, the
representative and class complain about the same act, defendant's use of a
written testing procedure, which is allegedly biased. 40 5 The representative is
motivated and has evidence to prove the biased testing procedure. The evidence
supports the claims of all members of a class who have been injured by the
same testing procedure although each class member must establish his or her
own damage. The self-interest of the representative, including motivation to
litigate, submit proof, or negotiate settlement, inures to the benefit of the
class. 406 This example is analogous to single act cases and is simply an
application of historical identity of claims principles. 407
C. General Policy/Subjective Decisionmaking Cases
After repeatedly stressing the requirement of same and encompassed claims
and explicitly rejecting across-the-board certification, the Supreme Court added
the following ambiguous language to footnote fifteen of General Telephone:408
Significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and
employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion
practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective
decisionmaling processes. In this regard it is noteworthy that Title VII
403 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
404 If petitioner used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both applicants for
employment and incumbent employees, a class action on behalf of every applicant or
employee who might have been prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). Id. at 159 n.15.
405 Id.
406 Id.
407 See Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1301, 1302-03 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (holding that varying factual circumstances among class members would not defeat
typicality if all complained of the discriminatory effect of employee performance appraisal
system); Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington, 109 F.R.D. 89, 91 (D.
Del. 1985) (finding typicality satisfied in reverse discrimination suit because all applicants
for promotion were subject to the same testing procedures).
408 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
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prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract policy of
discrimination. 409
This language will hereafter be referred to as the general policy exception.
Some commentators have interpreted the language as opening the back door to
across-the-board claims involving different acts, injuries, job categories, and
locations, so long as the representative alleges a general policy carried out by
subjective decisionmaking. 410
If the general policy exception is satisfied by mere allegation, any sweeping.
class action may be certified regardless of disparate acts, jobs, or injuries. Of
course, many, if not most, discrimination cases involve subjective
decisionmaking, and the accusation of a "general policy" of discrimination is
easy to make. However, the hundreds of cases cited denying certification based
on General Telephone establish that no such loose interpretation has been or
should be given to the general policy exception.
In 1986, the Second Circuit observed the strictness with which courts
follow General Telephone.411 This strict approach requires the following:
(1) Evidence, at the certification hearing, that there was one central policy
of discrimination. Therefore, evidence of a valid individual claim, a mere
averment, or a claimed presumption does not establish a general policy.
Evidence of general intent submitted by the class representative inures to
the benefit of the class and encompasses the class claim.
(2) The policy decisions must have been made by a single centralized
management. If policy decisions were decentralized or made by different
groups of people, the general policy exception does not apply.412
409 Id. at 159 n.15.
410 See Strickler, supra note 205, who concluded that the General Telephone decision
has not resulted in the demise of the broadly based class action. Id. at 137-41. Debra A.
Millenson, The Pract'cal Labor Lmvyer, 8 EMPL. REL. L.J. 526 (1983), suggests that
footnote 15 is the most significant part of General Telephone. Id. at 531.
411 Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 597 (2d Cir. 1986).
412 See Bradford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 673 F.2d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding class certification was improper without an evidentiary hearing in as much as each
Sears store established its own separately supervised operating procedures and personnel
policies); Rosenberg v. University of Cincinnati, 654 F. Supp. 774, 776-77 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (holding that, without centralized decisionmaking, university-wide sex discrimination
case was not certifiable).
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(3) The policy decisions were applied by subjective evaluation. If policy
decisions were made by established objective personnel procedures or
policies, including formal job descriptions, objective experience, education
requirements, or posting or listing of job openings, this requirement may
not be satisfied. A lack of uniform guidelines relating to hiring, placement,
pay, promotion, or discipline supports the establishment of this
requirement.413
A few cases have met the previously mentioned requirements. 414 Others
have directly415 or indirectly416 been found to lack one of the three
requirements, and certification was denied.
413 See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1198-99 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding reliance on general policy of discrimination exception was misplaced because
defendant relied on two "objective inputs" in making hiring decisions).
If there are job descriptions or qualification rules which are not job related and which
have a disparate impact on racial or sexual groups, the violation may be established by
statistical evidence without proof of intent and does not fall under the general policy cases.
414 See Rossini, 798 F.2d at 596-600 (finding typicality satisfied in sex discrimination
action because company used same subjective evaluation system for all members of the
class and decisions made by "same central group of people"); Meiresonne v. Marriott
Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622-23 (N.D. IM. 1989) (certifying claims of sexual discrimination
and pervasive sexual harassment in national class of management employees relying on
standard operating procedures as a general policy; the focus was on disparate impact and
statistical proof); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 122 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. Miss.
1988) (certifying class of those denied applications for employment because representatives
alleged systematic policy of refusing to give job applications to blacks); AFSCME v. Court
of Nassau, 664 F. Supp. 64, 67-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying class of female employees
alleging discrimination because they were employed in "traditional female jobs," and the
case involved one comprehensive plan not based on individual decisions in hiring and
promotion); Seizer v. Board of Educ., 112 F.R.D. 176, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding
typicality satisfied in action by female guidance counselors alleging sex discrimination in
selection for administrative and supervisory jobs because affidavits supported their claim
that they were discriminated against by the same central group of people applying the same
general policy); Ivy v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 108 F.R.D. 118, 122 (S.D. Miss.
1985) (finding typicality satisfied if one general policy of discrimination is established that is
manifested through an "entirely subjective decisionmaking process" with ultimate review by
the president and secretary-treasurer); Jordan v. Swindall, 105 F.R.D. 45, 47-48 (M.D.
Ala. 1985) (finding typicality in challenge to discriminatory treatment and impact in
advancement and training of police force based on a subjective evaluation process by same
persons involving sexual discrimination); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 103
F.R.D. 562, 567, 573-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (certifying class claiming discrimination in
favor of Japanese males); Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1440, 1443-46
(W.D.N.C. 1983) (certifying broad class of black employees in discrimination suit because,
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A strict application of the general policy exception does not violate the
identity of claims requirements. By showing that there was one general policy
of discrimination and that this policy was applied in all subjective
decisionmaking, the representative proves and fairly encompasses the class
claims. Therefore, the motivation, proof, and incentive to settle is the same
between the representative and the class.
D. Civil Rights (Other than Employment Discrimination)
The civil rights cases (other than employment discrimination) follow the
standard set by General Telephone.417 If the representative sets forth a claim
that fairly encompasses the class claims, certification will follow even if
individual damages differ. 418
For example, in Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Cor/s.,419 a
class challenge to an alleged discriminatory apartment rental policy was
although injuries were different, all were the result of "subjective" decisionmaking process
of "overwhelmingly white management/supervisory force" applying one general policy);
Johnson v. Montgomery County Sheriff's Dep't, 99 F.R.D. 562, 564-65 (M.D. Ala. 1983)
(allowing a class sex discrimination attack on behalf of applicants and employees because
the hiring, promotion, and transfer policies were interrelated by one general discriminatory
policy); Meyer v. Macmillan Publishing Co., 95 F.R.D. 411, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(allowing named plaintiffs complaining of sex discrimination in promotions to represent
class that included applicants because affidavits provided "significant proof [of]. . . a
general policy of discrimination which pervaded all personnel decisions"); Richardson v.
Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing female employee to represent
class that included job applicants because the same alleged discriminatory general policy
that restricted transfer opportunities limited hiring decisions); Carpenter v. Stephen F.
Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing hourly employees to
represent class that included salaried employees in race and sex discrimination action
because discrimination was based on university-wide "channeling policy" involving general
discrimination).
415 See Nation v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 85-88 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(refusing to certify an across-the-board race discrimination case absent significant proof that
the defendant operated under a general policy of discrimination).
416 See supra notes 328-367 and accompanying text.
417 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
418 See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Taylor v. White,
132 F.R.D. 636 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Ashe v. Board of Elections, 124 F.R.D. 45 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); Jane B. v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 117 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910 (D.N.J. 1986); Louis M. by Velma M. v. Ambach,
113 F.R.D. 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Tex. 1985);
Fischer v. Dallas Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 465 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
419 746 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
[Vol. 54:607
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
certified. 420 The General Telephone standard was satisfied because a showing
was made that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff using one
established policy that discriminated against minorities. 421 Conversely, some
courts have held that if the claims and acts differ between the representative and
the class, certification will be denied.422
XI. CONCLUSION
In 1982, General Telephone Co. v. Falcon42 restored the historic
requirement of identity of claims between a representative and a class. Because
of the amorphous language of amended Rule 23, a majority of federal courts
from 1966 to 1982 decided adequacy of representation (identity of claims) on
standards which were at odds with historic principles. Few of the incorrectly
decided cases during this period were corrected on appellate review or
collateral attack, which illustrates the pragmatic power and danger of
ambiguities within a civil rule. Amended Rule 23, as applied from 1966 to
1982, modified the substantive law of due process and identity of claims
despite the principle that a federal rule may not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right. 424
The historic cases establish that due process requires identity of claims.
The Supreme Court in General Telephone did not rely on due process but,
rather, reinterpreted the "merged" rule requirements of commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation. It was unnecessary to discuss
constitutional due process when rule reinterpretation led to the desired result.
Nevertheless, by failing to comment on due process, the Court has left unclear
future limits on Federal Rule 23 changes and has left uncertain the identity of
claims requirement on state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.
42 0 Id. at 305-06.
421 Id.
422 See Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 695 F. Supp. 1531
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Bennett v. Westfall, 640 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.W. Va. 1986)
(declining to certify former prisoner representing class of current jail inmates).
423 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
424 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (Supp. 1 1991).
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A. Common Course of Conduct: Derogations of the General Telephone
Precedent
In Grasty v. Amalgamated aothing and Textile Workers Union,425 the
court defined the typicality standard as follows: "Factual differences will not
render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is
based on the same legal theory." 426 Typicality was upheld contrary to General
Telephone, although the named plaintiffs did not share all of the claims of the
class.427
Essentially, same course of conduct is too broad a standard and has led to
various decisions at odds with the Supreme Court's insistence that the class
claims be encompassed within the representative's claims. If the representative
personally complains of some misrepresentations or acts causing harm, but did
not receive injury from other misrepresentations or acts which injured the class,
the self-interest, proof, and incentive to settle the individual representative's
claims does not inure to the benefit of the class even if all claims are part of a
common course of conduct. It is easy to allege and contend common course of
conduct. Every across-the-board employment discrimination case explicitly
rejected for certification by the Supreme Court qualifies for certification under
the common course of conduct standard. The majority of the hundreds of
decisions cited in this paper alleged a common course of conduct, yet
certification was denied or qualified as required by General Telephone. The
misleading language of "course of conduct" should not be cited to nor should
identity of claims be substituted.
B. Same Legal Theory
In De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.,428 the court declared that
"similarity of legal theory may control even in the face of difference of fact"429
and reached a holding contrary to General Telephone.430 This is simply not the
425 828 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1987).
426 Id. at 130 (quoting 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERO, NEWVBERG ON CLASS ACTIoNs § 3.15
at 168 (2d ed. 1985)).
427 Id. at 129-30; see also Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397,
1402-04 (D. Conn. 1988).
428 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983).
429 Id. at 232.
430 See also Tedesco v. Mishkin, 689 F. Supp. 1327, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stressing
that identical legal theories satisfy typicality).
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law. General Telephone and the cases applying it have rejected certification
although the same legal theory was involved.
C. Markedly Different Positions
Some courts have defined typicality by adopting a "markedly different
position" test. Wright, Miller, and Kane discussed this test as follows: "On the
other hand, Rule 23(a)(3) may have independent significance if it is used to
screen out class actions when the legal or factual position of the representatives
is markedly different from that of other members of the class even though
common issues of law or fact are raised." 431 Exactly when a position is
"markedly different" is left undefined and uncertain. The test refers to
positions, not claims. Under this standard, the representative with one claim
may represent unrelated class claims so long as the factual positions on the
unrelated claims are similar. However, the class is not thereby protected by the
self-interest of the representative claimant. General Telephone requires identity
of claims, not positions, so the markedly different position terminology should
no longer be used.
Indeed, in the light of this study, all cases defining typicality and adequacy
of representation between 1966 and 1982 are suspect and should be analyzed
under the General Telephone standard. Because some post-General Telephone
decisions have continued to employ overly broad language inconsistent with the
identity of claims requirement, the following is suggested to correct overbroad
certification:
(1) Findings of facts on adequacy of representation (identity of claims)
should be required in conjunction with all class certification.
(2) Such findings, when reviewed by appellate courts, should be subject to
an error of law standard, not an abuse of discretion standard, because
constitutional due process is at issue.432 Specific findings would also
facilitate collateral attack based on due process violations.
431 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 119, § 1764; see also Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
78 F.R.D. 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
432 Class certification is interlocutory and not subject to immediate review, but may
come before the appellate court in conjunction with collateral orders, preliminary
injunctions, or judgments following trial or settlement.
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(3) In a complex case, magistrates or masters should be appointed to
evaluate identity of claims and prepare the necessary findings for court
approval.
XlI. A POSTSCRIPT FOR PERSPECTIVE
With regard to the issue of representation (identity of claims) in
postcertification stages, it is important to note the following:
(1) The role of the named representatives has steadily and significantly
diminished; the representatives may not be consulted on settlement or trial
decisions and may be disregarded by the court if they object to a
settlement.433
(2) In pre-certification class settlements (negotiated by counsel) in which
certification is combined with settlement approval, adequacy of
representation (identity of claims) is largely ignored.434
(3) In both pre- and post-certification settlement hearings, notice of hearing
does not mention that adequacy of representation is a possible basis of
objection, and the issue of adequate representation is not explicitly
considered in conjunction with settlement approval.435 Even if objections
concerning adequacy are raised, discovery on the process of settlement
negotiation is not permitted436 and objections are seldom effective.437
433 See Walsh v. Great Ad. & Pae. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983); Laskey v.
UAW, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977).
434 See Clark Equip. Co. v. International Union Allied Indus. Workers, 803 F.2d 878
(6th Cir. 1986).
435 See Van Horn v. Triekey, 840 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Armored Car
Antitrust Litig., 472 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 645 F.2d
488 (5th Cir. 1981); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.
1975).
436 See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677,
683-84 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir.
1983).
437 See Walsh, 726 F.2d at 964-65; see also Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d




(4) In many instances, the specific plan of distribution is not disclosed in
conjunction with settlement approval, and, accordingly, preferences and
conflicts of interest are left undisclosed. 438
(5) Appellate review of class settlement is by an abuse of discretion
standard, even as to challenges of lack of due process. 439
(6) The binding effect of class settlement continues to expand and includes
claims which were or should have been litigated. 44
Thus, before celebrating the enhanced protection of class members
resulting from General Telephone, the legal community should consider the
weakening of protection for absent members in the postcertification stages and
particularly in settlement processes.
438 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435
(9th Cir. 1987); Huquley v. General Motors Corp., 128 F.R.D. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
aft'd, 925 F.2d 1464 (6th Cir. 1991).
439 See generally In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145; In re
Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435; In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
730 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1981).
440 See Laskey v. UAW, 638 F.2d 954, 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding objectors who
failed to appeal settlement were "collaterally estopped" from subsequent attack); see also
Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1499 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
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